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Summary 
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Summary 
The domestic support payments provided to agricultural producers are frequently the subject of 
heated debate because they distort industry and trade structures causing efficiency losses and 
welfare redistribution. In recent years, high-income countries have initiated several reforms of 
their agricultural policies to decrease such distortions. These reforms are partly enforced by the 
requirements to reduce distorting domestic support, as agreed upon by the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO). A prominent example of such a heavily criticized policy is the agricultural sup-
port of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). In 2005, the EU 
introduced the Single Farm Payment (SFP), which is supposedly decoupled from production, 
to decrease the production stimulating effects of its CAP, and thus to reduce the distortions 
caused by the domestic support payments. However, these policy instruments are also contro-
versial because the extent to which decoupled payments, such as the SFP, distort trade is still 
unclear. Domestic support provided to agricultural producers comprises a multitude of different 
and country-specific agricultural policy instruments, which makes it difficult to analyze the 
corresponding effects on domestic and third countries’ industry structure, trade, and welfare. 
The most common approach for evaluating the impacts from alternative policy options is based 
on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Nevertheless, the attention to detail re-
garding the complex structure and country specific properties of domestic support, and in par-
ticular the SFP, in such models has been largely neglected.  
Against this backdrop, this cumulative thesis analyzes the effects of domestic support pay-
ments on industry output, international trade and welfare, with a particular focus on the impact 
of varying assumptions of the SFP’s degree of decoupling in CGE modeling. In addition, this 
thesis introduces a new index to measure the degree to which agricultural domestic support 
distorts international trade.  
The first article develops an extended version of the standard Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) modeling framework. This extended framework enables a much more detailed repre-
sentation of domestic support payments based on the OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) 
database and considering the requirements regarding production that trigger the eligibility for 
specific subsidies. Applying a complex updating procedure, using the EU CAP as an example, 
a set of 21 databases accounting for various assumptions about the SFP’s degree of coupling to 
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output levels is created. These databases are then used to investigate the extent to which various 
assumptions of the SFP’s degree of decoupling and the corresponding modeling cause differ-
ences in results when a 100% removal of the SFP is simulated. The analysis shows that the 
allocation of the SFP can have strong impacts on factor allocation and thus industry output, 
market prices, trade structure and welfare in EU member states. Furthermore, it reveals, that 
the current way in which the SFP is modeled in the standard GTAP model and database repre-
sents a partial decoupling and still stimulates production to a large extent. 
The second article adapts the extended GTAP modeling framework developed in the first 
article to examine the extent to which the SFP, depending on its degree of decoupling and mod-
eling, contributes to the effect of removing EU domestic support payments on international 
trade and welfare. The results show significant variations due to alterations in the assumptions 
underlying the SFP’s degree of decoupling. Therefore, this paper clearly highlights the rele-
vance of considering the degree of decoupling in international trade analysis. Nevertheless, the 
application of such a framework enables neither the evaluation of the trade distorting effect of 
domestic support over time nor a cross-country comparison.  
These aspects are picked up by the third article, which evaluates the trade-distorting effects 
of domestic support payments using the EU CAP as an example. The third article develops a 
theoretically sound index based on the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) that 
measures the overall trade effects of domestic support in a general equilibrium framework. The 
new index named “MTRI of domestic support payments” (MTRI-DS) enables the measurement 
of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments over time and across countries. The 
results obtained by employing the extended GTAP framework to determine the uniform tariff 
equivalent of EU domestic support payments clearly indicate a decrease in trade distortion 
caused by the implementation of decoupled support in the EU. The MTRI-DS provides an ap-
pealing measure for evaluating the effects of agricultural policy reforms by summarizing the 
changes in the composition of domestic support payments, and thus, it might be of particular 
use in the support of trade negotiations. 
The centerpiece of this thesis, resulting from the three included articles, is a comprehensive 
modeling framework to analyze the effects of domestic support payments that is generally ap-
plicable. Important features are the very detailed representation of domestic support payments, 
the consideration of various assumptions about decoupled payments, and the integration of the 
MTRI-DS to evaluate and compare trade distortions. The empirical analyses, conducted using 
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the EU CAP as an example, clearly show significant effects caused by alterations of the as-
sumptions regarding the SFP’s degree of decoupling. The results confirm the necessity of this 
type of detailed setting to depict the impact of multifaceted agricultural policies covering a 
variety of different policy instruments on the efficiency of domestic industries, and international 
trade and welfare. 
The introduced approach will facilitate future research. While high-income countries, such 
as those in the EU, have continuously reduced the production incentives of their agricultural 
policies, domestic support, with its trade-distorting side effects is on the rise in many emerging 
countries, such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa; these countries have just started to 
expand their domestic support programs and are far from exceeding their WTO commitments. 
Based on the wide-spread use of the PSE concept to measure domestic support, the approach 
presented in this thesis is very general and hence can easily be extended to other countries. 
Therefore, the outcome of this thesis might offer an interesting and effective tool for analyzing 
various research questions concerning countries’ reforms or new implementations of agricul-
tural policy instruments. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Subventionen im Agrarsektor werden aufgrund ihrer handelsverzerrenden Wirkung, von 
entstehenden Effizienzverlusten, sowie ihrer wohlfahrtsumverteilenden Wirkung stark 
kritisiert. Mit dem Ziel diese Verzerrungen zu reduzieren und somit die Bedingungen der 
Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) zu erfüllen, reformierten Industrieländer ihre Agrarpolitik in 
den vergangenen Jahren zum Teil mehrfach. Die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (GAP) der 
Europäischen Union (EU) ist eine der oft kritisierten Subventionspolitiken. Im Jahr 2005 führte 
die EU mit der so genannten Betriebsprämie entkoppelte Direktzahlungen ein, die Landwirten 
unabhängig von der Produktion gewährt werden, und reduziert somit die handelsverzerrende 
Wirkung der eingesetzten Subventionen. Aber auch diese neuen Politikinstrumente sind 
umstritten, da das Ausmaß, in dem entkoppelte Direktzahlungen wie die Betriebsprämie 
dennoch die Produktion beeinflussen, nicht erwiesen ist. Die inländische Stützung umfasst eine 
Vielzahl verschiedener und insbesondere länderspezifischer Agrarpolitikinstrumente, die die 
Analyse ihrer Auswirkungen auf Industriestruktur, Handel, und Wohlfahrt sowohl auf der 
nationalen als auch auf der globalen Ebene erschweren.  
Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle zählen zu den häufig zur Politikfolgenabschätzung 
verwendeten Analysemethoden. Diese Modelle schenken jedoch der komplexen Struktur und 
den länderspezifischen Eigenschaften dieser Politikinstrumente bislang wenig Beachtung. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund beleuchtet die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation die 
Auswirkungen der Politikinstrumente der inländischen Stützung auf die landwirtschaftliche 
Produktion, den internationalen Agrarhandel sowie die Wohlfahrt. Der Einfluss 
unterschiedlicher Annahmen über den Grad der Entkopplung der Betriebsprämie und ihrer 
Modellierung in Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen findet hierbei besondere Beachtung. 
Darüber hinaus stellt die vorliegende Arbeit einen Index vor, der den Grad, zu dem die 
inländische Stützung zur Handelsverzerrung beiträgt, misst. 
Der erste Artikel entwickelt eine erweiterte Version des Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) Modells und der zugrunde liegenden Datenbasis. Dieser erweiterte 
Modellierungsrahmen ermöglicht eine im Vergleich zu bisher angewendeten Modellen viel 
detailliertere Repräsentation der Subventionszahlungen an Landwirte basierend auf der OECD 
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Producer Support Estimate (PSE) Datenbank. Zusätzlich berücksichtigt dieser Ansatz die 
unterschiedlichen Anforderungen, mit denen Direktzahlungen an die Produktion von 
landwirtschaftlichen Produkten gebunden bzw. von der Produktion entkoppelt sind, die die 
Grundlage der Förderfähigkeit bilden. Am Beispiel der EU GAP werden unter Anwendung 
eines komplexen Aktualisierungsverfahrens 21 Datenbasen generiert, die die verschiedenen 
Annahmen über den Entkopplungsgrad der Betriebsprämie von Produktionsentscheidungen 
widerspiegeln. Diese Datenbasen dienen als Ausgangspunkt, um die Effekte der Abschaffung 
der Betriebsprämie zu simulieren. Dieser Analyseaufbau untersucht, in welchem Ausmaß sich 
unterschiedliche Annahmen über den Entkopplungsgrad der Betriebsprämie und deren 
Modellierung auf die Simulationsergebnisse auswirken. Die Analyse bestätigt einen großen 
Einfluss der Verteilung der Betriebsprämie auf die Faktorallokation und damit auf Produktion, 
Marktpreise, Handelsstruktur und Wohlfahrt in den EU Mitgliedsstaaten. Des Weiteren zeigt 
die Analyse, dass die derzeitige Abbildung der Betriebsprämie im ursprünglichen GTAP 
Modell und der Datenbasis einer partiellen Entkopplung entspricht und somit deutliche 
Produktionsanreize schafft. 
Der zweite Artikel verwendet diesen erweiterten GTAP Modellierungsrahmen und passt 
diesen an die folgende Fragestellung an. Wie stark beeinflussen verschiedene Annahmen über 
den Entkopplungsgrad der Betriebsprämie und deren Modellierung die Effekte der 
Abschaffung der EU Agrarsubventionen auf den internationalen Handel und die Wohlfahrt? 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen erhebliche Unterschiede auf, die auf die Modifizierung des 
Entkopplungsgrades zurückzuführen sind. Die Relevanz der Berücksichtigung des 
Entkopplungsgrades in der Politikfolgenabschätzung wird durch diese Ergebnisse deutlich 
hervorgehoben. 
Dessen ungeachtet ermöglicht die Anwendung eines auf diese Weise erweiterten 
Modellierungsrahmens weder eine Evaluierung der Entwicklung der durch die inländische 
Stützung verursachten Handelsverzerrung im Zeitablauf noch einen Ländervergleich. 
Diese Aspekte greift der dritte Artikel auf. In diesem Artikel wird, ebenfalls am Beispiel der 
EU GAP, die handelsverzerrende Wirkung der Agrarsubventionen untersucht. Hierfür wird ein 
theoretisch fundierter Index, der auf dem Merkantilistischen Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(MTRI) basiert, weiterentwickelt, um den Gesamteffekt der inländischen Stützung auf den 
Handel in einem Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell zu messen. Dieser Index, genannt MTRI 
der inländischen Stützung (MTRI-DS), ermöglicht die Bewertung der Handelshemmnisse 
aufgrund von Subventionszahlungen im Zeitablauf und im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern. Das 
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um den MTRI-DS erweiterte GTAP Modell wird verwendet, um das Zolläquivalent der 
inländischen Stützung zu bestimmen. Dieses Zolläquivalent bestätigt, dass die Einführung der 
entkoppelten Direktzahlungen in der EU die handelsverzerrende Wirkung der inländischen 
Stützung reduziert. Der MTRI-DS erweist sich somit als eine geeignete Maßzahl zur 
Politikfolgenabschätzung, da dieser Index Änderungen in der Zusammensetzung von 
Politikinstrumenten abbildet. Auf diese Weise empfiehlt sich der MTRI-DS als ein nützliches 
Instrument zur Unterstützung von Verhandlungen über den internationalen Handel. 
Die Modellerweiterungen der drei eingebundenen Artikel bilden das Herzstück dieser 
Arbeit. Dieser umfassende Modellierungsrahmen zur Analyse der inländischen Stützung ist 
generell anwendbar und somit auf andere Länder übertragbar. Wichtige Bestandteile sind die 
detaillierte Abbildung der inländischen Stützung, die Berücksichtigung verschiedener 
Annahmen über den Entkopplungsgrad von Subventionszahlungen und deren Modellierung, 
sowie die Entwicklung und Einbindung des MTRI-DS zur Messung und Evaluierung der 
Handelsverzerrung. Die empirische Analyse wird exemplarisch für die EU GAP durchgeführt. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, bedingt durch Änderungen der Annahmen über den Entkopplungsgrad, 
signifikante Effekte. Demzufolge bestätigen die Ergebnisse die Notwendigkeit einer so 
detaillierten Methode, um die Auswirkungen vielfältiger Agrarpolitiken, bestehend aus einer 
Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Politikinstrumente, wie beispielsweise die EU GAP, auf 
Produktionssektoren, den internationalen Agrarhandel und die Wohlfahrt, abbilden zu können.  
Der vorgestellte Ansatz bietet darüber hinaus Anknüpfungspunkte für weitere Forschung. 
Während einkommensstarke Länder, wie die Mitgliedsstaaten der EU, fortlaufend die 
Produktionsanreize ihrer Subventionsinstrumente reduzieren, steigt der Einsatz von 
Agrarsubventionen in vielen Schwellenländern, wie beispielsweise Brasilien, Indien, China und 
Südafrika. Diese Länder haben gerade erst damit begonnen, den Einsatz von Agrarsubventionen 
auszuweiten, und haben ihre Möglichkeiten im Rahmen der WTO Vereinbarungen noch nicht 
ausgeschöpft. Da das in dieser Arbeit verwendete PSE Konzept weitverbreitet zur Analyse der 
inländischen Stützung eingesetzt wird, lässt sich der in dieser Arbeit vorgestellte generelle 
Ansatz problemlos auf andere Länder übertragen und anwenden. 
Zusammenfassung 
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Das Ergebnis dieser Dissertation bietet daher eine interessante und nützliche Methode zur 
Analyse verschiedener Fragestellungen mit Bezug auf länderspezifische Reformen von 
Agrarpolitiken oder Neuimplementierungen von Politikinstrumenten.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and objective 
Domestic support provided to agricultural producers stimulates agricultural production, distorts 
countries’ industry and trade structure, causes the redistribution of welfare and thus creates 
efficiency losses. These efficiency losses arise, e.g., from subsidy-induced factor reallocation 
and changes in the production structure favoring products that otherwise would not have been 
competitive or from preventing non-competitive farmers from exiting the business. Increased 
agricultural output lowers domestic market prices, increases exports and depresses world mar-
ket prices. In addition, the introduction of export subsidies, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
to raise domestic prices, add to this distortion. However, domestic support affects third coun-
tries differently. Net exporters of agricultural and food products suffer from lower world market 
prices, whereas net importers gain. 
This discussion about the trade-distorting effects caused by domestic support provided to 
agricultural producers gained momentum with the start of the Uruguay Round negotiations of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since the Uruguay Round, domestic support reduction 
criteria have been negotiated among WTO member states in the same line as market access and 
export subsidies to move towards multilateral trade liberalization. Industrialized economies 
such as the European Union (EU) initiated several reforms of their agricultural policies to meet 
domestic support reduction commitments enforced by the WTO. The total amount of agricul-
tural support utilized in high-income countries has not significantly decreased. However, an 
evaluation of the changes in countries’ domestic support instruments reveals that the composi-
tion of domestic support in high-income countries has changed from highly distortive policy 
instruments, such as market price support, towards policy instruments that create fewer incen-
tives to produce. Therefore, the trade-distortive effect of domestic support in high-income coun-
tries has presumably decreased. Nevertheless, the effect of policy instruments that are suppos-
edly decoupled from farm-level output decisions and thus should not create production incen-
tives is still controversial and debated. The extent to which decoupled payments stimulate pro-
duction caused by other coupling channels such as imperfect credit markets, risk behavior, and 
farmers’ decisions about farm exit or off-farm labor remains unclear. 
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By contrast, emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, that exhibit 
a considerably higher agricultural export share than industrialized economies have just started 
to expand their domestic support programs and are still far from exceeding their WTO commit-
ments. Furthermore, these countries benefit from the so-called “special treatment” of develop-
ing countries, which provides them with a certain scope on the level and type of agricultural 
support subject to WTO criteria. Currently, these countries predominantly use highly distortive 
policy instruments, such as market price support. This development emphasizes that domestic 
support provided to agricultural producers will continue to be a topic in negotiations.  
But how significant are the effects caused by domestic support payments on factor alloca-
tion, industry and trade structure, and welfare on the national and global level? How trade-
distortive, and thus important for multilateral trade liberalization are domestic support pay-
ments? How successful are the policy reforms introduced to reduce such distortions and to what 
extent do they decrease trade distortions on the national and global level? 
Trade policy instruments, and in particular their distortive properties, are a common topic in 
the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling community, and thus the methodology 
is rather mature in this area. The literature provides thorough analyses of the effects of multi-
lateral trade liberalization policies, including the impacts of market access, export subsidies and 
domestic support. Market access policy analysis and related methods to calculate the required 
detailed tariff cuts are well established.  
Domestic support is based on a multitude of different and country-specific agricultural pol-
icy instruments, which complicates the assessment of the corresponding trade and welfare im-
pacts. Agricultural producers receive domestic support either as market price support; as budg-
etary transfers given on the basis of output, input and production factor usage; or as decoupled 
support in the form of direct income transfers to farm households conditional on land entitle-
ments. In addition, these subsidies are granted to agricultural producers subject to specific pro-
duction requirements, which regulate the eligibility for support. In contrast to market access 
analyses, the attention to detail regarding the complex structure and country-specific properties 
of domestic support, and in particular decoupled payments, has received little attention and has 
been largely neglected in CGE models.  
These neglected details are the focus of this thesis. According to these deficiencies, the meth-
odological objectives are first, the development of a general CGE modeling framework that is 
1 Introduction 
3 
extended to cover a detailed representation of domestic support payments. Second, the intro-
duction of an updating procedure that alters the underlying database and enables the analysis of 
the effects of different assumptions regarding the production incentives induced particularly by 
decoupled payments. Third, the derivation of a theoretically sound index and its integration into 
a CGE model that facilitates the measurement of trade distortions across policy instruments, 
across regions, and over time.  
The standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database, which are widely 
applied in international trade analysis, are used as the point of departure. This thesis further 
develops the standard GTAP model into a framework that can be applied not only to analyze 
the effects of detailed domestic support payments on countries’ industry and trade structure and 
welfare but also to evaluate the level of trade distortion caused by such payments.  
By applying this extended GTAP modeling framework, the empirical objective of this thesis 
is to analyze the effects and distortions caused by domestic support payments on the national 
and global levels. Particular emphasis lies on the effect of different assumptions regarding a 
subsidy payment’s degree of decoupling and its modeling. The thesis aims to provide an elab-
orate analysis of domestic support and, in particular, decoupled support that can be used to 
validate the results obtained in international trade analysis in the absence of true estimators of 
the degree of decoupling. Therefore, this thesis examines the following empirical research ques-
tions: 
1. To what extent are factor allocation, industry output, trade, and welfare affected by var-
ious assumptions about a payment’s degree of decoupling and its modeling on a national 
level? 
2. What are the effects of removing countries’ domestic support payments on third coun-
tries, particularly developing countries? Do different assumptions about a subsidy pay-
ment’s degree of decoupling and its modeling affect other countries trade structure and 
welfare? 
3. How trade-restrictive is agricultural domestic support for international trade? Has the 
introduction of decoupled support decreased the magnitude of this effect? 
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1.2 Organization of the thesis: Structure and classification 
This cumulative thesis includes three chapters that contribute to the objectives emphasized in 
the previous section. Table 1 provides an overview regarding the title of the chapters, contrib-
uting authors, and journals that the chapters are published in or submitted to.  
In regard to the thesis’ objectives, the chapters can be classified according to their method-
ological and empirical objectives. Figure 1, provides further information regarding chapter ob-
jectives and foci, assumptions, data sets utilized and simulation experiments and thus helps to 
distinguish each chapter’s contribution. In addition, this graphical overview of the thesis illus-
trates how the chapters are connected with each other. 
Table 1: Overview of contributed articles 
Chapter Authors Title Journal 
2 
K. Urban,          
H. G. Jensen,    
M. Brockmeier 
Extending the GTAP database and 
model to cover domestic support 
issues using the EU as example 
GTAP Technical Paper 
Series No. 35 
3 
K. Urban,          
H. G. Jensen,     
M. Brockmeier 
How decoupled is the Single 
Farm Payment and does it matter 
for international trade? 
Food Policy, Vol. 59, p. 
126-138 
4 
K. Urban,         
M. Brockmeier, 
H. G. Jensen 
Measuring the Trade Restrictive-
ness of domestic support using the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy 
as an example 
American Journal of Ag-
ricultural Economics 
(submitted November 
2014) 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Chapter 2 introduces a comprehensive extension of the standard GTAP framework and 
therefore has been published in the GTAP Technical Paper Series. This chapter provides an 
overview covering the theoretical principles of decoupling and discusses the importance of 
other coupling channels on the degree of decoupling. Next, the chapter compares how other 
CGE and partial equilibrium (PE) models consider decoupled payments emphasizing signifi-
cant differences in the assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling and the modeling of 
decoupled payments. This comparison highlights the importance of analyzing the effects on 
policy simulation results caused by those differences, which to the authors’ knowledge is not 
yet available. 
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This chapter can be subdivided into methodological and empirical contributions. The meth-
odological contribution presents the extended version of the standard GTAP model and data-
base, which captures a much more detailed representation of domestic support payments con-
sidering not only different types of policies but also eligibility criteria such as different produc-
tion output level requirements. In addition, it describes the general, complex updating procedure 
that enables the systematically modification of assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling 
for domestic support payments underlying the GTAP database and model. This extended GTAP 
modeling framework and the updating mechanism serve as a starting point for the analyses 
conducted in chapters 3 and 4.  
Using the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as an example, the empirical contribution 
of chapter 2 is to investigate the extent to which different assumptions regarding the SFP’s 
degree of decoupling and its modeling cause differences in policy simulation results. The EU 
serves as an exceptional example because it is well-known for its multifaceted and complex 
agricultural policy, and this policy has been subjected to a considerable number of reforms. In 
1992, the EU initiated the first conspicuous reform to herald the start of decoupling agricultural 
support from production output levels. Several major reforms followed in the subsequent years. 
With the implementation of the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in 2005, the EU introduced a policy 
instrument that is supposedly fully decoupled from farm-level output decisions. 
Because the particular emphasis in this chapter lies on the discussion regarding the decou-
pling of direct payments from production requirements and its relevance to the underlying as-
sumptions and modeling in CGE analyses, the EU is a prime example to test the sensitivity of 
models regarding such assumptions about different subsidy types. In addition, the EU’s exten-
sive reform history facilitates a thorough examination of whether the improved modeling of 
domestic support has the ability to depict such changes; this examination is investigated in 
chapter 4. 
Applying the complex updating procedure, a set of 21 databases considering various as-
sumptions about the SFP’s degree of coupling to output levels is created. This set of databases 
is then used to analyze the effects of a complete removal of the SFP on factor allocation and 
thus on industry output, market prices, trade structure and welfare in the EU at member state 
level, accounting for primary agricultural commodities at the most disaggregated level.  
The effects on industry and trade structure, and welfare, from domestic support payments on 
a global level are well established, as mentioned in the motivation. However, to the author’s 
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knowledge it has not yet been assessed how much different payment types and eligibility crite-
ria contribute to these effects. The second chapter addresses this open question by analyzing 
and evaluating the extent to which differences in assumptions about the degree of decoupling 
of a support instrument and the corresponding modeling affect any changes in countries’ indus-
try and trade structure and welfare redistribution. Applying the extended GTAP modeling 
framework introduced in chapter 2 and again using the EU CAP as an example, chapter 3 adds 
to the picture of the effects of EU domestic support.   
Nonetheless, even the most detailed modeling of domestic support payments to evaluate ef-
fects on industry and trade structure and welfare redistribution cannot assess how trade-dis-
torting these subsidies are. For this purpose, chapter 4 aims to complete the modeling frame-
work and empirical analysis of the two previous chapters by measuring the trade restrictiveness 
of domestic support. This chapter provides a literature review of several articles developing 
theory-based aggregation procedures to overcome aggregation problems arising from the dif-
ferent types and variations of policies across sectors and regions. The two most influential ap-
proaches are the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (MTRI). In addition, the review finds a substantial number of empirical applications of 
the TRI and MTRI for tariff analysis applying PE and CGE models, whereas literature on the 
development of an index that measures the restrictiveness, and hence the distortion, of domestic 
support and its applications remains scarce. Chapter 4 tackles this issue by introducing the con-
cept of the “MTRI of domestic support payments” and its integration into the extended GTAP 
modeling framework developed in chapter 2. This index measures the overall effects of differ-
ent policy instruments in a single number and thus enables the evaluation of trade policies 
across policy instruments, sectors, regions, and in particular, over time. The application of the 
updating procedure introduced in chapter 2 is applied to create of a set of databases accounting 
for EU domestic support data for the years 2004 and 2007 as well as for different degrees of 
decoupling. In contrast to chapters 2 and 3, this chapter analyzes not only the effects of remov-
ing domestic support payments but also the elimination of tariffs and export subsidies.  
The final chapter concludes with a discussion and synthesis of the three main chapters, and 
highlights scope for future research.   
1 Introduction 
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Figure 1. Classification of included chapters 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Abstract 
The EU Single Farm Payment (SFP)2 is currently distributed in proportion to primary 
factor shares in version 8 of the GTAP database. In this paper, we investigate whether this 
way of modeling the EU SFP makes a difference in analyzing agricultural policy reforms. To 
do so, we create alternative versions of the GTAP database to compare the effects with the 
default setting in GTAP. Employing OECD data, along with the GTAP framework, we vary 
the assumptions about the allocation of the SFP. In the process, we demonstrate how to alter 
and update the GTAP database to implement domestic support of OECD PSE tables. We 
provide a detailed overview supplemented with assumptions of payment allocation, shock 
calculations and in particular, the Altertax procedure to update value flows and price 
equations extended in the GTAP model. Subsequently, we illustrate the impact of those 
assumptions by simulating a 100% removal of the SFP using the deviating versions of GTAP 
database. This sensitivity analysis reveals strong differences in results, but particularly in 
production responses of food and agricultural sectors that decrease with an increasing degree 
of decoupling. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the effect on welfare and the trade 
balance decrease with an increasing degree of decoupling. This experiment shows that the 
allocation of the SFP can have strong impact on simulation results. 
 
Keywords: GTAP, CGE modeling and database, domestic support, EU Common Agricultural 
Policy, Single Farm Payment.  
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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has introduced the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in its 2003 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the objective to provide basic income 
support to farmers without a linkage between subsidies and any specific production. Hence, 
those payments are decoupled from production. The extent to which the SFP is non-distorting 
of production is still a topic of debate. Even if the payments are decoupled from farm level 
output decisions, they can create incentives to produce via other channels. The SFP e.g., may 
not directly lead to an increase in production, but may influence a farmer’s decision about 
farm exit or off-farm labor. In any case, it has an effect on the readiness of farmers to accept 
risks and stay in business. Herewith, the EU has added one more policy instrument to the 
already complicated mix of measures utilized to establish domestic support.  
Previously, domestic support issues have only received minor attention within the 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling community. The main reason for this is the 
difference in national domestic support programs, which can vary widely between countries. 
Hence, a resource intense country-specific coverage of domestic support in the model’s 
database and a corresponding country-specific modeling of domestic support issues would be 
required. It is of importance to represent the SFP as correctly as possible in the database when 
running trade policy simulations to account for its decoupled character. One model often used 
for this purpose is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. Domestic support is 
incorporated into the GTAP database in form of price wedges. The underlying data is taken 
from the OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE) tables. 
Focal point of our analysis is to show how domestic support and particularly the SFP can 
be updated in the GTAP database using the EU as an example. This approach yields an 
updated version of the GTAP database covering domestic support payments in a more 
detailed manner through accounting for product specific support, all commodity and group 
specific support as well as the SFP payment. Beyond this, we present a tool that can be used 
to adjust the degree of decoupling of the SFP easily to enable GTAP users to alter the 
database according to their assumptions on the decoupled character of the SFP. In order to 
depict the effects of the SFP, we create a set of GTAP databases by altering the assumptions 
made in GTAP for the implementation of the EU SFP. Conducting a complete elimination of 
the SFP, we present a sensitivity analysis that reveals the impact of the assumptions regarding 
the SFP on models results exemplary done for the EU. The results clearly mirror the impacts 
of deviating degrees of decoupling. A SFP allocated with a homogeneous rate across sectors 
solely to the factor land creates no production incentives, does not lead to welfare effects, and 
generates only very small changes in the trade balance mainly driven by the non-agricultural 
sectors. 
Altogether, we provide thorough information on the extension of the GTAP model and 
database to capture domestic support and the SFP by describing in detail the implementation 
procedure to update domestic support in the GTAP database and allow variations in the 
distribution of the SFP. This method can easily be adjusted and applied to other countries 
subject to the availability of PSE data. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with the classification and the 
concept of measurement of domestic support and, in particular, discuss the issue of the term 
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decoupling. For this purpose, we summarize the main findings in the literature on coupling 
channels, give an overview on how other modelers deal with decoupled payments, and 
highlight some empirical results regarding the SFP in the EU. The extension of the GTAP 
model to capture domestic support is introduced in Section 3. After that, we demonstrate how 
to manipulate the GTAP database to represent the OECD PSE data, followed by the 
illustration of our experiment design. The technical update procedure is explained in Section 
5. Utilizing a sensitivity analysis, we furthermore show in Section 6 why it matters to 
implement domestic support and the SFP correctly. A final section concludes. 
2 Domestic support 
2.1 Classification of domestic support and concepts of measurement 
Different measures are developed to quantify domestic support. The OECD has developed 
a set of indicators, including the PSE, to monitor and evaluate agricultural support provided 
through a wide variety of policy measures. The target of the OECD is to establish a common 
base for policy dialog among countries regarding effectiveness and efficiency of policy 
reforms. The PSE is defined as “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers 
and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm 
production or income”(OECD, 2010, p. 17). 
According to the definition of the PSE, a policy measure will be included in the estimation 
of agricultural support, if either it provides a transfer whose incidence is at the farm level or it 
is directed specifically to agricultural producers, or it treats agricultural producers differently 
from other economic agents in the economy. The transfer to agricultural producers can be 
granted using different ways, e.g., an increased output price (market price support), a reduced 
input price or cost share for fixed capital or a direct payment (budgetary transfers). Market 
prices support covers transfers to agricultural producers generated by policy instruments that 
induce a gap between domestic market price and the border price of a specific product and 
therefore sustain the domestic prices at a higher level. While the term budgetary transfers 
covers policy instruments given to agricultural producers based on e.g., criteria as the output 
quantity, the amount of inputs used, the number of livestock, the area farmed or the received 
income. 
Budgetary transfers are currently classified by the OECD database in the following 
categories (OECD, 2010): 
A2 Payments based on output 
B Payments based on input use 
C Payments based on current Area / Animal Number / Receipts / Income, where 
production is required 
D Payments based on non-current Area / Animal Number / Receipts / Income, where 
production is required 
E Payments based on non-current Area / Animal Number / Receipts / Income, where 
production is not required 
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F Payments based on non-commodity criteria 
G Miscellaneous 
The PSE categories of support are specified into four groups of support given to primary 
agricultural production in a country (OECD, 2010 p. 18): 
 Activity-specific payments / single commodity transfer (SCT): Payments given to 
specific primary agricultural commodities, arising from policies linked to the 
production of a single commodity such that the producer must produce the commodity 
in order to receive the transfer. 
 Group-specific payments / group commodity transfer (GCT): Payments given to a 
group of primary agricultural commodities, arising from policies whose payments are 
made on the basis that one or more of a designated list of commodities is produced, 
e.g., a producer may produce from a set of allowable commodities and receive a 
transfer that does not vary with respect to this decision. 
 Activity-generic payments / all commodity transfer (ACT): Payments given to all 
primary agricultural commodities, arising from policies that place no restrictions on 
the commodity produced, but require the recipient to produce some commodity of 
their choice.  
 Other transfer to producers (OTP/SFP)3: Payments given to all primary agricultural 
commodities, arising from policies that do not require any commodity production at 
all (OECD, 2010). 
Another classification system for domestic support is developed by the WTO. Domestic 
support discussed in the WTO negotiations refers to the annual level of support in monetary 
terms provided to agricultural production. The Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations 
incorporated the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which embodies the Aggregated 
Measurement of Support (AMS) as a key concept and the box classification scheme that 
group domestic support payments into amber, blue and green boxes according to the trade-
distortive effect. The Doha WTO negotiations further specified domestic support by 
introducing the new measure of Overall Trade Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS). It 
comprises amber box support plus blue box support plus de minimis payments and is bound 
by a commitment.  
Data from the yearly EU’s financial reports are used officially to calculate both the PSE 
and AMS of the EU. Both concepts of measurement are indeed built on the same basis, but 
are differently extended afterwards. Hence, they are not comparable. The price gaps of the 
PSE calculation are estimated with reference to current domestic prices, while the AMS 
method uses a fixed reference to domestic administered prices of the year 1986 to 1988. 
Furthermore, the PSE concept includes all direct payments, whereas the AMS excludes some 
and allocates them to green and blue box support. The PSE includes implicit monetary 
                                                 
3 OTP is the denomination for the SFP in the OECD PSE database. In the following, we therefore use OTP when 
talking about the implementation of decoupled payments (SFP) in the GTAP database and model. In contrast, 
SFP is used when we talk about it in a political context. If it is not clearly related, we use OTP/SFP. 
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transfers from consumers resulting from import barriers. In the AMS calculation market price 
support is only defined, when an official administered price exists.4 
2.2 Decoupling of direct payments 
The EU SFP is considered to be decoupled and therefore to not affect production. Cahill 
(1997) clarifies the term decoupling which also constitutes the basis for the OECD’s 
conceptional overview of decoupling (OECD, 2001). He distinguishes between three stages of 
decoupling in his formal concept: 
 Full decoupling is the most restrictive definition and refers to a policy that does not 
influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments.  
 Effective full decoupling states that a subsidy can be declared as decoupled, if 
production does not differ from the production level that would have occurred in the 
absence of that policy measure. 
 Partial decoupling corresponds to the provision of a subsidy, which results in 
production that for any product exceeds the level that would exist without 
compensation, but does not achieve the level that would exist if the payments were 
fully coupled. 
Accordingly, decoupling is a complex issue and it seems to exist in various degrees. The 
definitions above show the necessity for a formalization of the degree of decoupling. It is not 
clear yet, how the degree of decoupling can be measured. Are there other potential channels 
of coupling, e.g., through labor, land, risk or wealth effects which could have an impact on 
agricultural production? There is extensive literature contributing to the ongoing discussion 
about the effect of various coupling channels on the production decision of farmers by 
identifying approaches on how to model decoupled payments taking different channels of 
decoupling into account. In these papers, coupling mechanisms are discussed which arise due 
to different allocative effects of payments. Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) referred in their survey 
paper, covering the literature on decoupling of farm program of the last 10 years, to the five 
major coupling mechanisms: uncertainty, imperfect credit markets, land and labor markets, as 
well as farmer’s expectations about future payments.  
Reviewing the literature with regard to different coupling channels, it seems that most 
authors consider only one or two of the different channels in their analysis. This review is 
therefore not intended to give a complete overview of the literature of different coupling 
channels. It rather provides a rough overview about how different coupling channels take 
effect and how researchers measure their influence.  
Decoupled payments increase farm income and reduce the income variability. This leads to 
the so-called insurance effect (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009). Most of the papers considering this 
issue are dealing with the effect of decoupling on risk and uncertainty. Hennessy (1998) 
measures the effects on risk aversion using utility functions with constant and decreasing 
                                                 
4 Since the OECD PSE concept and the WTO AMS concept both have it seeds in the same initial concept, the 
Producer Support Equivalent, and are based upon the same data, the PSE data incorporated in a model as e.g., 
GTAP can be reconciled according to the WTO classification and therefore improve WTO analysis (compare 
Jensen et al., 2009). 
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absolute risk aversion. According to Hennessy’s analysis, US counter-cyclical payments 
(CCP) create risk-related production incentives. Based on this approach Antón and Le Mouël 
(2004) identify that at the same level of price truncation the CCPs program has, holding other 
factors constant, weaker risk-related effects on production incentives than the US loan 
deficiency program. Based thereon, Just (2011), applying a new calibration-technique, states 
that significantly changes in wealth transfer are necessary to induce substantial changes in risk 
aversion and the herewith associated differences in production behavior. 
Beside the reduction of income variability, decoupled payments lead under decreasing 
absolute risk aversion preference to smaller coefficients of absolute risk aversion, which 
Bhaskar and Beghin (2009) denote as the wealth effect. The measurement of coupling effects 
through wealth for risk-averse farm households is considered by Femenia et al. (2010). Using 
a similar approach, they reveal, that even without taking capitalization into account, an 
underestimation of coupling effects expected due to the impact of the programs on farmer’s 
attitudes towards risk.  
In a credit-constrained environment, decoupled payments, which lead to an increase in 
farm income, allow for higher levels of savings and investments as well as improved access to 
credit. In their analysis, Sckokai and Moro (2009) argue that the degree of uncertainty 
regarding expected profit is the key to determine the rate of investment. Lobley et al. (2010) 
emphasize that market signals may become a more powerful driver of farmers’ behavior than 
EU CAP instruments. They also find that only a minority of farmers seems to be able to 
exploit related opportunities. Similar results are presented e.g., by Chau and de Gorter (2005), 
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) and Latruffe et al. (2009). 
Additionally, decoupled payments may have an influence on off-farm and on-farm labor 
supply. Serra et al. (2005) analyze whether 1996 US farm policy reforms altered household 
decisions using a probit model of labor supply. According to their analysis, decoupled 
payments have a negative impact on off-farm work participation and diversification of 
household income sources. Petrick and Zier (2011) account in their analysis for the 
employment effects of the entire CAP instruments. They find, ceteris paribus, a considerable 
decline in agricultural employment and point out that, on average, an increase in direct area 
payments result in labor shedding. In contrast, Key and Roberts (2009) suggest that non-
pecuniary benefits from farming which may lead to an increase in on-farm work. On-farm 
work may be boosted by decoupled payments because they increase farmers’ income and 
liquidity, thereby reducing farm household dependence on off-farm work.  
The extent to which decoupled payments like the SFP have an influence on farmers’ 
production decisions has been widely discussed in the literature, but remains inconclusive. It 
is assumed that the decoupled payment (e.g., SFP) provided through a subsidy given to land 
are capitalized in the factor price (rent) of land (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009). Many authors 
confirm the capitalization in land rents and the effect on production. Kilian et al. (2012) 
demonstrate the interdependence of the degree of decoupling on the relation of eligible 
hectares and SFP entitlements, the selected implementation model, and the land supply 
elasticity. However, van Meijl et al. (2006) find small negative effects on land use and effects 
smaller than in case of market price support for the production impacts. Furthermore, 
decoupled payments may influence exit decisions of farmers, in particular exit decisions for 
low-profit farm units where the payments can serve to cover fixed costs. Consequently, they 
prevent marginal farmers from exiting the sector (Chau and de Gorter, 2005). Reviewing the 
literature, most studies confirm the effects on production through other coupling channels, but 
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the extent to which these arise is often unclear (Goodwin and Mishra, 2005; Key and Roberts, 
2009). Moreover, Just and Kropp (2009) point out that, while direct payments may be 
decoupled in a static analysis, they can still become coupled in the long run through dynamic 
decisions.  
This literature overview indicates the complexity of analyzing the extent to which farm 
support is decoupled. The SFP scheme, in particular, is difficult to analyze when different 
coupling channels are taken into account. Most authors conclude that there are incentives to 
increase production induced by decoupled payments. However, they also state that those 
effects are rather modest. The effects of decoupled payments on land allocation and related 
production effects are the highest. Furthermore, this review shows that no single paper 
considers all coupling channels. Hence, when analyzing decoupled payments it is likely 
necessary to neglect some coupling channels – particularly if they are not of central 
importance for the analysis.  
This literature review also reveals this limited work to date on modeling of decoupled 
income support, in particular the SFP, within a CGE framework. One of the initial steps 
towards modeling direct income support decoupled from production was made by Frandsen et 
al. (2003). They adjusted the standard GTAP model to depict the implications of the EU CAP. 
They modeled decoupled payment as subsidies given to the factor land irrespective of the use. 
Due to the underlying model specification, this implies that decoupled support creates no 
production incentives. 
Subsequent work, including Scenar 2020, as described in Nowicki et al. (2009), employed 
the CGE model LEITAP5 together with partial equilibrium models such as ESIM and CAPRI 
to analyze the potential effects of the EU CAP. In LEITAP, decoupled payments are modeled 
as payments linked to land assuming that the factor land in all eligible agricultural activities 
receives the same rate. Although this implies no influence on the production choice, 
agricultural sectors have an advantage compared to manufacturing and services since the 
payments increase farm income and therefore binding more production factors in agriculture 
reducing the abandonment of land (Nowicki et al. 2009). A similar approach is chosen e.g., in 
the MIRAGE model (Decreux and Valin (2007). 
In addition to these modeling approaches of global CGE models, interesting studies 
applying single country models are available. Philippidis (2010), for instance, developed a 
single country CGE model for Spain based on the ORANI model to measure the impact of the 
EU CAP in Spain. In this study, the SFP is implemented as a uniform subsidy rate on the 
factor land, as was done in Frandsen et al. (2003). Deviating from this allocation mode, other 
single country CGE models implemented the SFP in form of income support given to 
households. One of those approaches is provided by Boysen et al. (2014) who applied a CGE 
model for Ireland based on a disaggregated SAM. They modeled the SFP as lump sum 
transfers from the government to households assuming that it creates no production incentives 
and is consequently fully decoupled. Gelan and Schwarz (2008, 2011) apply a similar 
approach for Scotland by decoupling the SFP from the agricultural activities and transferring 
                                                 
5 LEITAP (MAGNET) is a modified version of the GTAP model that treats agricultural policies (e.g., production 
quotas, intervention prices, tariff rate quotas together with coupled and decoupled payments) explicitly using 
information from the OECD's Policy Evaluation Model (PEM). This model gains through an enhanced 
production structure together with a new methodology of land allocation.  
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it as income support to households. Modifying the STAGE-model Ferrari et al. (2012) 
modeled as well agricultural policies and, in particular, the SFP for Ireland. They utilize 
different policy instruments to account for both fully or partially decoupled and fully coupled 
support.  
Additional progress is made in the field of Partial Equilibrium (PE) analyses. PE models 
are often applied at more disaggregated levels and therefore are better aligned through a much 
more detailed depiction of the agricultural sectors to capture the specific properties of 
decoupled income support. Britz et al. (2012) provide an EU-wide analysis at the regional and 
farm level to quantify the impacts of decoupled support applying the CAPRI model. Their 
results state that production is affected by the SFP through its effect land allocation and herd 
size, which considerably influences the income distribution.  
Gohin (2006) and Balkhausen et al. (2008) evaluated the effects of EU decoupled support 
applied in different GE (GTAP and GOAL) and PE (AGLINK, AG-MEMOD, CAPRI, 
CAPSIM, ESIM, FAPRI, and GOLD) models.6 Balkhausen et al. (2008) provide an overview 
of the effects of decoupling in the EU on land allocation and production comparing the model 
specification and parameter assumptions with focus on the SFP. In contrast, the objective of 
Gohin (2006) is to test whether the effects of the compared simulation models are sensitive to 
the specifications of the effects of CAP direct payments (AGENDA 2000). Both studies 
confirm that the effects are similar across different simulation studies, but that the magnitude 
of these effects varies due to the underlying model specifications. All simulations depict that 
decoupling reduces the total cereal area and come up with a decline in beef and sheep meat 
production, but with a large variation in the extent.  
The majority of studies assumed maximum decoupling in the conducted scenarios with 
decoupling rates of 100% (AG-MEMOD, CAPSIM, ESIM, GTAP, AGLINK, and FAPRI). 
Others deviate from this assumption adopting only partial decoupling based on e.g., 
production effects of the SFP that are assumed to be 6% of the effect of market price support 
for arable crops and beef production (AGLINK) (Gohin, 2006). In contrast, the analysis 
conducted with AG-MEMOD is based on the assumption that the SFP has 30% of the area 
allocation effect of arable crop payments under the AGENDA 2000, while FAPRI refers to an 
effect of 15% of the effect of price support on land allocation to activities (Balkhausen et al., 
2008). They find that the degree of decoupling is the most important factor in their analysis. 
Consequently, they criticize simulation models, which rely on ad-hoc assumptions about the 
degree of decoupling and emphasize the need for better empirical and theoretical support of 
this work. 
In summary, it is critically important to be aware of how the different SFP modeling 
assumptions can influence model’s results. The majority of approaches try to represent the 
SFP as decoupled or apply some ad-hoc assumptions about partially decoupled payments. 
Referring to the literature review on coupling channels it seems reasonable to focus on the 
effects of modeling assumptions referring to deviating degrees of decoupling. Thus, in the 
next sections we add to fill this gap and present the extension of the standard GTAP model 
and database that enables us to account for various degrees of decoupling in GTAP. In so 
                                                 
6 Balkhausen et al. (2008) covers all listed models except GOLD. Gohin (2006) included all models except 
CAPSIM and GOAL in the conducted analysis. They provide information on the standard documentation of the 
analyzed models in their articles and refer to different studies providing more details on the evaluated results. 
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doing, we comprise not only the assumption of a fully decoupled SFP in our analysis, but also 
a SFP that is not fully capitalized in land rents. Since Goodwin and Mishra (2005) find that 
the effect of other coupling channels is modest, while Chau and de Gorter (2005) observe that 
the SFP reduces the fix costs of farmers to some extent, we provide a sensitivity analysis that 
covers a broad range of underlying degrees of decoupling to evaluate the impact. 
3 Extended GTAP modeling framework  
This analysis is conducted using the comparative static regional general equilibrium model 
GTAP. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well documented in Hertel (1997) and 
available on the Internet7. Important for the conducted analysis is that all policy instruments 
are represented as ad valorem tax equivalents that create wedges between the undistorted 
prices and the prices including the policy. Domestic support is modeled accordingly, but only 
budgetary payments based on the OECD PSE tables are implemented in the GTAP database 
and model. Market price support is omitted here, since it is implicitly included via border 
measures in the GTAP model. An isolation of the market price support from the border 
measures is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, when dealing with domestic 
support issues in the following we focus on the behavioral equations in the production 
technology representation of the standard GTAP model (production tree). For a specific 
production activity, this production tree combines intermediate inputs and the primary factor 
inputs land, labor, capital and natural resources applying a nested structure. The production 
technology tree is shown in Figure 1.  
Firms purchase intermediates inputs that are both produced domestically and are imported. 
Trade is represented in the GTAP model by bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington 
assumption, which implies that all products can be differentiated by country of origin and the 
similarity of commodities from different regions is determined by the elasticity of 
substitution. In the lower nest of the production tree a CES production function aggregates the 
imported intermediate inputs from different regions (elasticity of substitution = ESUBM), 
while in the upper nest a CES production function determines the combination of aggregated 
imported intermediate inputs and domestically produced ones (elasticity of substitution = 
ESUBD).  
In the last step of the production process, a Leontief production function is applied to 
combine the aggregate of intermediate inputs with the value added. The value added is 
obtained using a CES production function to aggregate the factors of production (elasticity of 
substitution = ESUBVA). The GTAP model distinguishes between endowment commodities 
that are perfectly mobile between sectors as capital and labor and those that are sluggish, the 
factors land and natural resources. Mobile endowment commodities receive the same return in 
every sector while sluggish factor returns differ by sector in equilibrium. The primary 
production factors land, labor, capital, and natural resources are fully employed within each 
region. Factors cannot migrate between regions. The elasticity of substitution between factors 
is much smaller for the agricultural sectors (0.26) than for others (>=1.05) and is therefore 
inelastic. The factor land is agriculture-specific dampening the supply response of sectors 
requiring land. A raise in demand for all agricultural commodities will lead to an increase in 
                                                 
7 Please refer to https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/products/gtap_book.asp 
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the price for land. Growths in agricultural output while land supply is constant require 
substituting land by other primary factors. The supply response is much higher at the level of 
individual primary agricultural sectors as for agriculture as a whole, since the factor land is no 
longer a fixed factor for the disaggregated primary agricultural sectors. This land mobility is 
determined through the elasticity of transformation (ETRAE = -1) in GTAP.8  
Figure 1.  GTAP production technology tree 
 
Source: Adapted from Hertel (1997). 
A subsidy distributed with a homogeneous rate across primary agricultural commodities 
(all land using sectors) only to the factor land, capitalizes in land rent, and hence leads to an 
increase in the market price for land while the agent’s price is not affected.9 Consequently, a 
subsidy allocated with a homogeneous rate across all primary agricultural commodities and 
distributed solely to the production factor land creates no production effects in the GTAP 
model.  
At this stage, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to the GTAP-AGR model 
developed by Keeney and Hertel (2005), which introduces detailed agricultural structure 
covering important linkages between international trade and the farm and food economy into 
the standard GTPA model. GTAP-AGR would be good alternative for the simulation of 
agricultural policy reforms because of the following three features. Keeney and Hertel (2005) 
modified the factor supply and demand equations in order to account for the crucial role of the 
factor market regarding producer subsidies. They consider farm households as entities and 
therefore adjust the model to differentiate between income earned from farm or non-farm 
                                                 
8 For information that is more detailed refer to the GTAP book (Hertel, 1997) and the documentation of the 
GTAP database, in particular chapter 12.A (Narayanan et al. 2012). 
9 A detailed explanation is provided in the appendix (Section 8.2). 
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activities and to comprise taxes paid by farm households. Additionally, they adjust the 
specification of consumer demand to distinguish among food and non-food commodities. 
Beyond that, they allow substitution between feedstuffs used in the livestock sector. Our 
approach introduced in this paper is designed for the standard GTAP model as a general code 
to address a broader audience of GTAP users. Nevertheless, users can translate this approach 
to the more detailed GTAP-AGR model. 
The methodology introduced in this paper consists of two steps. First, we implement/ 
update domestic support payments into the GTAP database using an extended version of the 
Altertax model (Malcolm, 1998). Second, we extend the standard GTAP model in order to run 
different policy simulations to analyze the impact of domestic support payments on e.g., trade 
or welfare. 
3.1 Adjusted Altertax model 
For the integration of domestic support payments into the GTAP database, we apply an 
extensively adjusted version of the Altertax model developed by Gerard Malcolm. The 
Altertax model is a method that is commonly used to adjust the GTAP database by end users. 
The decision for Altertax as database adjustment procedure, instead of other iterative scaling 
methods as RAS or maximum entropy, was made because of advantages as no further 
investments are required and the Altertax model is accessible for all. Furthermore, our 
Altertax program not only encompasses factor subsidies (land, labor, and capital), but also 
intermediate and output subsidies, taking onboard all domestic support programs calibrated 
into the GTAP database. Our provided Altertax model takes indeed the EU as an example, but 
it can be easily applied to other countries. Malcolm’s Altertax model is based on a variant of 
the GTAP model. It is developed to update information on taxes in an existing aggregation of 
the GTAP database. Feature of the Altertax model is that it minimizes the impact of tax 
changes on the value flows by maintaining the internal consistency of the database through 
modifications in the underlying model structure and parameter settings.  
We utilize the variant of the Altertax model, in which all endowments are treated as 
sluggish and are incorporated using a uniform elasticity of substitution. Referring to Malcolm 
(1998), this implies that variations in the size of a specific agricultural sector do not have as 
much influence on other agricultural or non-agricultural sectors in the domestic market 
through factor markets since factor returns across sectors are not balancing. Nevertheless, the 
quantity response of the domestic sector itself is much more constraint since factor prices 
within that sector will vary more. This is consequently mirrored by the changes in output 
prices. Beyond, this causes subsequent effects on other sectors as the acquisition of 
intermediate inputs from the sector affected by the shock. 
To represent domestic support payments, we extensively modified the Altertax model to 
cover PSE budgetary transfers in more detail in the GTAP model.10 PSE payments are 
provided to agricultural producers through various agricultural policy instruments that are 
mirrored in GTAP in form of five price wedges evaluating transactions of producers at 
agent’s and market prices for output, intermediate inputs, land, capital and labor. Each of 
                                                 
10 More information about the PSE concept and the classification of budgetary transfer is available at the website 
www.oecd.org and in the PSE manual (OECD, 2010). 
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these price wedges however include payments belonging to the four PSE payment groups. 
Hence, this initial breakdown of policy instruments is much too rough to capture the diverse 
effects of domestic support payments. For the implementation of a more detailed depiction of 
domestic support payments, we added policy instruments representing SCT, GCT, ACT, and 
OTP in each of the price wedges. In so doing we achieve a more detailed structure of value 
flows and division of the corresponding price linkage equations. 
Following the definitions of the OECD, SCT payments can be modeled product specific. 
The GCT payments are granted to groups of primary agricultural commodities irrespective 
which of these commodities the farmer decides to produce. In order to reflect this allocation 
mechanism in the adjusted Altertax model GCT subsidies are implemented with a 
homogeneous rate across all sectors that are part of the predefined group. Similarly, the ACT 
payments are introduced, since farmers receive such payments as long as they produce at least 
one commodity out of the group all primary agricultural commodities.  
A special case in this analysis is the OTP/ SFP11 where no production is required to receive 
such payments. Since the SFP is a complex policy instrument, where the EU allows their 
member state much flexibility in how they calculate and distribute those payments to farmers, 
we include a short excurse on the SFP at this stage. 
 
Excurse SFP: 
In 2003 the EU introduced the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) with the objective to provide 
basic income support to farmers without a linkage between subsidies and any specific 
production (EC 1782/2003; EC 73/2009).* The SPS consists of two components, the SFP and 
the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). The SFP is in force since 2005 and is currently 
applied by 17 EU (EU15 plus Slovenia and Malta) member states. The remaining 10 member 
states are utilizing the SAPS, which was offered to the member states that joined the EU in 
2004 and 2007 in order to relax the implementation requirements. The SFP grants the 
member state high flexibility in the application and varies therefore from member state to 
member states. It is paid in form of a single annual payment based on entitlements allocated 
to farmers. Member states faced three options for determining the payment entitlements: 
First, based on historical payments received by farmers in a reference period resulting in 
different aid levels per hectare (historical model). Second, division of the total amount of 
payments received in one region by the number of eligible hectares resulting in a flat rate 
(regional model). Third, applying a mixture between both models (hybrid model). In contrast, 
SAPS replaced all direct payments with a single area payment without establishing 
entitlements and was therefore simpler than SFP. It was phased out in 2013.  
 
*  For extensive information on how the SPS works and how this payments scheme may develop after 2013 refer 
to a study requested by the European Parliament (2010) 
                                                 
11 Here, we repeat footnote no. 3 to facilitate the understanding. OTP is the denomination for the SFP in the 
OECD PSE database. In the following, we therefore use OTP when talking about the implementation of 
decoupled payments (SFP) in the GTAP database and model. In contrast, SFP is used when we talk about it in a 
political context. If it is not clearly related, we use OTP/ SFP. 
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Due to the modeling of the factor market in the standard GTAP approach and in particular 
the representation of the factor land, the distribution of the SFP to the factor land only with an 
allocation using a homogeneous rate across all primary agricultural commodities reflects an 
effectively fully decoupled SFP in the model. Furthermore, it accounts for both definition of 
measures, the SFP and the SAPS.12 Taking the statements of the literature review and in 
particular, the summarized empirical findings of other analyses into account, it is necessary to 
deviate somehow from effective fully decoupled payments. Besides, the default setting in the 
standard GTAP database and model is the allocation with a homogeneous rate across factors 
and primary agricultural sectors, which represent a variant of partially decoupled payments. 
This approach is illustrated in the following, first for domestic support in form of subsidies 
given to land, capital and labor, second domestic support given to intermediate inputs and 
finally domestic support in form of output subsidies.  
The standard GTAP model allows for a differentiation between producer expenditure on 
factor i at market prices (VFMijr) and producer expenditure on factor i at agents prices 
(EVFAijr) used by commodity j in region r. These values are based on the linear price equation 
that establishes the link between agents (pfeijr) and market prices (pmesijr) using the 
percentage change of the policy variable tfijr. It holds for endowment goods
13 and captures the 
effect of taxation of firms’ usage of primary factors (3.1).14 
(3.1)  ijr ijr ijrpfe tf pmes  
 
 
 
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
  
pfeijr Firms’ price for endowment i in commodity j of region r 
pmesijr Market price of endowment i used by commodity j in region r 
tfijr Tax on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
Adding the percentage change of the endowment quantity (qfeijr) to the respective prices 
yields the corresponding percentage change of values, while the difference between pmesijr 
and pfeijr is equal to the percentage change of the power of the ad valorem tax and subsidy, 
respectively. To account for the representation of the homogeneous (OTP, ACT, GCT) and 
non-homogeneous (SCT) support we add the percentage change variables tfsfpr, tfsubirg, tfsctijr 
and for the factor taxes tftijr as new policy instruments. These policy instruments are then used 
to establish four new price equations for the domestic support subsidies going to land, labor, 
and capital, which are linked to new value flow VFMXijrg in the database (equation (3.2) to 
(3.5)). 
In equation (3.2) the agent’s price of endowment i used by commodity j in region r equals 
the price pmesxijrg, with g = GCT12, which already includes OTP, ACT and GCT payments 
                                                 
12 The GTAP model is not suited to account for different options of the modeling of entitlements since the GTAP 
model includes only one representative household. 
13 In the standard GTAP model, this equation is separated into sluggish and mobile endowments. 
14 All equations that do not deviate from the standard GTAP model have a grey background. 
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plus the policy instrument for the SCT payments. Since the SCT is product specific, the policy 
instrument is directly related to commodities.  
(3.2)  ijr ijr ijrgpfe tfsct pmesx  
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
g GCT12
 
 
 

 
pmesxijrg Market price of endowment i incl. ACT, GCT and OTP subsidies used 
by j in region r 
tfsctijr Tax (SCT) on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
In contrast, equation (3.3) shows the group specific modeling of the policy instrument. The 
coefficient parameter MMREGjrg provides a mapping matrix that determines which product is 
allocated to a particular group. Within a group, the policy instrument tfsub is distributed 
homogeneously over the products. Furthermore, the production value share PROD_SHRjrg is 
added to the equation. It is calculated as the relation between EUROSTAT production value 
and the production value where some oilseeds are excluded to account for the composition of 
GCT groups that is deviating from the sector aggregation in GTAP. 
(3.3) 
* _ *

ijrg jrg jrg irg
ijrb
pmesx MMREG PRODV SHR tfsub
pmesx
 
 
 
 
 
 
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
g GROUP
b BASEGROUP
 
tfsubirg Tax(ACT, GCT) on primary factor i in region r for group g  
MMREGjrg Regional mapping matrix to allocate products to groups for 
commodity j in region r for group g 
PRODV_SHRjrg Relation of production values to account for deviating production 
values in GCT2 and GCT11 for commodity j in region r for group g  
Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) are needed to model the OTP. In equation (3.4a) the policy 
instrument tfsfp distributes the OTP payments with a homogeneous rate across sectors and 
factors, which is the default in GTAP. While it distributes the OTP payments in equation 
(3.4b) according the factor usage with a homogeneous rate across primary agricultural 
commodities. 
(3.4a)  ijrb r ijrpmesx tfsfp pmest  
 
 
 

i ENDW
j AGRI
r REG
b OTP
  
tfsfpr Tax (OTP/SFP) in region r 
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(3.4b)  ijrb ir ijrpmesx tfsfp pmest  
 
 
 

i ENDW
j AGRI
r REG
b OTP
  
tfsfpir Tax (OTP/SFP) for endowment i in region r 
Due to the homogeneous allocation across selected sectors, it is required to split up the 
equations between agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, where no OTP is included. 
(3.5) ijrb ijrpmesx pmest  
 
 
 

i ENDW
j NAGRI
r REG
b OTP
  
These price equations are then linked to new value flows VFMXijrg in the GTAP database that 
include the four groups of subsidies. Equation (3.6) is built to establish the value flow 
VFMTijr that includes the factor employment tax. 
(3.6)  ijr ijr ijrpmest tft pmes  
 
 
 
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG  
pmestijr Market price of endowment i incl. factor tax used by j in r 
tftijr Tax on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
Accordingly, pfeijr is the agents price of endowment i used by industry j in region r 
comprising homogeneous and non-homogeneous support, while pmesxijrg is the market price 
of sluggish endowment i used by industry j in region r that includes the homogeneous 
support. Whereas pmestijr is the market price of endowment i used in industry j in region r that 
includes the factor tax. The corresponding percentage changes of the values are obtained by 
adding the percentage change of the demand for endowment i for use in commodity j in 
region r (qfeijr) to the respective price changes (see Figure 2). We updated the equations for 
VFMT and VFMX15 using these new prices (equation (3.7) and 3.8)). 
(3.7) 
ijr ijr ijrVFMT pmest qfe   
 
 
 
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
 
(3.8) 
ijrb ijrb ijrVFMX pmesx qfe   
 
 
 
 
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
b BASEGROUP
 
qfeijr Demand for endowment i for use in commodity j in region r  
                                                 
15 Where the set BASEGROUP covers OTP, ACT, GCT1, …, GCT12. 
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Although not explicitly defined in the model, we thereby establish that the percentage 
change in tfijr is equal to the sum over tfsctijr, tfsubirg and tfsfpr. 
Figure 2.  New endowment value flows and policy variables in the GTAP model 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In the following, we briefly illustrate the implementation of new policy instruments for 
intermediate inputs. The linear price equation (3.9) establishes the link between pfdijr and pmjr 
using the percentage change of the policy variable tfdijr and (3.10) between pfmijr and pimjr for 
intermediate inputs in the standard GTAP model. 
(3.9)  ijr ijr jrpfd tfd pm  
 
 
 
i TRAD
j PROD
r REG
 
pfdijr Price index for domestic purchase i by commodity j in region r 
pmjr Market price of commodity j in region r 
tfdijr Tax on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
  
pmes
pmesx
(GCT12)
pmesx
(OTP)
pmest
tfsfp tfsubtft
pfe
tfsct
VFM
VFMX
(GCT12)
VFMX
(OTP)
VFMT EVFAValue flows:
Prices:
Policy
Variables:
EVFAijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at agent's prices
VFMTijr VFMijr plus factor employment revenue (FTRVijr)
VFMXijr VFMtijr plus homogenous support from OTP, ACT and GCT
VFMijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at market prices
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(3.10)  ijr ijr irpfm tfm pim  
 
 
 
i TRAD
j PROD
r REG
 
pfmijr Price index for import of i by commodity j in region r 
pimir Market price of composite import i in region r 
tfmijr Tax on imported i purchased by commodity j in region r 
In equation (3.11) the price index for domestic purchase i by commodity j in region r 
equals the price pmxijrg, with g = GCT12, which already includes ACT and GCT payments 
plus the policy instrument for the SCT payments. Since the SCT is product specific, the policy 
instrument is directly related to commodities. Subsequently, equation (3.12) shows the group 
specific modeling of the policy instrument.  
(3.11)  ijr ijr ijrgpfd tfdsct pmx  
i TRAD
j PROD
r REG
g GCT12
 
 
 

 
(3.12) 
_ *
*


ijrg jrg jrg
irg ijrb
pmx PRODV SHR MMREG
tfdsub pmx
 
i TRAD
j PROD
r REG
g GROUP
b BASEGROUP
 
 
 
 
 
 
pmxijrg Market price for domestic i in commodity j of region r including ACT 
and GCT subsidies 
pmxijrb Market price for domestic i in commodity j of region r including OTP, 
ACT and GCT subsidies 
tfdsctijr Tax (SCT) on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
tfdsubirg Tax (ACT,GCT) on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
Equation (3.11) and (3.12) show the modeling for the domestically produced intermediate 
imports. The price equations for imported intermediate imports are implemented accordingly. 
The input subsidies of the PSE do not distinguish between imported and domestically 
produced. Therefore, the two policy instruments are linked with the help of the variable 
tfdmsctjr to obtain a homogeneous allocation over inputs for product specific support 
(equation 3.13). A comparable linkage structure is used for the implementation of ACT and 
GCT payments (equation 3.14). 
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(3.13)  ijr ijr jrtfdsct tfmsct tfdmsct  
 
 
 
i INT
j PROD
r REG
 
(3.14)  irg irg rgtfdsub tfmsub tfdmsub  
 
 
 
i INT
r REG
g GROUP
 
tfdmsctjr Tax (SCT )for commodity j in region r 
tfdmsubrg Tax (ACT,GCT) in region r for group g 
All subsidies related to output are given product specific. Hence, it is not necessary to 
further split up the following price linkage equation according the PSE categories (3.15). 
(3.15)  jr jr jrps to pm  
 
 
j TRAD
r REG
 
psjr Agents price of commodity j in region r 
pmjr Market price of commodity j in region r 
tojr Output tax for commodity j in region r 
Deviating from the standard GTAP closure (compare Figure A1 in the appendix) the policy 
variables tfsfp, tfsct, tfsub and tft are defined as exogenous and hence replace tf in the closure. 
Regarding the inputs, tfdmsubrg and tfdmsctjr are exogenous with tfdijr and tfmijr endogenous, 
and tojr exogenous for outputs. 
Beyond the modifications of the price equations, it is necessary to define the shares of each 
category and type of support (Figure 2, 3 and 4) in the Altertax model and add change 
variables to determine the change in each category and type of support. Subsequent, the 
shares and new change variables are introduced. 
In Figure 3 the allocation of subsidies given to land, labor, and capital are illustrated 
according to their categories SCT, GCT, ACT, and OTP. The initial factor employment tax 
revenue (FTRVijr) of the GTAP database is given by the difference of VFMijr and VFMTijr. 
The newly introduced OTP is equal to the margin between VFMTijr and VFMXijrg with g = otp. 
ACT and GCT subsidies to land, labor and capital are specified by the difference between 
VFMXijrg with g = otp and VFMXijrg with g = gct12 while the product specific SCT is located 
between VFMXijrg with g = gct12 and EVFAijr. In the standard GTAP database, the value of all 
domestic support payments is reported as FBEPijr that is equal to the difference between 
VFMTijr and EVFAijr. Hence, FBEPijr is equal to the sum of OTP/SFP, GCT and ACT, and 
SCT payments. 
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Figure 3.  Homogeneous and non-homogeneous support in GTAP allocated to land, 
capital, and labor  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
For the implementation of e.g., the homogeneous OTP payments, we use the change 
variable del_otp_shrr that determines the change in the share of OTP support. The OTP share 
is calculated in relation to the value of output (equation (3.15)). The change variable of OTP 
share is then shocked to update OTP_SHRr using equation (3.16).  
(3.15) _  



 

ijr ijrbj AGRI i NNATDIS
r
jrj AGRI
VFMT VFMX
SH OTP
VOM
 r REG
b OTP
 
 
 
(3.16) 
  
 
 
100


 
 
 
 
 
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
 
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jr rj AGRI
r jr jr jrj AGRI
ijr ijr ijri NNATDIS j AGRI
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* VOM * del _ otp _ shr
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VFMX * pmesx qfe
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 
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OTP_SHRr Share of OTP support in region r 
del_otp_shrr Change in share of OTP support in region r 
pmjr Market price of commodity j in region r 
qojr Output of commodity j in region r  
The share of domestic support allocated to ACT and the 12 GCT subsidies on land, labor 
and capital (SHR_ACTir, SHR_GCT1ir, …, SHR_GCT12ir) is updated with the change variable 
of that share (del_shrendwjrg) using equation (3.18). In equation (3.18) only GCT1 is shown 
exemplary for all the other groups. 
VFM
VFMX
(GCT12)
VFMX
(OTP)
VFMT
SFP  / OTP
GCT and ACT
subsidies given to
land, labor and capital
FTRV
EVFA
SCT subsidies given
to land, labor and
capital
EVFAijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at agent's prices
VFMTijr VFMijr plus factor employment revenue (FTRVijr)
VFMXijr VFMtijr plus homogenous support from OTP, ACT and GCT
VFMijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at market prices
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(3.17) 





ijrb ijrgj AGRI
ir
jrj AGRI
VFMX VFMX
SHR _ GCT1
VOM
 
i NNATDIS
b ACT
r REG
g GCT1
 
 
 
 
 
SHR_GCT1ir Share of GCT1 domestic support allocated to land, labor, and capital 
subsidies in GTAP in region r 
(3.18)  
1
1
1 11
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 
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The share of domestic support allocated to ACT and the 12 GCT on input subsidies 
(SHR_INTACTr, SHR_INTGCT1r, …, SHR_INTGCT12r) is updated with the change of that 
share (del_shrintrg) using equation (3.20). In equation (3.20) the example for GCT1 is shown, 
the equations for the remaining groups are written in the same way. 
(3.19) 
_ 1
/
r kjrb kjrgj AGRI k INT
kjrb kjrg jrj AGRI k INT j AGRI
SHR INTGCT VDFMX VDFMX
VIFMX VIFMX VOM
 
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 

 

 
  
 
1
r REG
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g GCT
 
 
 
 
SHR_INTGCT1r Share of GCT1 domestic support allocated to input subsidies in GTAP 
in region r 
(3.20)  
   
 
100 * * _ int
_ * *
* *
* *
jr jrgj GCT 1
ir jr jr jrj GCT 1
kjrg 1 kjrg 1 kjr kjrg kjrg kjrk INT j GCT 1
kjrg 1 kjrg 1 kjr kjrg kjrg kjj GCT 1
VOM del shr
SHR INTGCT1 VOM pm qo
VDFMX pmx qfd VDFMX pmx qfd
VIFMX pimx qfm VIFMX pimx qfm


  
 


 

   
   


 
  rk INT
r REG   
The allocation of intermediate inputs according the categories ACT and GCT as well as SCT 
are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Following a modified procedure16, the power of support tax of the SCT payments can be 
adjusted in the GTAP database. In equation (3.21) the initial value of domestic support in 
GTAP is defined. 
                                                 
16 For the categories OTP, ACT, and GCT, we calculated the shares in relative to the value of output. Here, the 
category SCT comprises subsidies that needs to be allocated to output. Thus, the method used beforehand would 
create a bias, so that we slightly adjusted it. 
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(3.21) 
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VOTAX_SCTir Initial value of domestic support for commodity i in region r 
Figure 4.  Homogeneous and non-homogeneous support in GTAP allocated to 
intermediate goods 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In equation (3.22) the initial power of tax levels is given. 
(3.22) 
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ijrgj INT COMM ijr
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PO_TAX_SCTir Initial power of SCT subsidy levels for commodity i in region r 
VDFM VDFA
VDFMX
(GCT12)
GCT and ACT
subsidies given to
intermediate inputs
SCT subsidies given
to intermediate 
inputs
VDFAijr Purchases of domestic i for use in j in 
region r  at agent’s prices
VDFMXijrg Purchases of domestic i for use in j in 
region r  at market prices plus ACT 
and GCT
VDFMijr Purchases of domestic i for use in j in 
region r at market prices
VIFM VIFA
VIFMX
(GCT12)
GCT and ACT
subsidies given to
intermediate inputs
SCT subsidies given
to intermediate 
inputs
VIFAijr Purchases of imported i for use in j in 
region r  at agent’s prices
VIFMXijrg Purchases of imported i for use in j in 
region r  at market prices plus ACT 
and GCT
VIFMijr Purchases of imported i for use in j in 
region r at market prices
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The initial change in the power of SCT subsidy levels is calculated with the help of 
equation (3.23). 
(3.23) 
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 
_
_
100 * _ _ *
* _ _
* *
*
*
*
*
ir ir ir ir
ir ir
ir ir ir ir ir ir
jirg ijrg ijrj ENDW COMM
jir ijr ijr
ijrg ijrj INT COMM jirg
jir ijr
PO TAX SCT VOM pm qo
VOM del potax sct
VOA ps qo VOM pm qo
VFM X pmesx qfe
VFA pfe qfe
VDFMX pmx qfd
VDFA pfd q


 

   
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
_
*
*
ijr
jirg ijrg ijrj INT COMM
jir ijr ijr
fd
VIFM X pimx qfm
VIFA pfm qfm

 
 

 
i TRAD
r REG
g GCT12
 
 

 
This initial change in the power of tax is then updated using the OECD power of tax, 
which is calculated in equation (3.22). The initial value of domestic support uses the change 
in total tax (del_votaxir) defined in equation (3.24). 
(3.24)  
 
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_ * *
* _ *
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After the update of the SCT, the values are allocated to output, inputs, land, labor, and 
capital. For example, the share of domestic support allocated to output subsidies 
(SHR_OUT_SCTir) is updated with the change in the share of output subsidy 
(del_shrout_sctir) using equation (3.26). 
(3.25) 
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SHR_OUTir Share of domestic support allocated to output subsidies in GTAP for 
commodity i in region r 
(3.26) 
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The share of SCT payments allocated to output is shown in Figure 5. The remaining SCT 
payments are distributed accordingly to intermediate inputs as depicted in Figure 4 and the 
factors land, labor, and capital as displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 5.  Product specific support in GTAP allocated to output 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
3.2 Extended standard GTAP model 
We adjusted the structure of value flow and the corresponding price linkage equations in 
the standard GTAP model in a similar way we extended them in the Altertax model, but we 
relaxed some of the equations regarding the implementation of ACT and GCT payments and 
the distribution with homogeneous rates.17  
Equation (3.27) shows the group specific modeling of the policy instrument, but deviates 
from the equation (3.3) in the Altertax model. Using the Altertax model ACT and GCT 
payments are allocated with a homogeneous rate across all commodities belonging to the 
defined groups. As long as the tax rates are exogenous in the model, they can be modeled 
using a simplified equation (3.27). 
(3.27)  ijrg ijrg ijrbpmesx tfsub pmesx  
i ENDW
j PROD
r REG
g GROUP
b BASEGROUP
 
 
 
 
 
 
tfsubijrg Tax(ACT, GCT) on primary factor i used for commodity j in region r 
for group g  
Equation (3.28) shows the modeling for the domestic imports simplified according to 
equation (3.27), the price equations for imported imports are modified likewise.  
                                                 
17 The GTAP model is applied using the update database where domestic support is allocated accounting for the 
requirements of the different categories of support. As long as the policy instruments are exogenous in the 
closure, there is no need to implement the equations in such a detailed and complicated way. In case the value of 
domestic support needs to be constant in the model, it is necessary to apply change variables in order to 
endogenize the policy instruments. Therefore, the price equations used in the GTAP model need to be replaced 
by the more detailed ones used in the Altertax model presented in the previous paragraph. 
VOM VOA
SCT subsidies given
to output
VOAjr Value of output of commodity j in region r at agent's 
prices
VOMjr Value of output of commodity j in region r at market 
prices
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(3.28)  ijrg ijrg ijrbpmx tfdsub pmx  
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pmxijrg Market price for domestic i in commodity j of region r including ACT 
and GCT subsidies 
pmxijrb Market price for domestic i in commodity j of region r including OTP, 
ACT and GCT subsidies 
tfdsubijrg Tax (ACT,GCT) on domestic i used by commodity j in region r for 
group g 
In the closure (see Figure A2), the policy variables tojr, tfsfpr, tfsctijr, tfsubijrg and tftijr are 
again defined as exogenous. However, regarding the inputs now tfdsubijrg and tfdsctijr as well 
as tfmsubijrg and tfmsctijr are exogenous. To allow for variation of this standard closure we add 
change variables, which accounts for the different payments types in the extended GTAP 
model.  
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Mapping of the OECD PSE tables and the GTAP aggregation 
The agricultural domestic support in version 8 of the GTAP database originates from the 
OECD’s PSE tables of the year 2007 for the EU, which can be downloaded from the OECD 
website18. This database is a complement to the OECD report “Agricultural Policies in OECD 
Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation – At a Glance 2010”. The PSE concept contains market 
price support and budgetary transfers. Since market price support also includes border 
measures, it is not included in the GTAP database to avoid double counting with other policy 
measures, e.g., tariffs. To represent domestic support we implement PSE budgetary transfers 
in the GTAP database.19  
The OECD support categories (A2 to E) introduced in Chapter 2 are grouped into five 
GTAP support categories: 
 Output subsidies 
 Intermediate input subsidies 
 Land-based subsidies 
 Labor-based subsidies 
 Capital-based subsidies 
                                                 
18 http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_33797_39551355_1_1_1_1, 00.html.  
19 More information about the PSE concept and the classification of budgetary transfer is available at the website 
www.oecd.org and in the PSE manual (OECD, 2010). 
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The OECD support categories F and G are not included in the GTAP database because 
they are either not related to any production (based on non-commodity criteria as e.g., long-
term resource retirements comprising payments for afforestation) or are miscellaneous. 
The PSE data of the OECD is only available for the EU as a whole. Consequently, we had 
to divide this data to create individual PSE tables for all 27 member states. Thereby, 
additional information provided by the OECD, the Financial Plan of the EU Commission as 
well as the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) are employed.  
In general, the allocation of payments to the EU member states follows the method also 
used by the OECD at the aggregated level.20 Beyond, the disaggregation of EU PSE support 
to member state level comprises the following steps. First, the PSE payment items have to 
match with the corresponding payments in the EAGF of the financial year 200821, where the 
payments are given by member country. Second, using additional information from the 
OECD, national payments found in the PSE tables are differentiated into individual member 
country payments. Third, for the allocation of payments belonging to the EAFRD the national 
co-financing rate is used. 22 
In the newly created individual domestic support tables for the 27 EU member states the 
total support is grouped into SCT, GCT, ACT, and OTP for the EU by member states and by 
PSE type of support. In Table A3 in the appendix, the reallocation of the more detailed PSE 
types of support to the five aggregated GTAP support categories for the payment groups SCT, 
GCT, and ACT is presented.23 Thus, we obtain subsidy payments given to output, input, land, 
labor, and capital for each of the payment groups SCT, ACT, and GCT. 
The SCT payments are attached to specific sectors in the PSE tables that are aggregated to 
match the 12 primary agricultural commodities in the GTAP database. The ACT payments are 
distributed by PSE type of support to the group of all primary agricultural commodities, while 
the GCT payments are given to 12 defined groups of commodities. The OTP payments are 
assigned based on entitlements. Thus, they are not related to commodities and the different 
types of support in the PSE tables (shown in Table A3, appendix). 
For the groups other than SCT an allocation mechanism is required to incorporate them 
into the GTAP database since ACT and OTP payments are given to all commodities, while 
GCT is given to defined groups of commodities and are thus not linked to specific sectors. 
4.2 Re-allocation of PSE data according to GTAP aggregation 
Considering the explanations of Section 4.1, some re-allocation of PSE data according to 
the GTAP aggregation is required to enable the incorporation into the GTAP model and 
database.  
                                                 
20 Explanations can be found in the composition of OECD PSE tables (http://www.oecd.org/agriculture   
/agriculturalpoliciesandsupport/producerandconsumersupportestimatesdatabase.htm.). 
21 The financial year 2008 covers the period from July 2007 until June 2008. 
22 For more information that is detailed, compare the documentation of PSE domestic support payments in the 
GTAP Version 7 database for 2004 provided by Jensen (2008, 2010). 
23 Please note, that the PSE concept determines to which GTAP category payments have to be allocated. 
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Since the OTP are given in the PSE tables as one number for each member state, it is 
necessary to generate some redistribution methods before implementing the OTP into GTAP. 
In Section 3, we introduced different options to model OTP (see equations 3.4a and b). Now, 
the initial PSE data is prepared accordingly as shown in the upper part of Figure 6.  
Figure 6.  Transferring OECD domestic support to the GTAP database 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
We start with the allocation according to the factor usage in each agricultural sector. To be 
able to distribute the OTP payments of the OECD in this way, additional information on 
factor shares is required. This information is taken from the initial GTAP database and is used 
to calculate the GTAP factor usage share (TVFMSHRir).
24 According to equation (4.1), it is 
given by the sum of firms’ purchases at market prices for land, labor and capital taking the 
sum over all agricultural sectors (TVFMijr) divided by the sum of TVFMijr over land, labor, 
and capital and all agricultural sectors.25 The coefficient TVFMijr equals EVFAijr
26 with 
                                                 
24 The factor shares are utilized in the simulations are exogenous. In an ideal situation, the factor shares would be 
updated based on other information. However, this information is not available to us. 
25 For the description of all sets please refer to table A5 and for the descriptions of coefficients to table A6 in the 
appendix. 
26 We use the EVFA aggregated shares of land, labor, capital employed in primary agriculture to allocate the 
homogeneous SFP support rate in each country, because the EVFA share corresponds to the initial factor shares 
calibrated into the database, which are linked back to published econometric studies. 
Benchmark
OECD PSE Values
Domestic Support Values in 
the GTAP Data Base
Scaling to GTAP Data Base
Allocated to output, 
intermediate inputs, 
land and capital
Product-specific 
subsidy payments 
by payment types
Homogenous subsidy rates to primary agricultural 
commodities allocated as a homogenous rate to the 
factors land, labor and capital or according to 
underlying assumption about the degree of decoupling
Single commodity 
transfer payments
Other transfer payments
Factor shares
Scenario n
Decoupled
All and group commodity 
transfer payments
Allocated to intermediate 
inputs, land, labor and 
capital
Group-specific, 
homogenous subsidy 
rates to commodities 
by payment types
Scenario 1
Partially 
coupled with 
various degrees
PSE * GTAP value of output
Eurostat production value
…
…
 26 
 
unskilled and skilled labor aggregated to a single factor labor as shown in Figure 7. This 
factor share is then multiplied with the amount of PSE OTP payments that equals OTPHr 
(equation 4.2). This leads to OTP payments allocated according to the factor usage in each 
region shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 7.  Factor mapping 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure 8.  EU OTP payments by factor share in 2007 (EURO Mio.) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD PSE data. 
Beside the default allocation, we discuss in this paper the allocation of OTP according to 
deviating degrees of decoupling. To allow for the modification of such a degree it is required 
to introduce a new coefficient that enables the change of the extent of the distribution of OTP 
to each of the factors used without affecting each sector’s factor usage. 
Therefore, we introduce the coefficient SHIFTFCTi that determines by how much the 
distribution varies from the distribution according the factor usage. SHIFTFCTi is specified 
manually according to own assumptions about the degree of decoupling of OTP. In equation 
(4.4) the share of decoupling (DECOUPSHRi,r) – referred to as degree of decoupling – is 
obtained through first multiplying the factor usage share for labor and capital with the 
coefficient SHIFTFCTi and second substracting the sum over labor and capital of the obtained 
share from 1 to achieve the share given land. Using equation (4.4) and (4.5) we are able to 
deviate from the factor usage by a successively decrease share of a chose percentage. As 
example, we choose here 10%. Equation (4.4) reduces the share given to labor and capital 
(FCAP) by 10% each. This is then both shifted to the factor land as shown in equation (4.5). 
In so doing we obtain a coefficient that determines the degree of decoupling which can then 
be used to distribute the OTP according own assumptions about the decoupling (equation 
(4.6)) deviating from the default in GTAP.  
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(4.5) 1
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The ACT payments are activity-generic implying that they are given to all primary 
agricultural commodities without any restrictions on the commodity produced as long as some 
are produced. For the distribution of ACT payments over agricultural products in GTAP the 
power of ACT support (ACTPOWERir) is calculated (equation (4.7)). This is done by dividing 
the PSE category ACT, reallocated according to GTAP types of support, by the sum over all 
EUROSTAT production values of agricultural commodities. This relation is then multiplied 
with the EUROSTAT production value for each agricultural GTAP sector to obtain the ACT 
payments given to each GTAP sector as well as to input, land, labor or capital (ACTTRANijr) 
(equation (4.8)).  
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ACTPOWERir ACT power of support by payment type i and region r 
ACPMir All commodity transfer payments (OECD) by payment type i and 
region r 
PRODNjr Value of agricultural production (EUROSTAT) by commodity j and 
region r 
ACTTRANijr All commodity transfer payments by payment type i, commodity j and 
region r  
In Table 1 the ACT payments, distributed with a homogeneous rate (ACTPOWER) over 
the 12 GTAP agricultural commodities in the EU, are shown. 
Table 1.  ACT payments in the EU (EURO Mio.) 
ACT 
payments 
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total 
Output 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Input 17 351 371 1,040 202 48 4 957 523 815 646 2 4,974 
Land 17 402 552 1,258 236 65 19 1,159 829 1,125 1,170 2 6,833 
Capital 27 310 410 1,354 246 49 14 963 499 948 683 2 5,505 
Labor 3 32 32 107 21 4 0 106 46 71 59 0 481 
Total 63 1,095 1,365 3,759 704 166 38 3,185 1,897 2,959 2,557 6 17,792 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The GTAP database differentiates between 12 primary agricultural sectors, which can be 
assigned to 12 commodity groups as defined by the OECD (compare Table 2). Some PSE 
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payments are given to farmers for the production of commodities according to belonging to 
one or more of those 12 GCT groups. In order to receive such group specific payments, 
agricultural producers need to produce at least one commodity of the defined group. 
Table 2.  Allocation of GTAP sectors to different groups27 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Consequently, the payments of a specific group need to be distributed homogeneously 
across all products covered by that group. In equation (4.9) and (4.10), the computation of 
GCT1 payments is exemplary shown using a similar approach as used for the ACT payments.  
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GCT1POWERir GCT1 power of support by payment type i and region r 
GCT1Pir GCT1 payments (OECD) by payment type i and region r 
GCT1PAYijr GTAP activity-specific GCT1 payments by payment type i, commodity 
j and region r 
First, the share of GCT1 payments is calculated in relation to the sum of the EUROSTAT 
production value over the commodities belonging to group GCT1 (pdr, wht, gro, v_f, osd, 
c_b, pfb, ocr). This share is then used to distribute the subsidy to all sectors included in group 
GCT1 according to the value of production. The remaining 11 GCT payments are allocated 
                                                 
27 All primary agricultural sectors covered by a specific group are highlighted using a grey colored background. 
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accordingly. The allocation to the different groups is shown in Table 3 and the distribution 
across the commodities within GCT1 is presented in Table 4. 
Table 3.  Allocation of GCT payments in the EU (EURO Mio.) 
GCT 
payments 
GCT1 GCT2 GCT3 GCT4 GCT5 GCT6 GCT7 GCT8 GCT9 GCT10 GCT11 GCT12 Total 
Output 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Input 130 0 0 0 0 0 938 136 0 0 0 0 1,204 
Land 1,125 35 0 0 478 19 0 0 0 43 2,096 0 3,796 
Capital 146 0 0 0 6 0 434 148 0 0 0 5 739 
Labor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 1,402 35 0 0 484 19 1,373 284 0 43 2,096 5 5,740 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 4.  Allocation of GCT1 payments in the EU (EURO Mio.) 
GCT1 
payments 
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total 
Output 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Input 0 15 20 42 8 2 0 43 0 0 0 0 130 
Land 5 109 191 396 68 14 5 337 0 0 0 0 1,125 
Capital 1 11 16 64 8 1 1 45 0 0 0 0 146 
Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 6 135 227 503 84 17 6 425 0 0 0 0 1,402 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
GCT2 and GCT11 have to be treated differently for oilseeds and protein crops. In both 
groups, the production values for oilseeds have to be reduced by the olive oil production 
value, because payments to olive oil are not included. Furthermore, GCT11 contains only 
protein crops. Protein crops are aggregated with other crops in the sector OCR. Therefore, 
deviating value flows from EUROSTAT are calculated considering the excluded products. 
When updating the GTAP database, the support rate for OCR and OSD in GCT11 as well as 
for OSD in GCT2 is weighted with the share of the production values. 
The SCT is distributed according to the GTAP sectors. There is no particular distribution 
method required, because the SCT is allocated specifically to sectors as already mentioned 
(see Table 5).28 
Table 5.  Allocation of SCT of the EU across GTAP sectors (EURO Mio.) 
GCT1 
payments 
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total 
Output 9 -2 6 382 2 0 0 307 0 7 215 1 927 
Input 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 16 20 -1 0 32 
Land 168 125 1 212 118 30 248 302 0 0 0 0 1,203 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 242 2,376 120 78 0 2,817 
Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 178 123 6 594 120 30 248 848 2,393 147 293 1 4,978 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
                                                 
28 Several EU member states (deu, irl, fra, ita, ndl) had to refund agri-monetary aid to the EU. The negative 
domestic support payments lead to problems when calculating payment shares and shocks. Since the negative 
payments is marginal compared to the total amount of SCT, we omit such payments. 
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Finally, the total value of support for each primary agricultural commodity is found by 
adding up the support allocated to each commodity in the four types of support (SCT, GCT, 
ACT and OTP). 
So far, we only manipulated the OECD PSE data of support with additional information 
from EUROSTAT and the GTAP database. Since the underlying production values of the 
GTAP database differ from the one used in the OECD PSE tables that are based on 
EUROSTAT production values, we implement the new data or update the GTAP database 
using the scaling mechanism demonstrated in the lower part of Figure 6 to get finally 
domestic support into the GTAP database. We apply this scaling mechanism by calculating 
the relation of the different PSE payment types to the EUROSTAT production value.29 This 
share can then be used to shock the comparable relation of the difference between GTAP 
value flows in relation to the GTAP value of output to our target share. In so doing, we bring 
the GTAP data in accordance with the PSE database. 
The share of support for the different payment types is defined by the total value of 
domestic support of ACT, GCT, OTP and SCT divided by the total value of production 
(EUROSTAT) (see Figure 6). Equation (4.11) and (4.12) show that subsidy payments related 
to SCT payments are distributed with a non-homogeneous rate across agricultural sectors. 
First, the power of the subsidy equal to one plus the subsidy rate is calculated. The subsidy 
rate equals SCT per commodity divided by the production value (EUROSTAT). In the second 
equation, the allocation to output, input, land, labor, and capital is determined by computing 
the share of SCT payments going to each payment type. 
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SCTPAYPOSjr SCT payment power related to the production value by commodity j 
and region r 
SCPMijr SCT by payments by type i, commodity j and region r  
SCT_PVSijr Share of SCT by payment type i, commodity j and region r  
The total amount of group specific homogeneous payments over all payment categories 
(TOTPAYMijrg) is then calculated by summing up the 12 GCT payments and ACT payments. 
                                                 
29 The OECD calculates the PSE with the help of the production values provided by Eurostat. Since the 
production values used in GTAP differs from the one of Eurostat, we first calculate the relation of the PSE 
values to the production values provided by Eurostat and pass these shares on the to GTAP, where we multiply 
them with the GTAP production values. Applying these steps we achieve approximately the same relation of 
domestic support payments to the production value in GTAP as calculated before using PSE data and Eurostat 
production values (see Table 12). 
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Furthermore, the share going to each payment type (HOM_PVSijr) is given by the total 
payments divided by the sum over all agricultural commodities of the total value of 
production (see equation (4.13)). 
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HOM_PVSirg Homogeneous ACT and GCT production value shares by payment 
type i, region r and group g 
TOTPAYMijrg Total group specific payments of all categories by payment type i, 
commodity j, region r and group g 
To determine the share of OTP payments (equation (4.14)), the subsidy payments resulting 
from OTP are set in relation to the production value of EUROSTAT (see Figure 6).  
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In contrast to the SCT payments, the subsidy payments related to OTP, ACT and GCT are 
distributed across sectors using homogeneous support. To mirror this difference in the GTAP 
database, the difference between the producer expenditure at agent’s prices (EVFA) and the 
producer expenditure at market prices (VFM) is subdivided into homogeneous and non-
homogeneous support categories as introduced in Section 3 (Figure 3). Comparatively Figure 
4 and 5 illustrate the changes in value flows for intermediate inputs and for output. 
4.3 Experiment design 
The literature review depicted the importance of an evaluation of the effects of modeling 
decoupled payments in CGE models according to deviating underlying assumptions. Hence, 
the objective of our analysis is to examine the implications of different degrees of decoupling 
in a CGE framework and provide a tool to alter the implementation of decoupled payments in 
the model. Given the magnitude of coupling channels affecting the impact of the SFP on 
production decisions, it seems reasonable to prioritize the implementation of the SFP in our 
analysis that is based on the GTAP model. There are other issues, which have to be kept in 
mind, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. At present, the total SFP payments are 
distributed according to factor shares in the GTAP database and allocated across sectors using 
a homogeneous rate for each factor. Varying this representation of the SFP in the GTAP 
database and extending the GTAP model appropriately, enable us to identify the effects of 
different degrees of decoupling. 
In this paper, we compare the default implementation of the SFP in the GTAP framework 
with a set of different SFP distribution options based on deviating underlying assumptions 
about the supposed degree of decoupling. The default option to allocate the OTP payments of 
the OECD is based on the factor usage in each sector that is the default approach in the 
standard GTAP model. Since the factor land is only used in agricultural sectors in the 
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standard GTAP model and its supply is pre-determined, a uniform subsidy to all agricultural 
land is effectively fully decoupled (Frandsen et al., 2003). They stated in their analysis that a 
uniform subsidy given to all agricultural land, irrespective of its use, would result in the same 
supply response as would occur if the subsidy were eliminated, beside some minor budgetary 
effects of eliminating the subsidy. 
We start from the default in the GTAP database and gradually move the support onto the 
factor land. In so doing, we stepwise lower the share given to the factors labor and capital in 
equal proportions until we reach a 100% allocation to the factor land that reflects fully 
decoupling in our analysis as suggested by Frandsen et al. (2003).30  
According to the alternative ways of distributing the OTP, we create “N” alternative 
GTAP databases with i = 1, …, N (see Figure 9) with an increase in the degree of decoupling 
from benchmark to fully decoupled.  
1) BENCHMARK: OTP implemented with a homogeneous rate across factors and 
agricultural commodities (according factor usage). 
2) PARTIAL-DECOUPLED: OTP allocated with a homogeneous rate across primary 
agricultural commodities to the factors land, capital, and labor according to pre-determined 
shares based on varying assumptions. Such a set of deviating underlying degrees of 
decoupling is obtained by gradually diluting the share of the factors labor and capital in equal 
proportions and loading this onto the factor land. 
… 
N) EFFECTIVELY FULLY DECOUPLED : OTP allocated with a homogeneous rate 
across primary agricultural commodities to the factor land. 
These alternative databases are then used as starting points to run simulations respectively 
where the OTP subsidy payments are always completely removed.  
In our empirical example we use a regional disaggregation of the GTAP database that 
separates all EU27 member states, but aggregates Malta and Cyprus as well as Luxembourg 
and Belgium to avoid computational problems related to very small countries (for detail see 
Table A1 and A2, appendix). Furthermore, we consider the agricultural commodities as 
disaggregated as possible. The analysis is conducted with the extended version of the GTAP 
model introduced in Section 3.  
  
                                                 
30 We have been working with version 8 of the GTAP database, where the method used to calibrate OTP 
payments into the database is equal to our first experiment – the allocation based on the factor usage. 
Nevertheless, we start by recalibrating the standard approach into the database using the same method as we use 
to make alternative databases. In so doing, we make our comparison of databases more consistent by using the 
same program to calibrate all databases. 
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Figure 9.  Experiment design 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
4.4 Calculation of domestic support shocks 
In Section 3.1, we described the Altertax model that is used to implement domestic support 
into the GTAP database. Recap that we divided e.g., the difference of EVFA and VFM into 4 
parts (Figure 3). In the Altertax program, we modeled the shares of domestic support 
payments in relation to the value of production (VOM in the GTAP database) for each 
payment category and type. Then, in Section 4, we so far described the manipulation of the 
OECD PSE data to match the GTAP database and determined the shares of domestic support 
in relation to the value of production (Eurostat). Subsequent, the next step further imposes this 
scaling mechanism to implement the PSE domestic support payments in the GTAP database 
by introducing the still missing part on how the shocks employed to change the GTAP 
database are calculated. 
The initial share of OTP in the GTAP database needs to be shocked to the value obtained 
by the OECD PSE data in relation to the EUROSTAT production value. The new value is 
calculated by building the sum of the difference between VFMTijr and VFMXijrg with g = base 
over all agricultural commodities and dividing this value by the sum of VOMjr over all 
agricultural commodities (equation (4.11)). Thereafter the shock to OTP can be introduced by 
taking the difference between OTP_PVSr (see equation (4.10)), which was calculated in 
ds_eu.tab (OECD) and the newly calculated GTAP OTP_SHRr. In the initial situation, this 
share is equal to zero (see equation (4.12)). Using this shock, the share of domestic support 
allocated to OTP adjusts to the share calculated using the PSE values. 
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OTP_SHRr Share of domestic support allocated to OTP/SFP in GTAP by region r 
VOMjr Value of output at market prices by commodity j and region r 
SHOTPr Shock to OTP/SFP in GTAP by region r 
OTP_PVSr Share of domestic support allocated to OTP/SFP (OECD) by region r 
The scaling mechanism and the related shocks to GCT and ACT subsidies are applied in a 
similar way. In this part ACT and GCT payments are implemented at once, but the related 
value flows consider an additional index. This index includes the different payment groups 
(ACT, GCT1, …, GCT12) so that this value flow is established like a chain. Due to this chain, 
we are able to implement group specific policy instruments (see Section 3.1). The endowment 
share for ACT, e.g., is calculated by the difference between VFMXijrg with g = base and 
VFMXijrg with g = gct1 summed over agricultural commodities divided by the sum over 
agricultural commodities of VOMjr. Subtracting this initial GTAP share based on from the 
share obtained by the PSE data in relation to Eurostat production values, we get the shock to 
ACT payments allocated to land, labor, and capital in GTAP (equation (4.13) and (4.14)). 
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SHR_ENDWirg Share of all and group commodity domestic support allocated to land, 
labor and capital subsidies in GTAP in region r for group g 
SHK_ENDWirg Shock to all and group commodity payments allocates to land, labor 
and capital in GTAP in region r for group g 
HOM_PVSirg Share of all and group commodity domestic support allocated to land, 
labor and capital (OECD) in region r for group g 
The implementation of ACT and GCT payments allocated to intermediate inputs involves 
more consideration. In the GTAP model, inputs are differentiated according to their origin. In 
contrast, in the PSE tables, there is no distinction made between imported and domestically 
produced intermediate inputs. Therefore, the share in GTAP is determined by summing up 
both the share for domestically produced intermediate inputs and the imported one (equation 
(4.15)). The calculation of the shocks is analogous to the one for endowments and can be 
retraced from equation (4.16) that yields in a shock for both value flows together. 
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SHR_INTrg Share of all and group commodity domestic support allocated to input 
subsidies in GTAP in region r for group g 
SHK_INTrg Shock to all and group commodity payments allocated to inputs in 
GTAP in region r fro group g 
HOM_PVSirg Share of all and group commodity domestic support allocated to 
inputs (OECD)in region r for group g 
The product specific support is calculated differently, because those payments are directly 
related to one special commodity. The SCT is allocated to inputs, land and capital as well as 
output. Output subsidies are given only as commodity specific support. Due to the 
consideration of output subsidies, VOMjr has to be included in the procedure. Consequently, 
we need to deviate from the procedure applied before, where all shares are determined in 
relation to VOMjr to avoid a bias. 
The deviating approach to implement SCT is presented in equation (4.17) to (4.20). We 
first calculate the power of tax, by calculating the relation between the SCT value and VOMjr 
and add 1 (4.17.). Beforehand, we computed the power of SCTPAYPOS (compare equation 
(4.7)). This power is now divided by initial PO_TAXir (compare equation (4.18)) to determine 
the shock. Additionally, it is essential to calculate shares of SCT going to output, inputs, land, 
and capital. In equation (4.19) and (4.20) the calculation is shown for output subsidies as an 
example, the equations for the other subsidies can be found in the attached file containing the 
shock calculations. 
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5 Iterative procedure to integrate domestic support into the GTAP 
database  
In this Section, we explain the technical procedure utilized to implement domestic support 
payments. Since the technical steps are tightly intertwined, we provide here a systematic 
description of how to incorporate or alter domestic support in the GTAP database applying 
the models introduced in Section 3, the created databases described in Section 4.1 and 4.2 and 
the shocks specified in Section 4.4.  
As introduced in Section 4 the PSE values are re-allocated according the GTAP 
aggregation. After this re-allocating according to the GTAP sectors and payment categories 
(compare file EU_pse.xlsx)31 it is necessary to transfer the domestic support data into the 
GTAP database. Therefore, the OECD PSE data is copied into a header array (har)-file 
(compare pse_eu.har) which is read into a program called ds.tab. In this file, our exemplary 
region, the EU, is disaggregated at member state level.32 For the implementation procedure of 
domestic support, additional set definitions are needed. The file sets.har contains the standard 
GTAP set definitions, while the file ds_sets.har comprises the additional set definitions 
required for the domestic support calculations.  
The PSE payments can be differentiated into 4 payment groups. As introduced in Section 
4.2, the SCT payments are product specific and are therefore directly allocated to products 
and payment categories. The ACT and GCT payments are not product specific, but bound on 
production of commodities belonging to a defined group. These payments are allocated by 
payments types, but with a group-specific homogeneous subsidy rate to commodities. The 
remaining OTP is the focal point of this analysis. As introduced in Section 4.3, we applied 
different allocation options shown in Figure 8. This operation is conducted applying the tab- 
file ds.tab using the mentioned input files. Beyond, in the file ds.tab the share of product 
specific support going to the categories output, input, land, labor and capital is calculated. For 
the incorporation into the GTAP database the application of the scaling mechanism, as 
already mentioned, is required. Therefore, we calculate the share of PSE values in relation to 
the Eurostat production value and multiply this share with the value of output in the GTAP 
database. This procedure was more precisely explained in Section 4.2. Consequently, the 
output obtained by running ds.tab is PSE payments that are manipulated in order to fit with 
the GTAP database. The output is written to ds_gtap.har.  
In Figure 10, the implementation procedure is shown starting with the scaling of PSE data 
to the GTAP level up to the application of the extended standard GTAP model. To correctly 
implement domestic support in the GTAP database all support rates need to be updated, but 
particularly, the OTP needs to be allocated either with the help of a homogeneous rate across 
sectors to land, labor and capital (default in GTAP) or with an allocation to the factor land 
according an assumed degree of decoupling. Therefore, it is necessary to determine shocks 
(refer to Section 4.4) to adjust the GTAP database. These shocks are computed in ds_shk.tab.  
                                                 
31 Refer to table A4 in the appendix for the description of files. Please note that all required files will be provided 
via www.gtap.org. 
32 In case a higher aggregation of the EU member states is required, the tablo- (tab) file regions_mapping.tab is 
provided to change the OECD PSE data according to the selected aggregation of the EU member states. This tab-
file delivers an updated har-file named pse_eu_agg.har, which is then used to replace pse_eu.har. 
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Figure 10.  Structure of the implementation procedure IV 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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As shown in Figure 10 additional input files are required for this program, which are the 
standard GTAP input files (sets.har, default.prm, basedata.har) plus the required files for 
domestic support (ds_sets.har and ds_gtap.har). In the next step of the implementation 
process, the Altertax program developed by Gerard Malcolm (Malcolm, 1998) is applied to 
shock the domestic support variables and adjust the database within an iterative procedure. 
Specifically, ds_slug.tab is needed to calibrate the homogeneous subsidy rate for land; labor 
and capital depending on the chosen distribution method (compare Section 3 and 4). 
Therefore, the ds_slug.tab is adjusted to accommodate the needs to implement domestic 
support. The target is to achieve only minimal changes to all other variables in the database, 
when implementing domestic support.  
To run this Altertax program nine Gempack command-files (compare alterdo.cmf, 
alterdo1.cmf, ..., alterdo8.cmf) are applied to impose the closure shown in (Figure A1).33 In so 
doing, the shocks and swaps are introduced stepwise. The output is written to an updated 
GTAP database file (compare altbase.upd, alterbase1.upd …, alterbase8.upd).  
How does this procedure work? We swap for example the exogenous (compare Figure A1) 
policy variable tfsfpr with DEL_OTP_SHRr to become endogenous in the model. The change 
variable DEL_OTP_SHRr is then shocked with SHOTPir calculated in ds_shk.tab (compare 
equation (4.12) in Section 4.4). Following the method for tfsfpr the other policy variables (tfsr, 
tor, tfdmsctr,…) are likewise made endogenous using a swap. In the next step, the related 
change variables are shocked using shocks calculated in ds_shk.tab. For domestic support 
excluding OTP the shocks and swaps are subdivided into the different categories of support. 
The swaps and shocks required for the domestic support update are implemented stepwise to 
enable the GTAP Altertax model to solve as accurately as possible and achieve only minimal 
changes in other variables in the database. 
Finally, the ds_gtap.tab, adapted from the standard file gtap.tab to include the domestic 
support as explained in Section 3.2, is used for an initial run to establish the adjusted standard 
GTAP closure (compare Figure A2) and perform the price homogeneity test. After doing 
these steps domestic support is implemented in the GTAP database and can be used for 
simulations e.g., the 100% reduction of OTP as shown in Section 4.3 of this paper (compare 
Figure 10). 
After that, the tab-file ds_gtpvew.tab, a modification of the standard gtpvew.tab to capture 
the details of domestic support payments, is applied to calculate additional tax rates for the 
newly implemented allocation of domestic support subsidies together with some other 
summary values used to demonstrate how successful the implementation procedure was 
(Section 6). 
  
                                                 
33 A onetime solution results only in rough estimates, whereas the sequential steps are necessary for the fine-
tuning. Users have the ability to vary the number of iterations by reducing the number of alterdo.cmf-files and 
adjusting the batch-file accordingly, if they prefer shorter solution time over the fine tuning. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Output of database update 
In Table 6, the default allocation of OTP across sectors and factors is shown, displayed as a 
homogeneous percentage support rate across factors and sectors using Germany as an 
example. 
Table 6.  Homogeneous allocation of OTP across factors and sectors in Germany (%) 
RTFSFP PDR WHT GRO V_F OSD C_B PFB OCR CTL OAP RMK WOL 
Land -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 
Unskilled Labor -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 
Skilled Labor -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 
Capital -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 -72 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In contrast, Table 7 depicts the product specific rates for the SCT by type of support. 
Table 7.  Product specific allocation of SCT in Germany (%) 
RTFSCT PDR WHT GRO V_F OSD C_B PFB OCR CTL OAP RMK WOL 
Land 0 0 0 -0.02 0 0 0 -0.99 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.64 -0.07 0 0 0 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 -0.02 0 0 0 -1.63 -0.07 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
While in Table 8 the homogeneous distribution of ACT payments over all commodities by 
type of support is presented. 
Table 8.  Factor specific homogeneous allocation of ACT in Germany (%) 
RTFACT PDR WHT GRO V_F OSD C_B PFB OCR CTL OAP RMK WOL 
Land -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 -13 
Unskilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 9 illustrates the special case for the group commodity transfer payments in Germany. 
Here, it becomes obvious that only products belonging to the group GCT1 are receiving 
subsidies. These subsidies are allocated with a homogeneous rate across these commodities. 
In Germany GCT1 payments are only given to the factor land.  
 42 
 
Table 9.  Group and factor specific homogeneous allocation of GCT1 in Germany (%) 
RTFGCT1 PDR WHT GRO V_F OSD C_B PFB OCR CTL OAP RMK WOL 
Land -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 10 highlights the deviating allocation mechanism for GCT2 and GCT11 concerning 
oilseeds and protein crops.  
Table 10. Group and factor specific homogeneous allocation of GCT11 in Germany (%) 
RTFGCT11 PDR WHT GRO V_F OSD C_B PFB OCR CTL OAP RMK WOL 
Land 0 -2.68 -2.68 0 -2.68 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skilled Labor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 -2.68 -2.68 0 -2.68 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In the case of Germany the sectors for wheat, other grains and oilseeds receive a 
homogeneous tax rate, while in the remaining sector other crops (OCR) only the commodity 
protein crops is eligible for subsidies. Therefore, the subsidy rate is reduced compared to the 
other three commodities. In addition, the oilseeds sector in other EU member states, e.g., 
Greece, Spain and Italy, has a more varying rate due to excluded olive oil payments, which is 
not relevant for Germany. 
Table 11 and 12 provide a summary of the domestic support update of the GTAP database.  
Table 11. Total domestic support value of the EU27 (USD Mio.) 
 OTP ACT GCT SCT Total 
Output 0 0 0 1,384 1,384 
Input 0 0 0 0 0 
Land 8,775 9,507 5,236 2,557 26,075 
Capital 9,680 7,782 965 3,587 22,015 
Unskilled Labor 24,789 635 2 0 25,426 
Skilled Labor 1,688 44 0 0 1,732 
Total 44,933 24,635 6,757 7,576 83,901 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The file ds_gtpvew.tab contains the calculation of total domestic support in GTAP by 
product, payment category, and region. Furthermore, the share of each domestic support 
payment type related to the total value of domestic support as well as the value of production 
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is computed. The herewith-determined value of 83,820 USD Million in the GTAP database 
corresponds to 102%34 of the initial domestic support given by the OECD. 
The domestic support share of the production value is also close. The share in the GTAP 
database is equal to 5.11 while the PSE share in relation to the EUROSTAT production value 
accounts for 5.2. 
Table 12. Comparison of the information on domestic support in the OCED PSE tables 
and the GTAP database 
 OECD PSE payments related to Eurostat 
production values 
Domestic support payments related to GTAP 
production values 
 
SCT ACT GCT OTP Total SCT ACT GCT OTP Total 
Output 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 
Input 0.00 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.37 
Land 0.46 0.77 0.45 0.11 1.78 0.63 0.77 0.44 0.14 1.97 
Capital 0.48 0.38 0.16 0.27 1.29 0.52 0.38 0.15 0.24 1.29 
Unskilled Labor 1.48 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.51 1.28 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.31 
Skilled Labor 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Total 2.50 1.49 0.77 0.49 5.25 2.50 1.49 0.64 0.49 5.11 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
  
                                                 
34 To obtain a closer match of OECD and GTAP domestic support data more iterations of the update procedure 
would be required. In complex simulation models, we always face a trade-off fine-tuning versus solution time. 
Users of this implementation procedure can adjust the iterations and hence the accuracy according their needs. 
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6.2 Sensitivity analysis results 
In the course of this section, we present selected results of the conducted sensitivity 
analysis. To carry out the sensitivity analysis we stepwise increased the degree of decoupling 
through gradually diluting the allocation to the factors capital and labor while shifting it onto 
the factor land until the OTP is distributed completely to the factor land. The intention of our 
comparison is twofold. First, we show the development of the effects due to an elimination of 
OTP depending on the underlying degree of decoupling. Second, we contrast the results of the 
scenario, in which we implemented the OTP as an effectively fully decoupled payment, with 
the default implementation in GTAP. 
The production effects are illustrated by the percentage changes in output quantity in 
Figures 11 to 14 using different selections of countries and primary agricultural sectors. These 
graphs clearly depict that the effect of an elimination of OTP decreases with an increase in the 
degree of decoupling. It can be seen that there are no production changes in the scenario 
“decoupled” exposed by a degree of decoupling equal to one. The reason for this is of course, 
the distribution with a homogeneous subsidy rate across primary agricultural commodities 
given to the factor land, which is used only by agricultural sectors. 
Figure 11. Production effects in the wheat sector for selected EU member states 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
%
Degree of Decoupling
DEU IRL FRA ITA POL GBR NLD BGR AUT GRC
 45 
 
The Figures 11 to 14 show that OTP distributed only to the factor land causes no 
production effects in all EU member states and in all primary agricultural sectors. Hence, the 
Figures 11 to 14 approve that this way of implementation and modeling reflects effectively 
fully decoupled payments in the GTAP database and model. This method of distributing the 
OTP in the GTAP database should be selected, when one assumes that the subsidies create no 
incentives to produce. Beyond, this supports our presumption that the effects are smaller the 
higher the share of OTP allocated to land is. Thinking about the removal of subsidies one 
generally would expect negative effects on output. However, Figure 11 reveals that the 
abolishment of OTP in the EU leads to a rise in wheat production in the Netherlands and in 
Bulgaria. Of course, this effect is decreasing with an increase in the degree of decoupling. The 
cattle sector shown in Figure 12 has positive output effects in Italy, Poland and slightly 
positive in Estonia.  
In general, the range of the effects is much smaller in the EU member states that joined 
the EU in 2004. Beyond a significantly lower value of output in primary agricultural sectors 
of the EU, the main reason is that they receive OTP counting only for 3 to 5 percent of the 
value of output except for Estonia and Latvia (8%), Czech Republic (7%) and Hungary and 
Lithuania (6%). Most of the EU15 member states hold share higher than 8% except some of 
the Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain (6%), Portugal (4%) and France (7%)) and, in 
particular, the Netherlands with only 2%. 
Figure 12. Production effects in the cattle sector for selected EU member states 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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From both graphs, it becomes obvious that Ireland faces in both sectors the highest effect 
on output. Figure 13 confirms those high effects, in particular, for the sectors oilseeds, wheat 
as well as vegetables and fruits, while the livestock and other meat sectors together with other 
grains and other crops are less affected.  
Figure 13. Production effects in selected sectors in Ireland 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
A closer look at agricultural production in Ireland reveals that meat and dairy products 
comprise the major shares of Irish agriculture, while plant breeding plays only a minor role. 
Nevertheless, this does not explain why Ireland observes the highest negative effect on cattle 
production in comparison to all other EU member states. The value of output in the Irish cattle 
sector is comparable low to all other EU 15 member states. Beyond this, the OTP counts for 
almost 16% of the total value of primary agricultural output, while countries such as France, 
Germany, or Italy face numbers between 6 and 9%. In Ireland the elimination of the OTP 
leads to a shift of the production factors capital and labor from primary agricultural and food 
processing sectors to manufacturing and services, while the factor land migrates from less 
competitive sectors such as wheat, vegetables and fruits, and oilseeds into sectors such as 
livestock and other crops. This factor movement explains the negative production effects and, 
in particular, why they are less negative for some of the sectors. 
In contrast, Figure 14 shows the primary agricultural sectors of the Netherlands. Here, we 
see a picture that is split up into two pieces. The ruminant livestock and dairy sectors and, in 
particular, the oilseeds sector denote slightly negative influences due to the elimination of 
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OTP, while all other plant breeding sectors and other animal production are positively 
affected, clearly led by the wheat sector. 
Figure 14. Production effects in selected sectors in the Netherlands 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Agriculture in the Netherlands is dominated by the production of other crops, e.g., flowers, 
seeds and fodder, and vegetables and fruits as well as livestock and dairy products. The 
positive effects on production can be explained with the lowest share of OTP in relation to the 
value of output that counts for only 2%. This increases the competitiveness of the plant 
breeding sectors and consequently leads to a shift of production factors from ruminant 
livestock and oilseed production to plant breeding. 
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presents the changes in the equivalent variation induced by the elimination of OTP with 
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15, an effectively fully decoupled OTP has no influence on welfare. Besides, Figure 15 
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for some countries while positive for others requires a more specific experiment setting, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. The different implications on welfare are possibly 
caused by other market distortions together with intra EU trade as well as inter-regional trade. 
The variation of OTP among regions also leads to unequal effects. In case of partially 
decoupled support a removal causes effects on output and prices, consequently the factor 
allocation is affected that may enhance the production in sectors that are highly supported in 
some EU countries and not or only minimal in others. This could lead to opposite welfare 
effects. Furthermore, the reaction of consumers and producers on price effects, caused by the 
removal of a partially decoupled subsidy, varies between EU member states.  
Figure 15. Change in the equivalent variation in selected EU member states (Mio US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Beyond the creation of production effects and the accompanied changes in the equivalent 
variation, it is interesting to point out the effects on trade. In particular, since OTP are 
designed as decoupled payments that create no production incentives and that are 
consequently only minimally trade distorting. To account for the distortive effects, Figure 16 
highlights the changes in the trade balance in selected EU member states. Generally, one 
would assume that at least the removal of partially decoupled payments leads to a decrease in 
the trade balance. Here, it becomes apparent that partially decoupled payments create an 
increase in trade balance, again with a diminishing extent as the degree of decoupling rises. 
Striking is that the change in trade balance does not reduce to zero in all member states. In 
Germany, the change in the trade balance due to an effectively fully decoupled OTP is still 
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positive while it turns to be negative for some other countries as France or UK when it 
reaches a high degree of decoupling. 
Figure 16. Change in the trade balance of selected EU member states (Mio US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The analysis of the German import and export value flows uncovers that the removal of 
OTP leads in all scenarios to a decrease in net exports in primary agricultural commodities. 
This does not apply to ruminant livestock and meat production as well as dairy products. 
However, this reduction in net exports is offset by the increases in net export in the 
manufacturing and service sectors. In France, the total net exports are negative in the initial 
situation due to the relative dominance of manufacturing. For the agricultural sectors such as 
wheat, other grains, oilseeds and livestock we see a different picture. France is net importer 
mainly for vegetables and fruits as well as other crops. The removal of OTP allocated 
homogeneously according the factor usage or reflecting partial decoupling with only little 
degree of decoupling results in an increase in agricultural imports and a decrease in exports 
except for wheat and cattle, together with an increase of manufacturing exports and less 
imports. In contrast, the elimination of an effectively fully decoupled OTP causes only 
minimally rises in the value of imports and exports leading to a more or less constant value 
for net exports of agricultural sectors. The negative change in the trade balance in the highly 
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modeled as decoupled in the GTAP framework are not free of implications for trade, but the 
effects in the model can be regarded as modest. 
So far, only the results of the implementation of OTP with varying degrees of decoupling 
are analyzed. Thus, we now turn the focus on the comparison with the default in the GTAP 
model that deviates from the other options through modeling OTP with a homogeneous rate 
not only across primary agricultural commodities but as well across factors. The results are 
shown in Table 13 and contrasted against partially decoupled support distributed according 
the factor usage with a homogeneous rate across primary agricultural commodities in GTAP.  
Table 13. Comparison of the default distribution mode of the SFP in the standard GTAP 
with partial decoupling according the factor usage for selected countries 
 SPAIN FRANCE IRELAND NETHERLANDS 
 default 
according to 
factor usage default 
according to 
factor usage default 
according to 
factor usage default 
according to 
factor usage 
Degree of 
decoupling 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
% change in 
output 
        
wheat -7.32 -7.61 -6.21 -6.57 -28.07 -31.68 11.29 12.29 
other grains -3.32 -3.47 -3.18 -3.35 -13.97 -15.77 2.12 2.41 
vegetables 
and fruits 
-5.54 -5.76 -9.69 -10.26 -23.26 -26.24 1.09 1.49 
oilseeds -7.65 -8.00 -10.58 -11.18 -35.49 -38.93 -3.67 -3.65 
sugar crops -1.50 -1.57 -1.20 -1.28 -1.67 -1.91 0.37 0.44 
other crops -3.88 -4.07 -3.83 -4.07 -11.14 -12.80 2.59 3.06 
cattle -1.88 -2.12 -1.47 -1.52 -14.43 -16.42 -0.88 -0.69 
other meet -2.03 -0.05 -3.63 -3.85 -14.11 -16.02 2.34 2.73 
raw milk -0.05 12.20 -1.28 -1.36 -17.14 -19.28 -0.49 -0.36 
         
Change in 
trade balance 
532.93 529.89 1,046.39 1,044.68 96.08 103.14 99.61 104.17 
         
Change in 
welfare 
631.16 669.15 867.37 927.61 255.60 301.50 601.69 629.59 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
The simulation results clearly depict that the homogeneous distribution across factors and 
agricultural commodities reduces the effect on production compared to the allocation 
according the factor usage. The changes in trade balance are negligible for Spain and France, 
while we see a reduction of around 7% in Ireland and the Netherlands. Contrary, the decline 
in the equivalent variation is more remarkable with 6% in Spain up to 18% in Ireland due to 
the allocation with a homogeneous subsidy rate to the factors. 
Summarizing the results, our sensitivity analysis reveals strong differences in simulation 
results, which are particularly notable in the responses of the food and agricultural sectors. 
Accordingly, results of trade liberalization including domestic support are highly sensitive to 
the approach, which is chosen to implement OTP in simulation models. 
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7 Summary and future directions  
This paper shows how to implement or alter domestic support in the GTAP database using 
the EU as an example. We use the PSE tables provided by the OECD and reallocated the PSE 
payments to align them with the sectoral aggregation employed in GTAP framework. In the 
paper, we explain stepwise how the standard GTAP model and the Altertax model are 
extended, the data is modified, and the shocks for the GTAP database are calculated and 
implemented within an iterative procedure. With this approach, we provide a tool allowing 
GTAP users to change the distribution of domestic support in the standard GTAP database to 
apply their assumptions regarding domestic support and particularly decoupled domestic 
support. Furthermore, GTAP users are able to update domestic support in the GTAP database 
for other countries included in the GTAP database given that PSE data is available. Hence, 
this approach can easily be adjusted to incorporate PSE data of other countries into the GTAP 
model and database.  
The EU’s SFP is regarded as more or less non-trade distorting. The literature review points 
out that decoupled payments still have an influence on production via various coupling 
channels, e.g., risk and wealth, credit constraint, land and labor allocation as well as farmers 
expectations about future policies. Most of the authors not only state that these effects are 
rather modest, but that the effect of decoupled payments on land allocation and related 
production effects are most important. Econometrically determined effects of decoupled 
payments are mainly estimated for selected coupling channels. 
As revealed in the literature, there is not just “one degree of decoupling” that should be 
used in CGE models. This implies that every user needs to find out the most appropriate one 
depending on the selected aggregation of the GTAP database and the posed research question. 
From our point of view, the default implementation in GTAP (homogeneous distribution 
across factors and sectors) is too pessimistic, while effectively fully decoupled 
implementation in GTAP (allocation only to the factor land with a homogeneous rate across 
sectors) is too optimistic. Several studies confirm that the SFP capitalizes in land rents (e.g., 
Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009), van Meijl et al. (2006)) and other studies state moderate 
effects of other coupling channels (e.g., Goodwin and Mishra (2009), Bhaskar and Beghin 
(2009)). Since we apply the same distribution to all EU member states without accounting for 
regional deviations of the SFP, without considering different types of agricultural producers 
(self-supporter up to agricultural co-operatives) and the importance of the agricultural sector 
in the EU countries, it is not possible to determine one specific degree of decoupling. 
However, we would suggest GTAP users to specify a range of the degree of decoupling that is 
more oriented in the direction of decoupled support, e.g., shifting 80 to 90% of the SFP 
allocated to labor and capital onto the factor land. This way the GTAP database and model 
reflect the decoupled character of the SFP without neglecting other coupling channels. 
 To improve the implementation of SFP in simulation models, one needs to employ 
coupling factors that are more accurate. The adjustment of the underlying assumptions for the 
distribution of the SFP using such coupling factors would reflect the coupling through other 
channels in a more realistic way. While allocating the SFP with a homogeneous rate to the 
factor land, possible production effects due to other coupling channels are not reflected by the 
model. Therefore, these effects have to be estimated and can then be integrated into the model 
by adjusting the degree of decoupling in the model. The higher the estimated degree of 
decoupling is the higher should be the share allocated to land in the GTAP model. 
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Based on the discussion in the literature, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the mode of 
allocation of SFP payments in simulation models utilizing OECD PSE data and the GTAP 
framework. Thus, we apply a set of simulations to update domestic support and, in particular, 
the SFP in the GTAP database by varying the underlying assumptions about the distribution 
of OTP/ SFP. This sensitivity analysis reveals strong differences in simulations results, which 
are particularly pronounced in the production responses of the food and agricultural sectors. 
The results clearly indicate that the distribution of OTP over the factors is a crucial driver for 
the model’s results. Accordingly, results of trade liberalization, including the removal of 
domestic support, are highly sensitive to the mode by which the SFP is implemented in 
simulation models. The current standard approach to calibrate the GTAP database is based on 
a distribution of OTP/ SFP with a homogeneous rate according to factor shares, which 
represents a low degree of decoupling. Our analysis reveals that effectively fully decoupling 
can be achieved, when the SFP is completely allocated to the factor land and distributed over 
agricultural production sectors with a homogeneous subsidy rate.  
Our approach enables GTAP users to adjust the GTAP database to be able to account for 
country specific domestic support issues and run more adequate agricultural policy 
simulations or WTO trade liberalizations scenarios. In case of WTO simulations, a 
reconciling of OECD and PSE data is required to capture the WTO classification of domestic 
support according to amber, blue, and green boxes. This is done for the EU25 in Jensen et al. 
(2009). For future analysis, it would be desirable to have better empirical results of the “real” 
degree of decoupling and an explicit modeling of market price support in the GTAP model.   
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Tables and Figures  
Table A1.  Regional aggregation of the GTAP database 
Countries and Regions 
 
Abbreviation 
1  Austria  aus 
2  Belgium and Luxembourg  BLUX 
3  Denmark  dnk 
4  Finland  fin 
5  France  fra 
6  Germany  deu 
7  Ireland  irl 
8  United Kingdom  gbr 
9  Greece  grc 
10  Italy  ita 
11  Netherlands  nld 
12  Portugal  prt 
13  Spain  esp 
14  Sweden  swe 
15  Czech Republic  cze 
16  Hungary  hun 
17  Malta and Cyprus  CM 
18  Poland  pol 
19  Slovakia  svk 
20  Slovenia  svn 
21  Estonia  est 
22  Latvia  lva 
23  Lithuania  ltu 
24  Bulgaria  bgr 
25  Romania  rou 
26  Rest of the World:  ROW 
 
 United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, 
Albania, Croatia, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Panama, Rest of South America, Rest of Oceania, 
Rest of Caribbean, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Hong Kong, Korea, Rest 
of East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Rest of Central America, Belarus, Rest 
of Eastern Europe, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Rest of Western Asia, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa, Rest of South African CU, Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Rest of Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, Rest of South Asia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Rest of Western Africa, Rest of Central Africa, Rest of South Central 
Africa, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Other 
Eastern Africa, Taiwan, Rest of North America, Russian Federation, Rest of Europe, 
Kazakhstan, Rest of FSU, Azerbaijan, Iran Islamic Republic, Ukraine, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Bahrein, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab. 
Emirates, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Kenia, Rwanda, and 
Namibia 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table A2.  Sectoral aggregation in GTAP 
Sectors 
 
Abbreviation 
1  Paddy rice  pdr 
2  Wheat  wht 
3  Cereal grains nec  gro 
4  Vegetables, fruits, nuts  v_f 
5  Oilseeds  osd 
6  Sugar cane, sugar beet  c_b 
7  Plant-based fibres  pfb 
8  Crops nec  ocr 
9  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses  ctl 
10  Animal products nec  oap 
11  Raw milk  rmk 
12  Wool, silk worm cocoons  wol 
13  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, hoarses  cmt 
14  Meat products nec  oap 
15  Vegetable oils and fats  vol 
16  Dairy products  mil 
17  Processed rice  pct 
18  Sugar  sgr 
19  Other food  ofd 
20  Beverages and tobacco products  b_t 
21  Manufacturing:  MNFC 
  
Coal, oil, gas, petroleum, coal products, Forestry, fishing, minerals, Textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather products, wood products, paper products, publishing, chemical, rubber, 
plastic prods, mineral products nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products, motor 
vehicles and parts, transport equipment, electronic equipment, machinery and equipment, 
manufactures nec 
  
22  Services:  SERVICES 
 
 Water, construction, trade, transport nec, sea transport, air transport, communication, 
financial services nec, insurance, business services nec, recreation and other services, 
PubAdmin/ Defence/ Health/ Educat, dwellings 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table A4.  List of files 
Type Name of file Description 
Excel file EU_pse.xlsx OECD PSE data, allocated according to GTAP aggregation 
Gempack command 
file 
alterdo.cmf, alterdo1.cmf, …, 
alterdo8.cmf 
Command file to start the file ds_slug.tab 
ds.cmf Command file to start the file ds_eu.tab 
ds_shk.cmf Command file to start the file ds_shk.tab 
ds_regmap.cmf Command file to start the file regions_mapping.tab 
init.cmf Command file to start the numeraire shock 
tsfpllc.cmf Command file to shock SFP to zero 
Gempack solution 
file 
altbase.sl4, altbase1.sl4, …, 
altbase8.sl4 
Solution file after updating the GTAP data base with the 
calculated domestic support shocks 
tsfpllc.sl4 Solution file after removal of SFP 
Header array file 
basedata.har Original GTAP base data 
ds_sets.har 
Additional sets required for the implementation of domestic 
support 
ds_gtap.har Data file including the GTAP PSE data 
pse_eu_agg.har 
Data file including the OECD PSE data aggregated to the 
selected GTAP aggregation 
pse_eu27.har 
Data file including the OECD PSE data for the 27 EU member 
states 
ds_shk.har, ds_shk1.har, …, 
dsshk9.har 
Shock file including shares to shock the GTAP data base 
altbase8T.har View files for the tax rates after DS update 
altbase8V.har View files for coefficients after DS update 
tsfpllcT.har View files for the tax rates after SFP removal 
tsfpllcV.har View files for coefficients after SFP removal 
sets.har Original GTAP set file 
Stored input file 
ds_slug.sti Stored input file to change the closure in Altertax program 
ds_gtap.sti Stored input file to change the closure for ds_gtap.tab 
Tablo file 
ds.tab Program to calculate the PSE domestic support shares 
ds_slug.tab Altertax program to shock the GTAP data base 
ds_gtap.tab Standard GTAP tab file with extension for domestic support 
ds_gtpvew.tab GTAP view tab.file with modifications for domestic support 
ds_shk.tab 
Shock file to calculate the values used to shock the GTAP data 
base 
ds_regmap.tab 
Program to aggregate the PSE data according to the selected 
GTAP aggregation 
Updated Gempack 
data file 
altbase.upd, altbase1.upd, .., 
altbase8.upd 
Updated data base after running the Altertax program 
tsfpllc.har Updated data base after SFP removal 
Windows batch file 
update_ds.bat 
Batch file to update domestic support in the standard GTAP data 
base 
p_sfp_0.bat 
Batch file to update domestic support in the standard GTAP data 
base and shock SFP in the updated GTAP data base to zero 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
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Table A5.  List of additional sets for domestic support 
Name of set (paper/ 
tab.file) 
Description Header 
AGRI/ AGRI_COMM All primary agricultural commodities AGRI 
ALLPAYT All payment types (output, input, land, labor and capital) PAYT 
BASEGROUP ACT and GCT product groups plus OTP GB 
DS_REG Domestic support countries DS_R 
ENDW/ ENDW_COMM Endowment commodities H6 
ENERGI/ ENERGI_COMM Manufacturing goods ENER 
GCT1 All agricultural commodities belonging to group 1 (all crops) GCT1 
GCT12 
All agricultural commodities belonging to group 12 (all 
crops) 
GC12 
GROUP ACT and GCT product groups GR 
INPUT Input INP 
INT/ INT_COMM Intermediate inputs INT 
MFAC/ MFAC_COMM Labor and capital endowments MFAC 
NAGRI/ NAGRI_COMM Non-agricultural commodities  
NNAT/ NNAT_COMM Non-natural resources (land, labor and capital) NNAT 
NNATDIS/ 
NNTATDIS_COMM 
Non-natural resources, labor disagg. into skilled and unskilled NDIS 
NOPT Non-output payments NOPT 
OUTPUT Output OUT 
PROD/ PROD_COMM Produced commodities H5 
REGS Disaggregated domestic support countries H1 
TRAD/ TRAD_COMM Traded commodities H2 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table A6.  List of variables and coefficients 
Name Description 
ACTPir All commodity transfer payments (OECD) by payment type i and region r 
ACTPOWERir ACT power of support by payment type i and region r 
ACTTRANijr All commodity transfer payments by payment type i, commodity j and region r  
DECOUPSHRir Degree of decoupling for endowment i and region r 
del_otp_shrr Change in share of OTP support in region r 
del_potax_sctjr Change in the power of tax for commodity j in region r 
del_shr_endwjrg 
Change in share of subsidies allocated to land, labor and capital for commodity j in 
region r for group g 
del_shr_intjrg 
Change in share of subsidies allocated to input for commodity j in region r for 
group g 
del_shrout_sctjr Change in the share of output subsidy for commodity j in region r 
del_votax_sctjr Change in the total tax for commodity j in region r 
EVFAijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at agents prices 
GCT1PAYijr 
GTAP activity-specific GCT1 payments by payment type i, commodity j and 
region r 
GCT1Pir GCT1 payments (OECD) by payment type i, commodity j and region r 
GCT1POWERir GCT1 power of support by payment type i and region r 
HOM_PVSirg Share of domestic support allocated to payment type i in region r for group g 
MMREGjrg 
Regional mapping matrix to allocate products to groups for commodity j in region r 
for group g 
OTP_PVSir OTP share of the production value for endowment i in region r 
OTP_SHRr Share of domestic support allocated to SFP in GTAP by region r 
OTPHkr Other transfer payments to producers by endowment k in region r 
OTRANir Other transfer to producers by factor usage for endowment i in region r 
pfdijr Price index for domestic purchases of i by j in region r 
pfeijr Firms’ price for commodity i in commodity j of region r 
pfmijr Price index for imports of i by commodity j in region r 
pimir Market price of composite import i used by commodity j in region r 
pmesijr Market price of sluggish endowment i used by commodity j in region r 
pmestijr Market price of sluggish endowment i incl. factor tax used by j in r 
pmesxijrg 
Market price of sluggish endowment incl. homogeneous support i used by j in r of 
g 
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Table A6.  List of variables and coefficients (cntd.) 
Name Description 
pmir 
Market price of commodity i in region r 
pmxijrg 
Market price for domestic i in commodity j of region r including ACT and GCT 
subsidies 
PO_TAX_SCTir 
Initial power of tax (SCT) levels for commodity i in region r 
PO_TAXir Power of tax in GTAP for commodity i in region r 
POSCTjr Power of tax shock in GTAP for commodity j in region r 
PRODNjr Value of agricultural production (EUROSTAT)by commodity j and region r 
PRODV_SHRjrg 
Relation of production values to account for deviating production values in GCT2 
and GCT11 for commodity j in region r for group g  
qfdijr Industry demands for domestic goods 
qfeijr Demand for endowment i for use in commodity j in region r 
qfmijr Industry demands for aggregate imports 
qojr Output of commodity j in region r 
SCPMijr Single commodity payment by payment type i, commodity j and region r  
SCTPAYPOSjr SCT payment power related to the production value by commodity j and region r 
SCT_PVSijr Share of SCT by payment type i, commodity j and region r  
SHIFTFCTi 
Predetermined coefficient to vary from the distribution according to factor usage 
for endowment i  
SHK_ENDWirg 
Shock to payments allocates to land, labor and capital in GTAP in region r for 
group g 
SHK_INTrg Shock to payments allocated to inputs in GTAP in region r for group g 
SHK_OUTir Shock to payments allocates to output i in GTAP in region r 
SHOTPr Shock to SFP in GTAP by region r 
SHR_ENDWirg 
Share of domestic support allocated to land, labor and capital in GTAP in region r 
for group g 
SHR_INTrg Share of domestic support allocated to input in GTAP in region r for group g 
SHR_OUT_SCTir Share of domestic support allocated to output i in GTAP in region r  
tfdijr Tax on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
tfdmsctjr Tax (SCT) for commodity j in region r 
tfdmsubrg Tax (ACT, GCT) in region r for group g 
tfdsctijr Tax (SCT) on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
tfdsctijr Tax (SCT) on domestic i used by commodity j in region r 
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Table A6.  List of variables and coefficients (cntd.) 
Name Description 
tfdsubirg Tax (ACT,GCT) on commodity i used by commodity j in region r 
tfmijr Tax on imported i purchased by commodity j in region r 
tfijr Tax on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
tfsctijr Tax (SCT) on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
tfsfpr Tax(SFP)in  region r 
tfsubirg Tax (ACT, GCT) on primary factor i in region r for group g 
tftijr Tax on primary factor i used by commodity j in region r 
TOTPAYMijrg 
Total group specific payments of all categories by payment type i, commodity j, 
region r and group g 
TVFMijr Factor usage for endowment i in region r 
TVFMSHRir Factor usage share for endowment i in region r 
VDFAijr Purchases of domestic i for use in j in region r at agent’s prices 
VDFMijr Purchases of domestic i for use in j in region r at market prices 
VDFMXijrg 
Purchases of domestic i incl. Homogeneous support for use in j in region r for 
group g 
VFMijr Producer expenditure on factor i by sector j in region r at market prices 
VFMTijr VFMijr plus factor employment revenue (FTRVijr) 
VFMXijr VFMTijr plus homogeneous support 
VIFAijr Purchases of imports i for use in j in region r at agent’s prices 
VIFMijr Purchases of imports i for use in j in region r at market prices 
VIFMXijrg 
Purchases of imports i incl. homogeneous support for use in j in region r for group 
g 
VOAir Value of commodity i output in region r 
VOMjr Value of output j at market prices in region r 
VOTAX_SCTir Initial value of domestic support for commodity i in region r 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure A1.  Closure used for domestic support implementation (Altertax) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure A2.  Adjusted closure used in the extended GTAP model 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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8.2 Explanations of the effects of distributing the SFP with a 
homogeneous rate to land 
In GTAP, landowner ship and the farmer using the land to produce output are 
distinguished from each other, even though in fact they can be the same person. The 
landowner rents his land to the farmer receiving the market price PM (basic price) which 
includes the SFP subsidy plus the producer price PFE the farmer is paying the landowner. The 
farmer is paying the producer price PFE that reflects domestic and world market prices of 
output so that marginal cost (MC) of production is equal to marginal review (MR) 
(world/domestic output prices). When 100% of the SFP is allocated as a homogeneous 
subsidy rate to land in the GTAP database, then the landowner captures the entire subsidy. If 
the homogeneous land subsidy rates where to be removed then the landowner would also take 
the full loss of revenue. The landowner in the standard GTAP model has no alternative use of 
the land than renting it out to the present farmers. Since the homogeneous subsidy rate is 
removed across all land uses, there is no incentive for farmer to change their production 
patterns, and thus, they keep paying the same producer price PFE to the landowner. The 
farmer does not change his or her output level/pattern because domestic / world mark prices 
for his produce have not changed and he is still producing output, for which MC is equal to 
MR. The landowner takes the full adjustment/loss of changes in the SFP. 
When the SFP is allocated as a homogeneous subsidy rate across land, labor and capital 
then farmer’s production levels/patterns will change when the SFP is reduced. The market 
price of capital PM for example is a result of the economies demand for capital, where 
agricultural demand only plays a minor role. The SFP subsidizes among other endowments 
also the agricultural capital and thereby increases the amount of capital investment in 
agricultural production because the subsidy reduces the farmer’s price of capital below the 
economy-wide price PM. The increased agricultural demand for capital increases the market 
price (PM) of capital marginally in the economy. When the agricultural subsidy is removed, 
the price of capital PM declines marginally as capital move out of agriculture into other 
industries. At the same time the farmers capital producer price PFE increase to equal the 
market price PM. This increases the MC of production, which raise output price, reducing the 
amount produced by the farmer until MC in again equal to MR, whereas the amount of capital 
employed in agriculture is reduced. In this case, the farmer takes nearly the full adjustment/ 
loss of changes in capital subsidies linked to the SFP. The same is given when the SFP 
subsidies are allocated to labor employed in the primary agricultural sector. 
This effect can also be shown with the help of the following equations of the extended 
GTAP model and selected results presented in Table A7 and A8 to demonstrate that the 
change in the market price for land has no effect on output. 
Equation spfactprice1 
# This equation links domestic and firm demand prices. It holds for Sluggish 
  endowment goods and captures the effect of taxation of firms’ usage of 
  primary factors.  (HT#17) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    pfe(i,j,r) = tfsct(i,j,r) + pmesx(i,j,r,“gct12”); 
Equation spfactprice2 
# This equation links domestic and firm demand prices. It holds for Sluggish 
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  endowment goods and captures the effect of taxation of firms’ usage of 
  primary factors.  (HT#17) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,g,GROUP) 
    pmesx(i,j,r,g) = sum{g0,BASEGROUP:$pos(g0)=$pos(g) ,pmesx(i,j,r,g0) 
                   + tfsub(i,r,g)}; 
Equation spfactprice3a 
# This equation links domestic and firm demand prices. It holds for Sluggish 
  endowment goods and captures the effect of taxation of firms’ usage of 
  primary factors.  (HT#17) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,AGRI_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    pmesx(i,j,r,“otp”) = tfsfp(i,r)+pmest(i,j,r); 
Equation spfactprice3b 
# This equation links domestic and firm demand prices. It holds for Sluggish 
  endowment goods and captures the effect of taxation of firms’ usage of 
  primary factors.  (HT#17) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,NONA_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    pmesx(i,j,r,“otp”) = pmest(i,j,r); 
Equation spfactprice4 
# This equation links domestic and firm demand prices. It holds for Sluggish 
  endowment goods and captures the effect of taxation of firms’ usage of 
  primary factors.  (HT#17) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    pmest(i,j,r) = tft(i,j,r) + pmes(i,j,r); 
In order to prove the above statement we eliminate the SFP distributed with a 
homogeneous rate across agricultural sectors to the factor land - tfsfp(i,r) in the GTAP model. 
The results show a decrease in the market price for land (pmes) and only negligible changes 
in the agent’s price for land (pfe) (see Table A7). Beyond, the changes in the agent’s price for 
the other factors are equal to the change for the factor land. This confirms the explanation 
given in the previous two paragraphs. According to equation ENDWDEMAND, the change in 
the demand for land (qfe) is determined by the agent’s price and consequently yields only 
marginal changes. Since the subsidy is allocated homogeneously across sectors, the relative 
change in the market price for land (pmes) is the same for all primary agricultural sectors. The 
changes in all other sectors can be disregarded because no land is distributed to those sectors 
(compare Table A7, column “VFM”). Referring to GTAP equation “ENDW_SUPPLY” 
below that distributes the sluggish endowments across sectors, it becomes apparent that this 
causes no changes in the factor demand for land and thus no changes in output due to the 
modeling of pm equal to pmes * REVSHR (see Table A7, A8). 
  
 67 
 
Equation endwdemand 
# Demands for endowment commodities (HT 34) # 
(all,i,ENDW_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    qfe(i,j,r) 
        = - afe(i,j,r) + qva(j,r) 
        - ESUBVA(j) * [pfe(i,j,r) - afe(i,j,r) - pva(j,r)]; 
Equation mktclendws 
# Eq’n assures mkt clearing for imperfectly mobile endowments in each r (HT 5) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    qoes(i,j,r) = qfe(i,j,r); 
Coefficient (ge 0)(all,i,ENDW_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    VFM(i,j,r) # Producer expenditure on i by j in r valued at mkt prices #; 
Update (all,i,ENDWM_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    VFM(i,j,r) = pm(i,r) * qfe(i,j,r); 
Update (all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    VFM(i,j,r) = pmes(i,j,r) * qfe(i,j,r); 
Coefficient (all,i,ENDW_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    REVSHR(i,j,r); 
Formula (all,i,ENDW_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    REVSHR(i,j,r) = VFM(i,j,r) / sum(k,PROD_COMM, VFM(i,k,r)); 
Taking the sum over commodities “j” REVSHR equals 1 (see Table A7). 
Equation ENDW_PRICE 
# eq’n generates the composite price for sluggish endowments (HT 50) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    pm(i,r) = sum(k,PROD_COMM, REVSHR(i,k,r) * pmes(i,k,r)); 
Equation ENDW_SUPPLY 
# eq’n distributes the sluggish endowments across sectors (HT 51) # 
(all,i,ENDWS_COMM)(all,j,PROD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    qoes(i,j,r) = qo(i,r) - endwslack(i,r) + ETRAE(i) * [pm(i,r) - pmes(i,j,r)]; 
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Table A7.  The prices for land in the GTAP database 
   Percentage change in: 
pm("land", 
"deu") = 
REVSHR 
("land",j,"deu") 
* pmes 
("land",j,"deu") 
j REVSHR 
VFM("land",
j,"deu") 
pfe("land
",j, 
"deu") 
tfsfp("lan
d", 
"deu") 
pmes("land
",j, 
"deu") 
pm("la
nd","d
eu") 
pdr 0.00 0.62 0.10 
128.37 
 
 
 
 
-56.17 
-56.17 
-0.01 
wht 0.08 476.12 0.10 -56.17 -4.63 
gro 0.07 426.75 0.10 -56.17 -4.15 
v_f 0.12 679.90 0.10 -56.17 -6.61 
osd 0.04 239.52 0.10 -56.17 -2.33 
c_b 0.02 91.38 0.10 -56.17 -0.89 
pfb 0.00 13.50 0.10 -56.17 -0.13 
ocr 0.27 1,543.90 0.10 -56.17 -15.02 
ctl 0.03 177.61 0.10 -56.17 -1.73 
oap 0.10 565.71 0.10 -56.17 -5.50 
rmk 0.27 1,558.42 0.10 -56.17 -15.16 
wol 0.00 1.40 0.10 -56.17 -0.01 
Sum 1.00 5,774.84     -56.17 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table A8.  Equation ENDW_SUPPLY 
j 
qfe("land",
j,"deu") 
qoes("land
",j,"deu" 
qo("land",
"deu") 
endwslack 
("land","d
eu") 
ETRAE("l
and") 
pm("land", 
"deu") 
pmes("land
",j, 
"deu") 
pdr -0.000005 -0.000005 
0.00 0.00 -1.00 -56.17 
-56.17 
wht -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
gro -0.000003 -0.000003 -56.17 
v_f -0.000005 -0.000005 -56.17 
osd -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
c_b -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
pfb -0.000003 -0.000003 -56.17 
ocr -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
ctl -0.000003 -0.000003 -56.17 
oap -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
rmk -0.000004 -0.000004 -56.17 
wol -0.000007 -0.000007 -56.17 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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For decades, there have been ongoing discussions regarding the
trade distortions caused by the domestic support provided to agri-
cultural producers. It is well established that agricultural support
in high-income countries critically affects agricultural producers
in developing countries, particularly in the least developed
countries (McCalla and Nash, 2007a). Subsidies to agricultural pro-
ducers enhance agricultural production, and border measures, such
as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, protect many subsidized
agricultural sectors by ensuring higher market prices. In addition,
instruments such as export subsidies facilitate the dumping of
subsidy-induced overproduction onto the world market, thus low-
ering world market prices. In this manner, subsidized countries
procure a competitive advantage compared with other exporting
countries and hurt developing countries, particularly those that
are net exporters of agricultural and food commodities, by limiting
net exporters’ share of exports to the world market. By contrast,
the impact on those developing countries that are net importers
of agricultural and food commodities is less clear. These countries
have become increasingly dependent on low-priced imports of
long-term subsidized products from highly protected countries.As a consequence, consumers in net food-importing countries
are, at least in the short run, potential beneficiaries of domestic
support. Furthermore, developing countries are favored through
preferential trade agreements, and producers thus gain from the
higher market prices in highly protected countries (Hertel and
Keeney, 2006; Matthews, 2008; Panagariya, 2005).
The European Union (EU) is a prominent example of a heavily
subsidized – and thus trade-distorting – agricultural sector.
Despite multiple reforms to its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
that aim to fulfill WTO requirements, the EU remains the subject
of criticism because of the support it provides to agricultural pro-
ducers. The EU’s most important step toward less distortive trade
was the introduction of the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in 2005,
through which the EU provides direct income support to farmers
with no production required, and which now accounts for over
50% of the EU’s total domestic support payments. Thus, the SFP
might be regarded as decoupled from production, but even the
newly introduced SFP remains controversial. Decoupled payments
may stimulate production through other coupling channels –
including risk, uncertainty, imperfect credit markets, land and
labor markets, and farmer’s expectations about future payments
(Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009) – and thus remain at least somewhat
trade distortive (e.g., Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Goodwin and
Mishra, 2006; Key and Roberts, 2009; Latruffe and Le Mouël,
2009; O’Toole and Hennessy, 2015). Furthermore, there is no
consensus yet about the extent to which decoupled payments are
capitalized in land values (Ciaian et al., 2014).
K. Urban et al. / Food Policy 59 (2016) 126–138 127In recent years, a considerable number of articles have analyzed
the effects of multilateral trade liberalization that focus on market
access, export subsidies, and domestic support and that evaluate
these effects with a particular focus on developing countries
(Anderson and Martin, 2006, 2005; Anderson and Valenzuela,
2007; Bouët et al., 2005; Bureau et al., 2006; Martin and
Anderson, 2008; McCalla and Nash, 2007b). Notwithstanding gen-
eral trade liberalization, some analyses continue to focus on the
effects of domestic support versus export subsidies (Nuetah
et al., 2011), domestic support versus tariffs (Tamini et al., 2012),
and agricultural tariffs versus subsidies (Hoekman et al., 2004).
(Dimaranan et al., 2004; Rae and Strutt, 2003), in particular, exam-
ine the effects of domestic support on developing countries.
Although a number of analyses have identified the effects of the
CAP on the EU agricultural market, fewer assessments are available
that emphasize the effects of the CAP on developing countries
(Boysen et al., 2015a; Matthews, 2008; Nowicki et al., 2009;
Winters, 2005).
Some of this literature analyzes the effects of trade liberaliza-
tion scenarios by accounting for domestic support payments and
applying various methodological settings. However, to our knowl-
edge, no available analysis considers the effects of different under-
lying assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling of decoupled
payments. With respect to the extent to which the SFP continues to
incentivize production, the effects of the degree of the SFP’s decou-
pling must be considered when analyzing the effects of domestic
support on international trade.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are comprehen-
sive tools for analyzing trade liberalization scenarios. However, the
attention to detail regarding the complex structure and country-
specific properties of domestic support has been lacking in the pre-
vious literature. Although most of the applied CGE models consider
the SFP, the assumptions about the degree of decoupling differ. The
majority of approaches treat the SFP as fully decoupled by dis-
tributing 100% of it to land (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015;
Frandsen et al., 2003; Nowicki et al., 2009), whereas single-
country CGE models treat the SFP as lump sum transfers allocated
to households (Boysen et al., 2015b; Ferrari et al., 2012). By con-
trast, the standard Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model
allocates the SFP according to factor usage. Gohin (2006) and
Balkhausen et al. (2008) compile different assumptions regarding
the SFP’s degree of decoupling as applied in CGE and partial equi-
librium models and conclude that the degree of decoupling is the
most important factor when comparing different analyses.
The objective of this article is to provide an analysis that reveals
the effect of the SFP accounting for different assumptions regarding
its degree of decoupling, its modeling, and its effects on trade with
developing countries. Thus, this analysis helps validate results
based on the experiences of experts and the available econometric
results of the degree of decoupling. We base our analysis on the
GTAP model, which incorporates domestic support payments that
originate from the OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) tables.
Based on the approach of Urban et al. (2014), we extend the stan-
dard GTAP model to capture detailed domestic support payments,
accounting for different types and categories of support, and we
adjust the GTAP database accordingly. Applying this extended ver-
sion, we generate a set of 21 databases that reflect various degrees
of decoupling, which are then used to simulate a total elimination
of domestic support payments, of which the SFP accounts for more
than 50%, and to quantify the effects on international trade and
welfare. In so doing, we conduct an elaborate analysis that enables
us to consider the effects of different assumptions regarding the
production incentives resulting from the SFP. We compute differ-
ent meaningful and commonly used indexes in international trade
analysis to represent the SFP’s effect on the model’s results with a
particular focus on developing countries. The results of this analy-sis provide a solid benchmark to contrast with other simulation
results based on ad hoc assumptions and to validate their impact.
This article is organized as follows. First, we introduce the
extended GTAP modeling framework and account for a detailed
representation of domestic support payments and the modeling
options of the SFP. The next section describes the elaborate exper-
iment design that enables us to consider various degrees of decou-
pling. A selection of the results obtained is presented in
Section ‘Results’. The article concludes with a discussion of the
effects that removing EU domestic support payments would have
on international trade and welfare, with a particular focus on both
developing and the least developed countries and prioritizing the
impact of the SFP’s degree of decoupling.Extended GTAP modeling framework
The analysis in this article is based on the comparative-static,
multi-regional general equilibrium GTAP model, which is well doc-
umented in Hertel (1997). The standard GTAP model represents all
policy instruments as ad valorem tax equivalents that create
wedges between the undistorted prices and the prices including
the policy. Accordingly, the GTAP model mirrors agricultural policy
instruments related to domestic support in the form of five price
wedges that affect producers’ transactions at agents’ and market
prices: output, intermediate inputs, land, capital, and labor. In this
manner, the GTAP model considers only budgetary transfers but
also indirectly captures market price support that is implicitly
included in border measures. The primary production factors of
land, labor, capital, and natural resources are fully employed
within each economy. Labor and capital are mobile in the model
and can relocate among sectors but not among regions. By contrast,
land and natural resources are sluggish.
In this article, we apply an extended version of the standard
GTAP model and updated versions of the underlying GTAP data-
base Version 8.2 (Narayanan et al., 2012) that consider a much
more detailed representation of domestic support payments,
including payment categories and types. The PSE concept, which
is defined on the basis of different production requirements, allo-
cates domestic support payments to a specific product (single com-
modity transfers (SCT)), a special group of commodities (group
commodity transfers (GCT)), all commodities (all commodity
transfers (ACT)), or farm households without requiring any produc-
tion (other transfers to producers (OTP)). In addition, the PSE dis-
tinguishes between payments based on output, input use, area,
number of animals, receipts, income, and non-commodity criteria
that are predicted on a current or fixed basis (OECD, 2010).
Adopting the approach of Urban et al. (2014), we integrate
detailed domestic support payments into the GTAP database by
applying an elaborate procedure. This updated procedure enables
the integration of the PSE data by payment type, which is reflected
in the GTAP model as five price wedges: output, input, land, labor,
and capital. To integrate additional – and thus more precise –
policy instruments into the GTAPmodel, we further subdivide each
of the five price wedges according to the four PSE categories. In so
doing, we achieve a detailed representation of domestic support
payments in the underlying value flows and the corresponding
price linkage equations.
The SFP is categorized as an OTP payment in the PSE concept,
which by definition is a policy that requires no production. Thus,
farmers receive those subsidies in the form of direct income trans-
fers to households based on land entitlements. In the GTAP model,
one representation of the SFP is the allocation to land at a homoge-
nous rate across primary agricultural commodities (Urban et al.,
2014). Policy instruments modeled in this manner do not create
production effects in the GTAP model; thus, payments can be
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capitalizes into the land rents (Frandsen et al., 2003).1 Accounting
for other coupling channels requires a reconnection of the SFP to
production. The SFP affects structural changes in agriculture, which
implies that farms are prevented from farm exit (Chau and de
Gorter, 2005), and particularly for low-profit farmers, exit is reduced.
Imperfect labor markets and off-farm labor or farm-exit decisions
affect the labor market; thus, these coupling channels can be repre-
sented in a general equilibrium modeling framework as subsidies
provided according to each agricultural sector’s labor usage. (Breen
et al., 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Sckokai and Moro, 2009;
O’Toole and Hennessy, 2015) refer to the increase in farm income
and the reduced volatility of farm income due to the SFP that allows
for higher savings and investment and a better access to credit. The
risk behavior and investment decisions of farmers are affected and
stimulated; and thus the SFP creates risk-related effects on produc-
tion incentives. Imperfect credit markets, risk behavior and farmers’
expectations about future payments clearly influence the agricul-
tural sector’s capital endowment, and thus can be represented as
subsidies provided according to each sectors’ capital usage. Subsidies
allocated according to each sector’s land usage capitalize only partly
into the price of land (Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Ciaian et al., 2014;
Kilian et al., 2012; Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009; Michalek et al., 2014;
Van Meijl et al., 2006). Therefore, we introduce a second modeling
option for the SFP. Utilizing the first modeling approach, we obtain
the allocation of the SFP according to each sectors land usage. This
information enables us to redistribute the SFP sector specific to land,
labor, and capital, and thus introduces a general link to production
without incentivizing the production of a specific commodity.2 This
approach is therefore partially decoupled.
Furthermore, our model reports widely used meaningful
indexes, such as different aggregations of the trade balance,
Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration indexes, and the equivalent
variation. These indexes enable us to provide a concise but expres-
sive overview of the effects on developing countries’ trade of
removing domestic support payments while explicitly considering
different assumptions about the SFP’s degree of decoupling.3 Example: The SFP amounts to 44,828 million USD in the GTAP database. In
allocating this amount at a homogeneous rate across the 12 primary agricultural
commodities to land (FD), for example, the capital- and labor-abundant cattle sector
receives only 3.5% of the SFP, which is equal to 1,599 million USD, whereas the moreExperiment design
The effects on farmers’ production decisions through other cou-
pling channels (e.g., Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009; Goodwin and
Mishra, 2006; Key and Roberts, 2009; Latruffe and Le Mouël,
2009; O’Toole and Hennessy, 2015; Petrick and Zier, 2012) and
the capitalization of decoupled payments in land rents (Ciaian
et al., 2014) have been the subjects of controversial discussions
in the literature. However, empirical evidence for the EU remains
scarce. Despite considerable research efforts in analyzing the effect
of decoupled payments on farm level output decisions the results
cannot be considered as conclusive (Moro and Sckokai, 2013).
Ciaian et al. (2014) and Michalek et al. (2014) note that differences
in land markets and land regulations in the EU might lead to
important differences among EU member states. These authors
generate an evaluation of empirical estimates of the capitalization
rate of decoupled subsidies in land rent that results in a capitaliza-
tion ratio that ranges from 20% to 80%. In addition, Michalek et al.1 Cahill (1997) distinguishes between full decoupling, which reflects policies that
do not influence farmers’ production decisions, and effective full decoupling, which
reflects policies that do not result in production changes that differ from those that
would have occurred in the absence of the policy.
2 Taking the first modeling option as the basis implies that land-intensive sectors
receive a higher amount of the SFP than do labor- or capital-intensive sectors.
Consequently, through initially allocating the SFP according to land usage, we ensure
that labor- and capital-based sectors such as vegetables and fruits and the livestock
sector do not achieve a biased amount of the SFP, which would lead to an
overestimation of the effect of the SFP on those markets.(2014) emphasize that the SFP’s capitalization in land rents largely
varies between EU member states (from 3% to 94% of the value of
the payment). The average capitalization of the SFP in land rents
equals 6–7% for the EU-15.
Considering the significant differences in the extent to which
the SFP is capitalized in land values – thus stimulating production
through other coupling channels – we utilize the GTAP database
Version 8.2 (base year 2007) and the approach of Urban et al.
(2014) as the starting point for our analysis. Using OECD PSE data
(OECD, 2014) to integrate the EU domestic support payments, we
therefore create a set of different GTAP databases by gradually
varying the underlying degrees of the SFP’s decoupling encompass-
ing two components of the SFP – a decoupled one and a re-coupled
one. Because there is no consensus yet, we start from a 100% fully
decoupled SFP that is allocated at a homogenous rate across pri-
mary agricultural commodities to the factor land (modeling option
1). Then, we stepwise increase the share of the re-coupled
component of the SFP that enables the representation of various
assumptions about the effect of other coupling channels (modeling
option 2).
Table 1 shows the composition of the created set of databases.
According to the eligibility criteria of the SFP, this subsidy is pro-
vided to agricultural producers based on historical land usage.
Thus, the starting point in our analysis is the allocation of the
SFP only to land with a homogenous distribution across primary
agricultural sectors. This database, which is labeled fully decoupled
(FD), represents a full capitalization of the SFP into land rent and
hence reflects a fully decoupled SFP. Various degrees of decoupling
are obtained by gradually reducing the amount of the SFP initially
distributed to the factor land and moving this amount to the re-
coupled component of the SFP, which is distributed by sector at a
homogeneous rate according to factor usage.3 In Table 1, the SFP
in the second database (PD-5) slightly stimulates production
through other coupling channels and therefore no longer fully capi-
talizes in the market price for land. To achieve PD-5, we begin with
the SFP allocation according to land (FD) and shift 5% of the sector-
specific SFP values that were achieved by initially allocating the SFP
at a homogenous rate across agricultural commodities to land (first
component) to the second component of the SFP that is distributed
by sector at a homogenous rate according to capital, labor and land.
This procedure continues by gradually reducing the SFP initially allo-
cated to land until we obtain the last database, which is labeled par-
tially decoupled (PD-100). Thus, the share of the SFP allocated to the
second component increases stepwise in equal proportions until
100% of the SFP is distributed by sector according to the factor usage,
which represents the highest effect of other coupling channels and
thus a high degree of coupling.
This procedure leads to 21 alternative databases, which serve as
starting points for simulating the elimination of domestic support
payments. This analysis enables an evaluation of the effect of vary-
ing assumptions regarding the extent to which other couplingland-employing wheat sector receives 10% of the SFP, which is equal to 4,386 million
USD. Redistributing this amount by sector at a homogeneous rate across factors (PD-
100), the cattle sector receives an allocation of 12% to land (818 million USD), 39% to
capital (608 million USD) and 49% to skilled and unskilled labor (768 million USD).
The wheat sector shows the following distribution: 26% to land (1,128 million USD),
19% to capital (836 million USD) and 55% to skilled and unskilled labor (2,422 million
USD). Particularly interesting is the other crops sector, as this sector uses the highest
amount of land, although other crops are labor and capital abundant. Thus, this sector
receives 24% of the SFP (10,655 million USD) based on land use. Distributing this
amount according to the factor usage of the other crops sector allocates 18% to land
(1,930 million USD), 21% to capital (2,285 million USD) and 61% to skilled and
unskilled labor (6,439 million USD).
Table 1
Database setting. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Domestic support implementation
into the GTAP database
SFPa allocation Effect on production Simulation
Land Factor use Fully
decoupled
(FD)
Partially
decoupled (PD)Homogeneous allocation
across agricultural sectors
Sector-specific
allocation
FD 100% of SFP – X
100% removal of domestic
support payments
PD-5 95% of SFP 5% of initial
allocation to land
X
..
. Gradually shifting SFP from land onto capital, labor
and landb
X
PD-95 5% of SFP 95% of initial
allocation to land
X
PD-100 – 100% of initial
allocation to land
X
a SFP = Single Farm Payment.
b This includes a homogenous distribution of SFP according to each sectors’ factor usage. Please refer to Section ‘Experiment design’ for more information on the integration
of domestic support into the GTAP model and database and the experiment design.
Fig. 1. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the agricultural trade balance.c,d Note: a Agricultural
trade balance = agricultural exports minus agricultural imports; negative value =
net importing country; positive value = net exporting country. This graph plots the
pre- and post-simulation values of the agricultural trade balance (y-axis) and the
percentage changes compared to pre-simulation value (x-axis). Movement to the
right hand side means that a country/region reinforces its status as net exporter
(upper right quadrant) or net importer country (lower right quadrant). With a
movement to the left the country reduces its status as net exporter/importer
(upper/lower left quadrant). b Initial = Pre-simulation value of the trade balance for
food commodities. c Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of
databases and the scenario design. The numbers 25, 50, 75 and 100 in the legend
indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to
land to the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and
land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number increases. Selected scenarios
are highlighted, all others are depicted as small dots. d Please refer to Table A1 in the
appendix for more details on the regional aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
K. Urban et al. / Food Policy 59 (2016) 126–138 129channels induce the SFP to generate production incentives. Utiliz-
ing this set of databases in our analysis sheds light on the effects of
the underlying assumptions about the effect of the degree of
decoupling on the model’s results with a particular focus on coun-
tries’ development status.
The utilized GTAP database additionally includes bilateral trade
and protection matrices linking 57 sectors in 140 regions. To facil-
itate computation, we use an aggregate of 14 regions and 22 sec-
tors. The regional aggregation accounts for the EU as one region
and for aggregates of developed (IC) and developing (DC) WTO
member countries, in addition to the least developed countries
(LDC) (Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). We singled out at least
two EU trading partners from each of the aggregates. The primary
agricultural sectors and the forward-linked food-producing sectors
that enter the analysis are as disaggregated as possible, but all
other industries are aggregated into a service and a manufacturing
sector.
Results
Removing EU domestic support payments causes well-known
effects, such as reduced EU output and exports, whereas EU
imports and world market prices increase.4 The first section of
the results presents the changes in countries’ trade balances. Delving
deeper into the results, the focus moves toward trade indicators to
shed light on the changes in countries’ trade patterns by applying
the Herfindahl–Hirschman market and product concentration
indexes. Finally, the equivalent variation provides further insights
into how eliminating domestic support affects countries’ welfare.
The results focus on primary agricultural and food commodities
and are reported for developed, developing, and the least devel-
oped countries. However, in interpreting the results, the main
emphasis is on the effects on developing and the least developed
countries.
Effect on the trade balance for agricultural commodities
Production changes and increasing world market prices raise
the question of how the removal of domestic support payments
affects foreign trade patterns. To answer this question, this section
analyzes the changes in countries’ import and export structures.
Fig. 1 presents the initial and the 21 post-simulation values of4 The changes in output and world market prices are provided in Tables B5–B8 in
Appendix B.the trade balances for the aggregation of all primary agricultural
commodities, of which the results for scenarios FD, PD-100,
PD-25, PD-50, and PD-75 are highlighted. Effects on the trade bal-
ance are represented as both values (y-axis) and percentage
changes (x-axis) to offer more insight into these effects. A move-
ment to the right hand side means that a country/region reinforces
Fig. 2. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on countries’ export share.b,c Note: a Initial =
Pre-simulation index number. b Please refer to Table 1 for more information on
the set of databases and the scenario design. The numbers 25, 50, 75 and 100 in the
legend indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution
according to land to the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage to capital,
labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in the legend
increases. Selected scenarios are highlighted, all others are depicted as small dots. c
Please refer to Table A1 in the appendix for more details on the regional
aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5 Additional information regarding domestic support payments is provided in
Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
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quadrant) or net importer of agricultural commodities (lower right
quadrant). With a movement to the left the country reduces its sta-
tus as net exporter/importer of agricultural commodities (upper/
lower left quadrant). Furthermore, Fig. 1 shows the effect on the
EU’s trade balance twofold considering total EU trade and EU extra
trade excluding intra-EU trade.
Initially, the EU is a net importer of agricultural commodities
(trade balance = 38 billion USD). Removing domestic support
payments widens this import-export gap. In scenario FD, the trade
balance increased to 42 billion USD (12%), whereas the trade bal-
ance increased by 50% to 57 billion USD in scenario PD-100. Thus,
the graph shows that removing agricultural domestic support
tends to strengthen the initial direction of trade in the EU. By con-
trast, in all other countries, whether net importing or net export-
ing, agricultural exports increase more than imports. Therefore,
net-exporting countries clearly benefit from rising world market
prices (Canada 3% in FD to 12% in PD-100, the US 4–16%, Brazil
3–16%, South Africa 8–31%, Ethiopia 3–12%, and the LDC 5–21%).
The effect on net-importing countries other than the EU is only
moderate (China 1% in FD to 6% in PD-100, Bangladesh 0% to
1% and Russia 11% to 2%.
In addition, Fig. 2 highlights the increase in the share of
exports to the EU in all countries. Net-exporting countries such
as South Africa, Brazil, and Ethiopia export more than
50%/45%/35% of their total exports to the EU, respectively.
Depending on the degree of decoupling, these shares increase to
54%/50%/41%, respectively. Although net-importing countries
initially show much lower shares of exports to the EU than net-
exporting countries, they experience higher percentage changes
at each degree of decoupling. The share for Bangladesh increases
from 11% to 15%, and the share for Russia increases from 11% to
16%. Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix display further informa-
tion regarding the changes in bilateral exports of aggregated
agricultural commodities.Fig. 1 presents the extent to which the underlying assumptions
regarding the SFP’s degree of decoupling affect these results.
Removing the fully decoupled SFP creates only minimal and thus
negligible effects. Therefore, scenario FD reflects the change caused
mainly by non-SFP domestic support payments. Plotting the trade
balance value with the percentage changes of the 21 scenarios
depicts the range. Thus, comparing scenarios FD and PD-100 indi-
cates that – depending – on the assumptions about the degree of
decoupling – removing domestic support payments may cause an
effect of up to quadruple that of the effect obtained in scenario FD.Trade balance of net-exporting developing countries
By contrast, the range of the effect on the trade balance shown
in Fig. 1 reveals high variation in the results for net food-exporting
countries (DC 140%, South Africa 23%, LDC 16%, Brazil 13%, Ethiopia
9%, the US 12%, and Canada 9%). These results clearly indicate that
changing the degree of decoupling affects developing countries the
most. The ratio of the range (e.g., Brazil 13%) and the maximum
effect of removing domestic support payments obtained in sce-
nario PD-100 (e.g., Brazil 16%) shows that the SFP is responsible
for up to 81% of the overall effect on the Brazilian trade balance
for primary agricultural commodities. Thus, the SFP allocated by
factor usage increases the effect of removing EU domestic support
payments in Brazil more than fivefold. Correspondingly, the results
demonstrate that developing and the least developed countries
(more than quadruple the effect) are more affected than developed
countries (triple the effect).
In the EU, other crops and vegetables and fruits are the most
heavily subsidized agricultural products, followed by wheat, other
grains, and livestock. Countries that specialize in exporting at least
some of these products are thus considerably more affected by the
EU removing domestic support payments than are other countries.
Developing countries’ exports are more concentrated in agricul-
tural commodities than are the exports of high-income countries,
which typically specialize in manufacturing and services. Brazil
gains the most from the removal of vegetable, fruit, other crops,
and livestock subsidies in the EU, whereas South Africa benefits
from the removal of vegetable, fruit and, in particular, other crop
subsidies. In addition to other crops, Ethiopia is negatively affected
in its arable crops sectors because the factors of production are
relocated to raise other crops. Nevertheless, why does the SFP
affect countries differently? Subsidies distributed at a homoge-
neous rate across commodities allocated to land are capitalized
in land prices and thus cause no production effects in the EU. By
contrast, subsidies allocated by factor usage continue to stimulate
production. In this case, the more capital- and labor-intensive a
sector is, the more it is affected by removing the subsidy, and it
thus would achieve a higher SFP amount than in the previous case
when the subsidy was granted based on land. Although we allo-
cated the SFP in the first step based on land and in the second step
we redistributed the land-based value according to the sectors’ fac-
tor usage to diminish such a bias, vegetables and fruits, other crops,
and livestock remain the most responsive sectors in the EU5 (com-
pare Footnote 3). Eliminating the SFP leads to decreased production
in these sectors. Production decreases to a lesser extent in other sec-
tors that are less dependent on capital and labor – and that are thus
more land-intensive – such as wheat, other grains, and oilseeds.
Consequently, those sectors are less harmed by removing the SFP
and hence do not generate effects as large as those from changes
in vegetables, fruits, and other crops. Accordingly, developing coun-
tries in general and countries such as Brazil and South Africa, whose
agricultural production and trade substantially rely on sectors such
K. Urban et al. / Food Policy 59 (2016) 126–138 131as vegetables and fruits and other crops, are affected the most by
removing the SFP and therefore show the highest variance caused
by the underlying assumptions about the degree of decoupling.Trade balance of net-importing developing countries
Regarding other net food-importing countries, the range of the
effect on the trade balance varies between 0% (Japan), 1% (Bangla-
desh) and 9% (Russia) and thus indicates only minor effects (Fig. 1).
Consumers in net food-importing countries are negatively affected
through higher world market prices, whereas producers gain and
exports increase. Fig. 1 reveals that the negative impact on con-
sumers is offset by increases in agricultural commodity exports
and hence leads to slight reductions in negative trade balance val-
ues. The more the degree of decoupling decreases, the larger the
difference is between the extent of the effect on producers vs. con-
sumers. Russia reports a comparably high number because it is in
fact a net importer of agricultural commodities but a net exporter
of wheat and is thus more affected than other net-importing
countries.Fig. 3. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the food trade balance.c,d Note: a Food trade
balance = food exports minus food imports; negative value = net importing country;
positive value = net exporting country. This graph plots the pre- and post-
simulation values of the food trade balance (y-axis) and the percentage changes
compared to pre-simulation value (x-axis). Movement to the right hand side means
that a country/region reinforces its status as net exporter (upper right quadrant) or
net importer (lower right quadrant). With a movement to the left the country
reduces its status as net exporter/importer (upper/lower left quadrant).
b Initial = Pre-simulation value of the trade balance for food commodities. c Please
refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario
design. The numbers 25, 50, 75 and 100 in the legend indicate the share of the SFP
that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is
increasing as the number increases. Selected scenarios are highlighted all others are
depicted as small dots. d Please refer to Table A1 in the appendix for more details on
the regional aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.Effects on the trade balance of food commodities
The aggregated trade balance of food commodities presents dif-
ferences for total EU trade and EU trade that excludes intra-EU
trade (Fig. 3). Initially, the EU is in both cases a net exporter of food
commodities. Removing domestic support decreases net exports
by 49% on average for the EU, excluding intra-EU trade; however,
when considering intra-EU trade, the results show an average
decrease in net exports of 104%. A percentage change greater
than 100% implies that the net export value inverts. Thus, the
SFP’s degree of decoupling determines a change in the direction
of EU trade. In scenario PD-100, the EU becomes a net importer,
whereas in scenario FD, the EU remains a net exporter of food com-
modities. Here, the degree of decoupling determines price changes
for the agricultural inputs used in the food sector. The less decou-
pled the SFP is, the higher the increase in agricultural commodity
prices is and the less competitive is the EU food industry. Thus,
EU food imports increase with a decreasing degree of decoupling.
As a result, for the majority of countries, regardless of whether they
are net importers or net exporters of food commodities, removing
domestic support payments tends to strengthen the value of
exports more than that of imports. Depending on the degree of
decoupling, the SFP can increase the effect of removing domestic
support payments by up to three times that obtained in scenario
FD. However, in value terms, the implications for the food sector
caused by the underlying degree of decoupling are less important
than they are in the agricultural sector. In particular, the least
developed countries reveal only minor effects.
The results in Figs. 1–3 clearly show that the degree of decou-
pling has a significant impact on the effect caused by removing
domestic support payments – particularly for agricultural
products.6Effect on market and product concentration
This section addresses the effect of market and product concen-
tration on trading partners and the commodities traded. The
Herfindahl–Hirschmann market concentration index (HHMCI)
and the Herfindahl–Hirschmann product concentration index
(HHPCI) are well-known indexes for analyzing the effect of trade
dispersion applied in trade analysis. The HHMCI determines the
dispersion of trade value across an exporter’s trading partners. By6 Trade balance results are provided in Appendix B.contrast, the HHPCI measures the dispersion of trade value across
an exporter’s products.
Fig. 4 shows the development of the HHMCI for agricultural
commodities for selected countries. The y-axis represents the
HHMCI, which ranges from 0 to 1. An index value close to 1 implies
that a country has a high trade share concentrated in only a few
markets, whereas an index value close to zero implies equally
distributed trade. The x-axis shows the percentage changes in the
index caused by removing domestic support payments. Fig. 4 high-
lights the results for five scenarios, whereas it depicts all other
scenarios with a small dot.
At 0.67 (PD-100), the EU exhibits the highest HHMCI value of all
countries and regions, which indicates that a high share of its agri-
cultural trade value is concentrated in a few trading partners. EU
agricultural trade is relatively concentrated in that intra-EU trade
accounts for a significant share of EU exports (Fig. 2). The HHMCI
increases by 9.3% when domestic support payments in database
PD-100 are eliminated, which can at least partly be explained by
an increase in intra-EU trade.
Fig. 1 confirms that intra-EU trade slightly diminishes the
difference between EU imports and exports. Considering a fully
decoupled SFP, the HHMCI of the EU increases by only 2.9%, to
0.63. Thus, abolishing domestic support payments tightens the
concentration of EU agricultural trade to a few trading partners.
Thereby, the higher the degree of decoupling is, the lower the
increase in the HHMCI is.
Fig. 4. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the Herfindahl–Hirschman Market Concentration
Index.c,d Note: a Herfindahl–Hirschman Market Concentration Index (HHMCI):
0 = trade is equally distributed; 1 = trade is concentrated in one market. This graph
plots the pre- and post-simulation values of the HHMCI (y-axis) and the percentage
changes compared to pre-simulation value (x-axis). Upwards movements to the
right indicate an increase in market concentration. Downward movements to the
left indicate a decrease in market concentration. b Initial = Pre-simulation index
number. c Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and
the scenario design. The numbers 25, 50, 75 and 100 in the legend indicate the
share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to
the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The
coupling degree is increasing as the number increases. Selected scenarios are
highlighted, all others are depicted as small dots. d Please refer to Table A1 in the
appendix for more details on the regional aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Fig. 5. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the Herfindahl–Hirschman Product Concentration
Index.c,d Note: a Herfindahl–Hirschman Product Concentration Index (HHPCI):
0 = trade is equally distributed across products – not vulnerable to trade shocks;
1 = trade is concentrated on one product – vulnerable to trade shocks. This graph
plots the pre- and post-simulation values of the HHPCI (y-axis) and the percentage
changes compared to pre-simulation value (x-axis). Upwards movements to the
right indicate an increase of the vulnerability to trade shocks Downward
movements to the left indicate a decrease of the vulnerability to trade shocks.
b Initial = Pre-simulation index number. c Please refer to Table 1 for more
information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The numbers 25, 50,
75 and 100 in the legend indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial
distribution according to land to the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage
to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number
increases. Selected scenarios are highlighted, all others are depicted as small dots. d
Please refer to Table A1 in the appendix for more details on the regional
aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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ticular, are less dependent on their trading partners compared with
the EU, as indicated by an index value that is lower than 0.2. The
exceptions are South Africa (0.25), Bangladesh (0.39), Brazil (0.2),
Ethiopia (0.14) and the LDC (0.2).
The removal of domestic support payments results in a non-
uniform picture. The HHMCI decreases for developed countries
but increases for developing countries, which implies that devel-
oped countries’ trade diversifies more, whereas developing coun-
tries’ dependency on their trading partners increases. The
exceptions are Bangladesh and Russia, which are net importers of
agricultural commodities. Initially, both countries show a compa-
rably high dependency on their trading partners; removing domes-
tic support payments (scenario PD-100) leads to rather low
changes (6.2% and 9.3%, respectively) but reduces each coun-
try’s dependency on its trading partners. The most affected coun-
tries are Brazil (18.4%), South Africa (16.3%), Ethiopia (21.6%), and
the DC (16.2%). Accordingly, Fig. 4 shows that deviations in the
SFP allocation clearly influence the index. Comparing scenarios
PD-100 and FD, the means (5.1% and 1.0%, respectively) and stan-
dard deviations (10.8% and 2.3%, respectively) calculated across
regions clearly decrease. Thus, the effect of removing domestic
support is much more uniform across countries, assuming a fully
decoupled SFP.
Particularly notable are the developing and least developed
countries regarding agricultural commodities. Only these countries
reveal an increased concentration of trading partners that is con-
siderably affected by the degree of decoupling. Brazil and South
Africa are already important EU trading partners. Consequently,
the significant impact of the degree of decoupling on sectors such
as vegetables, fruits, and other crops leads to increased exports to
the EU, thus increasing these countries’ dependency on EU trade.Fig. 5 shows the HHPCI for agricultural commodities for
selected countries. An HHPCI value close to 1 implies that a coun-
try has a high trade share concentrated in a few products. The
HHPCI of 0.16 for the EU indicates that the EU is not particularly
vulnerable to trade shocks because its trade is substantially dis-
persed across products. In this regard, most of the countries also
show an index value below 0.2.
The exceptions include Brazil (0.24), South Africa (0.5), Bangla-
desh (0.47), and Ethiopia (0.34). These countries are much more
vulnerable to trade shocks because their trade is considerably
more concentrated in a small number of products. In the initial
GTAP database, vegetables and fruits account for 71% of South
Africa’s agricultural export value. In Brazil, other crops and oilseeds
comprise 75% of the country’s agricultural export value, and other
crops determine 55% of Ethiopia’s agricultural export value.
Eliminating domestic support payments in the EU – and particu-
larly the SFP, depending on the degree of decoupling – causes the
highest effects in the vegetables, fruits, and other crops sectors.
South Africa and Ethiopia are notable for their increased exports
in the vegetables and fruits sectors and other crops sector, respec-
tively. Thus, trade diversification diminishes. Brazilian exports are
concentrated in other crops and vegetables and fruits; therefore,
product concentration increases only slightly and is thus less
affected by variations in the degree of decoupling. By contrast,
Fig. 6. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the
SFP’s degree of decoupling on welfare in selected countries.a,b,c Note: a The
percentage number gives the percentage change between scenario full decoupling
and partial decoupling – 100. b Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the
set of databases and the scenario design. The numbers 25, 50, 75 and 100 in the
legend indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution
according to land to the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage to capital,
labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number increases. c Please
refer to Table A1 in the appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
K. Urban et al. / Food Policy 59 (2016) 126–138 133the index decreases in Bangladesh. Bangladesh diversifies its trade
by reducing plant-based fiber exports, which initially accounted
for 72% of the country’s agricultural export value, in favor of other
crops.
Comparing the effects on both indexes reveals that the degree
of decoupling of EU domestic support affects the HHMCI consider-
ably more than it does the HHPCI. Nevertheless, the HHPCI also
shows that increased decoupling leads to more balanced effects
across regions. The degree of decoupling again determines the
extent to which the effect on highly affected countries such as
South Africa and Ethiopia varies and demonstrates that the con-
trast with less affected countries can be strong, depending on the
degree of decoupling.Effect on welfare
Finally, Fig. 6 sheds light on the welfare effects of eliminating
domestic support payments for selected countries. Scenario FD
shows that the EU clearly gains from removing domestic support
payments (1.3 billion USD). In addition, the welfare gain increases
by 124% in scenario PD-100 to 3 billion USD. This result indicates
that the EU welfare gain clearly diminishes with increased decou-
pling. Such a welfare gain occurs because the SFP’s effect on the
market is less distortive when there is a higher degree of decou-
pling. Thus, production incentives and the effects on agents’ prices
decline and lead to a crowding out of non-competitive producers
and reduced distortion losses.
The mean based on the simulation results found with the 21
databases, reveals that the average EU welfare gain equals 2 billion
USD. Overall, the EU exhibits the highest welfare effects. Othercountries and regions are affected differently when the EU removes
its domestic support payments. Net food-exporting countries such
as the US, Brazil, South Africa and Ethiopia report welfare gains,
whereas net food-importing countries such as China and least
developed countries experience welfare losses. In addition, China,
and least developed countries reveal a low share of agricultural
exports to the EU relative to total exports and thus benefit less
from the EU’s increasing import demands. By contrast, these coun-
tries have a relatively higher share for all traded commodities and
are therefore somewhat negatively affected by reduced EU import
demand for all traded commodities. Fig. 6 highlights the consider-
able effect on the equivalent variation that stems from integrating
the SFP into the GTAP model and database. In general, the effect of
decreased decoupling on welfare is higher for all other countries
than it is for the EU. The effect on welfare varies between 186%
and 440% in scenario FD compared with PD-100.
The results for the least developed countries are an exception
because modeling the SFP as partially decoupled (scenario PD-
100) increases the welfare loss by only 69% for those countries.
Delving deeper into the results reveals that the welfare loss is
caused by the degree of decoupling. However, reallocating the
SFP to labor and capital (PD-5–PD-100) leads to changes in the fac-
tor allocation and consequently affects production, such that the
effect of other payment categories on welfare increases and offsets
the effect of a fully decoupled SFP. We observe these effects in all
countries, but not to this extent.Discussion and conclusion
The SFP is granted to agricultural producers based on land enti-
tlements. Hence, it can be regarded as a lump-sum transfer to
households, which is an approach that is often applied in single-
country CGE models in particular. According to the literature, it
is widely accepted that at least part of the SFP capitalizes in the
price for land. However, lump-sum transfers to households do
not account for such an effect. Therefore, to account for the capital-
ization in land rent, the SFP is allocated according to land at a
homogeneous rate across primary agricultural commodities in
the GTAP model. According to Frandsen et al. (2003) and Urban
et al. (2014), the SFP then fully capitalizes in the market price for
land. According to the GTAP approach, the value added is modeled
as a transfer to the regional household, which allocates the income
to households, savings and the government. Thus, modeling the
SFP in this way reflects an income transfer to households.
However, the extent to which the SFP capitalizes in the land rent
is still uncertain, and the estimates differ between regions depend-
ing on land markets. The implications of other coupling channels
are not conclusively addressed. Numerous studies specifically ana-
lyze the effect of a particular coupling channel. In addition, the
effects of other coupling channels are country specific and depend
on the structure of the factor market. Our approach still relies on
ad-hoc assumptions. The GTAP model does not represent the dif-
ferent coupling channels explicitly, which would require several
major extensions of the model, such as the introduction of hetero-
geneous firms to account for farm-exit decisions and risk aversion
of producers to account for the risk-reducing effect of the SFP. In
addition, a dynamic framework would be necessary to include
the future expectations of farmers and the effect on wealth. By
matching the coupling channels with the GTAP production factors,
we are able to overcome this problem. This modeling procedure
enables the re-coupling of the SFP at different degrees; thus, we
adjust the model’s assumptions to depict country-specific ranges
of estimation results or the full range of degrees of decoupling
and quantify the effect of over- or underestimations of the real
degree of decoupling.
134 K. Urban et al. / Food Policy 59 (2016) 126–138Our sensitivity analysis confirms the results revealed by a num-
ber of other studies that have analyzed agricultural domestic sup-
port, such as those by Dimaranan et al. (2004), Bouët et al. (2005),
Matthews (2008), Winters (2005), and Hertel and Keeney (2006).
In addition to the prior literature, we show a strong contrast
between scenarios PD-100 and FD. The variance in the results mea-
sured across regions considerably increases as the degree of decou-
pling decreases. It becomes apparent that the SFP’s degree of
decoupling significantly influences the results for net exporters
of agricultural and food commodities, in particular for developing
and the least developed countries. The effects on the trade balance
substantially increase from scenario FD to scenario PD-100 (e.g.,
Brazil: 3–16%; South Africa 8–31%; Ethiopia 3–12%), leading to
results that range from four to five times higher when domestic
support payments are removed under different assumptions
regarding the SFP’s degree of decoupling and its modeling. A sim-
ilar dimension can be observed regarding changes in the HHMCI,
whereas the impact of the degree of decoupling is lower for the
HHPCI. In addition, the degree of decoupling has a clear impact
on high-income countries. However, the magnitude of these effects
compared with developing countries is slightly lower. By contrast,
the impact of the degree of decoupling is the lowest in net food-
importing countries. Higher world market prices negatively affect
consumers, whereas agricultural producers benefit. The effect on
producers offsets the effect on consumers, such that the ratio of
exports to imports slightly increases. Of course, these contradictory
effects reflect the impact of the degree of decoupling, but the
observed overall effect is clearly mitigated. The welfare gains
achieved in net food-exporting countries and the welfare losses
in net food-importing countries increase by more than 200% with
increased decoupling, with the highest effects in developing coun-
tries, which experience an increase of 440% from scenario FD to
PD-100.
This result emphasizes the relevance of considering the under-
lying assumptions about the SFP’s degree of decoupling when ana-
lyzing agricultural domestic support. These assumptions
significantly affect the results and thus clearly matter for interna-
tional trade analyses, particularly in developing countries. In the
absence of comprehensive estimators of the degree of decoupling
that cover other coupling channels, experienced experts and the
results of the best available analysis determine the assumptions
about the SFP’s degree of decoupling in trade analyses.
Consequently, these analyses might over- or underestimate theTable A1
Regional aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Countries and regions
1 EU
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom,
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lat
2 Canada
3 US
4 Japan
5 Rest of WTO developed countries
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, Croatia, Hong Kong,
6 Brazil
7 South Africa
8 China
9 Rest of WTO developing countries
Mongolia, Rest of East Asia, Brunei Darassalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Ric
Central America, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago
Armenia, Georgia, Bahrein, Israel, Jordhan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Re
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenia, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Botswanaeffects of domestic support payments. To overcome this problem,
our analysis delivers insights into the effects of removing domestic
support payments that account for the full bandwidth of underly-
ing assumptions about the degree of decoupling. Therefore, our
analysis helps validate the results by providing a range for the
actual impact.
Our analysis presents a step toward validating the model’s
results, and it thus provides a scope for further research. In recent
years, a number of high-income countries have altered the support
they provide to agricultural producers, and emerging countries
such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa have begun to expand
their support programs. Accordingly, analyzing multilateral trade
liberalization requires more than EU domestic support payments
to validate results. It would also be helpful to extend this analysis
to cover at least all of the countries that provide their producers
with a significant amount of domestic support, particularly with
uncertain assumptions about the possible outcomes of policy
instruments. The approach applied in this article is general and
can thus be easily transferred to all other countries, given that
PSE data are provided. Second, the focus in this article is on domes-
tic support. The impact of country-specific border measures that
prevent producers and consumers from receiving the total gains
associated with removing EU domestic support payments possibly
affected the results. Such policies might hinder the adjustment of
domestic market prices according to changes in world market
prices, and there might therefore be only a partial pass-through
of the effects on other countries’ domestic markets. Thus, this
result might have led to understated effects of domestic support
payments in our analysis.Acknowledgements
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See Tables A1–A6.Abbreviation
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
via, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania
EU
can
usa
jpn
Korea, Singapore, Kuwait, United Arab. Emirates
IC
bra
zaf
chn
Thailand, Viet Nam, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Argentina,
a, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Rest of
, Caribbean, Albania, Ukraine, Rest of Eastern Europe, Kyrgyzstan,
st of Western Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa,
, Namibia, Rest of South African CU
DC
Table A1 (continued)
Countries and regions Abbreviation
10 Bangladesh bgd
11 Ethiopia eth
12 Rest of least developed countries
Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Rest of Southeast Asia, Nepal, Rest of South Asia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Togo, Rest of
Western Africa, Rest of Central Africa, Rest of South Central Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Other
Eastern Africa
LDC
13 Russia rus
14 Rest of the World
Rest of Oceania, Taiwan, Rest of North America, Rest of South America, Belarus, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Rest of FSU, Azerbaijan, Iran Islamic
Republic, rest of the world
RoW
Table A2
Sector aggregation. Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Sectors Abbreviation
Primary agricultural commodities
1 Paddy rice pdr
2 Wheat wht
3 Cereal grains gro
4 Vegetables, fruits, nuts v_f
5 Oilseeds osd
6 Raw sugar (sugar cane, sugar beet) c_b
7 Plant-based fibers pfb
8 Crops nec ocr
9 Ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats, horses) ctl
10 Non-ruminants (other animal products nec) oap
11 Raw milk rmk
12 Wool, silk worm cocoons wol
Food commodities
13 Ruminant meat products cmt
14 Non-ruminant meat products omt
15 Vegetable oils and fats vol
16 Dairy products mil
17 Processed rice pcr
18 Refined sugar sgr
19 Other food ofd
20 Beverages and tobacco products b_t
Other commodities
21 Manufacturing
Coal, oil, gas, petroleum, coal products, Forestry, fishing, minerals, Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, paper products,
publishing, chemical, rubber, plastic prods, mineral pro- ducts nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport
equipment, electronic equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures nec
MNFC
22 Services
Water, construction, trade, transport nec, sea transport, air trans-port, communication, financial services nec, insurance, business services nec,
recreation and other services, PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat, dwellings
SERV
Table A3
Effects of eliminating domestic support on bilateral exports for aggregated agricultural commodities for
selected countries in % (fully decoupled SFP)a,b Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Partner
EU can US IC bra zaf chn DC bgd eth LDC
Reporter
EU 0.3 -5.1 -9.1 -5.0 -4.6 -5.5 -4.3 -7.7 -14.5 -8.2 -7.5
can 9.0 0.9 1.5 1.9 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.3 2.5 3.7
US 8.6 0.8 1.1 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 1.3 0.3 3.8 2.5
IC 7.0 0.4 0.4 3.4 1.3 1.0 0.3 1.3 0.0 1.0 2.7
bra 4.5 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.9 0.4 1.5 0.2 2.0 1.4
zaf 6.8 0.5 0.7 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.4 1.3 1.4
chn 5.9 1.2 1.1 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.0 2.1 2.0
DC 7.3 0.7 0.9 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.8 2.0
bgd 13.5 2.0 2.2 3.3 1.2 3.7 1.1 2.8 1.1 1.5 2.9
eth 5.4 0.5 0.4 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.9
LDC 7.6 0.8 0.8 2.5 0.7 1.1 0.4 1.4 0.3 1.9 1.1
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design.
b IC = developed countries, DC = developing countries, LDC = least developed countries. Please refer to
Table A1 in the appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.
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Table A4
Effects of eliminating domestic support on bilateral exports for aggregated agricultural commodities for selected
countries in % (partially decoupled SFP – 100)a,b Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Partner
EU can US IC bra zaf chn DC bgd eth LDC
Reporter
EU -1.4 -19.4 -22.9 -17.3 -15.8 -22.7 -14.7 -26.8 -38.3 -32.9 -30.2
can 45.5 2.2 3.2 6.3 -0.8 0.5 1.5 3.6 0.1 9.3 13.5
US 34.4 2.5 2.9 6.4 2.0 1.5 1.9 4.1 0.4 15.6 9.1
IC 23.8 1.4 1.5 8.1 4.5 4.3 0.7 4.0 -0.1 5.7 11.4
bra 26.8 3.7 4.3 5.2 2.9 9.0 1.2 4.8 0.1 10.1 5.2
zaf 25.1 1.4 2.3 7.2 6.1 4.5 3.3 4.8 0.8 6.0 5.3
chn 24.6 4.1 3.6 9.0 6.3 5.2 4.8 6.8 3.2 8.9 8.2
DC 29.9 2.5 2.7 7.2 2.8 3.7 0.9 4.0 1.0 9.0 8.0
bgd 45.2 8.4 8.8 11.9 4.2 19.4 3.3 7.5 3.6 5.9 14.1
eth 27.8 0.9 0.4 4.7 0.5 1.9 -1.1 1.6 -1.6 2.1 2.0
LDC 32.5 2.1 2.2 8.1 2.1 4.2 1.1 3.7 0.0 8.4 3.6
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number (100)
indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number
increases.
b IC = developed countries, DC = developing countries, LDC = least developed countries. Please refer to Table A1 in
the appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.
Table A5
Allocation of domestic support payments in the GTAP database version 8.2 year 2007 – partially decoupled SFP-100.a Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Payment type Productb
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total
Value of domestic support payments in million USD
Land 562 3,627 3,708 4,283 1,985 287 1,520 5,673 520 2,065 2,021 5 26,255
Capital 106 1,352 1,442 3,434 885 185 189 4,698 4,584 2,402 2,583 5 21,866
Unskilled labor 197 2,320 2,516 5,029 1,481 297 383 6,198 748 2,939 3,071 7 25,185
Skilled labor 14 149 156 344 97 19 27 419 53 183 206 0 1,667
Output 16 0 8 493 4 0 0 507 0 9 286 1 1,325
Input 4 366 281 957 161 39 10 904 1,468 1,986 1,455 6 7,636
Total 899 7,814 8,110 14,541 4,612 828 2,130 18,399 7,372 9,583 9,623 24 83,934
Share of domestic support payments in %
Land 0.7 4.3 4.4 5.1 2.4 0.3 1.8 6.8 0.6 2.5 2.4 0.0 31.3
Capital 0.1 1.6 1.7 4.1 1.1 0.2 0.2 5.6 5.5 2.9 3.1 0.0 26.1
Unskilled labor 0.2 2.8 3.0 6.0 1.8 0.4 0.5 7.4 0.9 3.5 3.7 0.0 30.0
Skilled labor 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 2.0
Output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.6
Input 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.7 2.4 1.7 0.0 9.1
Total 1.1 9.3 9.7 17.3 5.5 1.0 2.5 21.9 8.8 11.4 11.5 0.0 100.0
Ratio of domestic support payments to value of production in %
Land 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 5.7
Capital 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 4.8
Unskílled labor 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.0 5.5
Skilled labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Input 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.7
Total 0.2 1.7 1.8 3.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 4.0 1.6 2.1 2.1 0.0 18.3
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number indicate the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial
distribution according to land to the distribution according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number increases.
b Please refer to Table A2 in the appendix for more details on the sectoral aggregation.
Table A6
Allocation of domestic support payments in the GTAP database version 8.2 year 2007 – fully decoupled SFP.a Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Payment type Productb
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total
Value of domestic support payments in million USD
Land 842 6,886 7,220 11,290 4,050 699 2,069 14,387 1,893 6,225 6,339 15 61,916
Capital 33 514 547 1,636 360 81 48 2,401 3,974 1,270 1,437 2 12,302
Unskilled labor 3 44 48 140 31 7 4 165 30 76 86 0 634
Skilled labor 0 3 3 10 2 0 0 11 2 5 6 0 43
Output 16 0 8 494 4 0 0 508 0 9 286 1 1,326
Input 4 369 283 965 162 39 10 910 1,477 1,999 1,465 6 7,689
Total 898 7,815 8,109 14,534 4,610 827 2,132 18,381 7,377 9,583 9,619 24 83,909
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Table A6 (continued)
Payment type Productb
pdr wht gro v_f osd c_b pfb ocr ctl oap rmk wol Total
Share of domestic support payments in %
Land 1.0 8.2 8.6 13.5 4.8 0.8 2.5 17.1 2.3 7.4 7.6 0.0 73.8
Capital 0.0 0.6 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.1 0.1 2.9 4.7 1.5 1.7 0.0 14.7
Unskilled labor 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8
Skilled labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.6
Input 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.8 2.4 1.7 0.0 9.2
Total 1.1 9.3 9.7 17.3 5.5 1.0 2.5 21.9 8.8 11.4 11.5 0.0 100.0
Ratio of domestic support payments to value of production in %
Land 0.2 1.5 1.6 2.5 0.9 0.2 0.5 3.1 0.4 1.4 1.4 0.0 13.5
Capital 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.7
Unskílled labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Skilled labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Input 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.7
Total 0.2 1.7 1.8 3.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 4.0 1.6 2.1 2.1 0.0 18.3
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design.
b Please refer to Table A2 in the appendix for more details on the sectoral aggregation.
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
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Table B1. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the trade balance (TB)a,b,c 
  Primary agricultural commodities  Food commodities 
  
Partial de-
coupling - 100 
Full decoupling Statistics  
Partial de-
coupling - 100 
Full decoupling Statistics 
  
USD 
mn 
% USD 
mn 
% md 
(%) 
rngd 
(%) 
 USD 
mn 
% USD 
mn 
% md 
(%) 
rngd 
(%) 
EU:               
Total trade  -56,535 49.7 -42,222 12.3 31.1 37.4  -2,538 -149.2 2,187 -58 -103.8 91.2 
Excl. intra 
EU trade 
 -53,791 55.2 -39,318 13.6 34.5 41.6  3,236 -70,7 8,016 -27.6 -34.5 -43.1 
Canada  8,829 12.4 8,118 3.3 7.9 9.1  -502 -41.0 -730 -14.2 -27.7 26.8 
US  22,336 15.7 20,136 4.3 10.0 11.4  -22,469 -4.7 -23,224 -1.5 -3.1 3.2 
Japan  -14,695 0.1 -14,709 0.2 0.1 -0.1  -34,384 -0.1 -34,468 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Developed 
countries 
 -11,159 -1.8 -11,308 -0.5 -1.2 1.3  -2,261 -35.6 -2,915 -16.9 -26.2 18.7 
Brazil  16,331 16.3 14,460 2.9 9.6 13.4  23,186 4.6 22,726 2.5 3.6 2.1 
South Africa  1,757 30.7 1,458 8.4 19.6 22.3  25 -137.6 -36 -45.9 -92.2 91.7 
China  -12,309 -6.3 -12,942 -1.5 -3.9 4.8  6,348 10.2 5,954 3.3 6.8 6.9 
Developing 
countries 
 12,091 186.1 6,175 45.7 116.1 140.3  27,551 10.4 25,912 3.8 7.1 6.6 
Bangladesh  -2,084 -1.1 -2,103 -0.2 -0.7 0.9  -1,443 -0.3 -1,448 0.0 -0.2 0.3 
Ethiopia  802 12.5 733 2.8 7.7 9.7  -77 2.4 -75 0.3 1.3 2.1 
Least 
developed 
countries 
 4,109 21.5 3,570 5.5 13.5 16.0  -9,958 -0.4 -9,986 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 
Russia  -3,413 -10.8 -3,734 -2.4 -6.5 8.4  -12,544 -2.2 -12,731 -0.8 -1.5 1.4 
Rest of the 
world 
 -142 -85.8 -749 -24.8 55.4 61.0  -8,877 -2.9 -9,058 -0.9 -1.9 2.0 
m_rege   17.1  4.0 10.6 24.0   -24.7  -9.2 -17.0 18.1 
std_rege   57.3  14.6 36.0 37.3   52.5  19.2 36.0 32.02 
a Trade balance = exports minus imports; negative value = net importing country; positive value = net exporting 
country. This table displays post-simulation values of the agricultural and food trade balance and the percentage 
changes compared to pre-simulation value. 
b Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number 
increases.  
c Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.  
d The mean (m) and the range (rng) are calculated across the 21 databases.  
e The mean (m_reg) and the standard deviation (std_reg) calculated across regions are determined accounting for 
total EU trade.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B2. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes calculated 
for agricultural commoditiesa,b,c 
  Market concentration (HHMCI)  Product concentration (HHPCI) 
  
Partial 
decoupling - 
100 
Fully 
decoupling Statistics  
Partial 
decoupling 
- 100 
Fully 
decoupling Statistics 
  
H
H
M
C
I 
C
h
an
g
e 
(%
) 
H
H
M
C
I 
C
h
an
g
e 
(%
) 
m
d
 
(%
) 
rn
g
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(%
) 
 H
H
P
C
I 
C
h
an
g
e 
(%
) 
H
H
P
C
I 
C
h
an
g
e 
(%
) 
m
d
 
(%
) 
rn
g
d
 
(%
) 
EU  0.67 9.3 0.63 2.9 6.2 6.4  0.16 5.2 0.16 1.4 3.4 3.8 
Canada  0.16 -5.9 0.17 -1.1 -3.6 4.8  0.12 4.8 0.11 0.5 2.6 4.3 
US  0.14 -3.6 0.15 -1.0 -2.3 2.6  0.09 -2.6 0.09 -1.4 -2.0 1.1 
Japan  0.13 -6.5 0.13 -1.2 -4.0 5.3  0.24 3.8 0.24 0.3 2.0 3.6 
Developed 
countries  
0.10 -0.1 0.10 -0.4 -0.3 0.3  0.07 -1.5 0.07 -0.8 -1.2 0.7 
Brazil  0.24 18.4 0.21 2.8 10.6 15.5  0.24 0.4 0.24 -0.6 -0.1 1.0 
South Africa  0.29 16.3 0.26 4.5 10.4 11.8  0.50 3.9 0.48 1.3 2.6 2.6 
China  0.11 1.8 0.11 0.3 1.0 1.4  0.17 -2.2 0.17 -0.3 -1.3 1.8 
Developing 
countries  
0.14 16.2 0.12 3.6 9.8 12.6  0.21 1.0 0.20 -0.1 0.4 1.1 
Bangladesh  0.37 -6.3 0.39 -1.6 -4.0 4.6  0.47 -6.9 0.50 -1.5 -4.2 5.5 
Ethiopia  0.18 21.6 0.15 3.8 12.5 17.8  0.33 7.3 0.31 0.6 4.0 6.7 
Least 
developed 
countries  
0.21 2.7 0.20 0.4 1.4 2.2  0.17 7.2 0.16 0.4 3.8 6.9 
Russia  0.45 -9.3 0.49 -1.9 -5.6 7.4  0.61 2.0 0.60 0.4 1.2 1.6 
Rest of the 
world  
0.09 10.3 0.08 2.3 6.1 8.1  0.15 -4.0 0.16 -1.2 -2.6 2.8 
m_rege  0.23 4.6 0.23 1.0 2.7 7.2  0.25 1.3 0.25 -0.1 0.6 3.1 
std_rege  0.16 10.6 0.16 2.3 6.4 5.4  0.17 4.34 0.17 0.9 2.6 2.1 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number 
increases.  
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.  
c Herfindahl-Hirschman Market Concentration Index (HHMCI): 0 = trade is equally distributed; 1 = trade is 
concentrated in one market. Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index (HHPCI): 0 = trade is equally 
distributed across products - not vulnerable to trade shocks; 1 = trade is concentrated on one product -vulnerable 
to trade shocks. This table displays post-simulation values of the HHMCI and HHPCI and the percentage changes 
compared to pre-simulation values.  
d The mean (m) and the range (rng) are calculated across the 21 databases.  
e The mean (m_reg) and the standard deviation (std_reg) are calculated across all regions. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B3. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on welfare in selected countriesa,b 
  Full 
decoupling 
Partial 
decoupling 
- 100 
 
Changec Meand Ranged 
  
(USD 
millions) 
(USD 
millions) 
 
% 
(USD 
millions) 
(USD 
millions) 
EU  1,346 3,019  124 2,032 1,673 
Canada  61 222  264 140 161 
US  377 1,077  186 724 700 
Japan  -151 -567  276 -361 718 
Developed countries  -262 -895  242 -590 633 
Brazil  211 703  233 455 492 
South Africa  17 56  240 36 40 
China  -243 -830  242 -539 587 
Developing 
countries 
 68 369 
 
440 195 300 
Bangladesh  -13 -49  271 -31 49 
Ethiopia  14 67  374 40 53 
Least developed 
countries 
 -11 -18 
 
69 -16 7 
Russia  -244 -674  177 -463 431 
Rest of the world  -18 -53  198 -37 35 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number 
increases.  
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.  
c The percentage number gives the percentage change between scenario full decoupling and partial decoupling -
100.  
d The mean and the range are calculated across the 21 databases. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B4. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on countries’ export sharea,b 
  Partial decoupling - 
100  
Full 
decoupling  
Statistics 
  Export 
share 
Change 
(%)  
Export 
share 
Change 
(%)  
Mean 
(%)c 
Range 
(%)c 
EU  0.83 4.28  0.81 1.35  2.89 2.93 
Canada  0.13 35.65  0.10 6.91  21.00 28.74 
US  0.14 25.78  0.12 6.54  16.08 19.24 
Japan  0.11 26.84  0.09 4.35  15.52 22.49 
Developed countries  0.19 16.08  0.17 4.79  10.41 11.29 
Brazil  0.50 11.48  0.45 1.95  6.82 9.53 
South Africa  0.54 8.89  0.51 2.58  5.80 6.31 
China  0.20 13.67  0.18 3.32  8.52 10.35 
Developing countries  0.35 16.59  0.31 4.24  10.51 12.35 
Bangladesh  0.15 30.28  0.12 9.36  19.93 20.92 
Ethiopia  0.41 15.81  0.37 3.03  9.53 12.78 
Least developed 
countries 
 0.33 18.54  0.29 4.36  11.58 14.18 
Russia  0.16 44.53  0.12 8.65  26.11 35.88 
Rest of the world  0.23 25.98  0.20 7.87  16.98 18.11 
m_regd  0.31 21.03  0.27 4.95  12.98 16.08 
std_regd  0.21 11.04  0.20 2.53  6.53 8.89 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in 
the legend increases. 
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.  
c The mean and the range of the percentage changes are calculated across the 21 databases.  
d The mean (m_reg) and the standard deviation (std_reg) are calculated across all regions. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B5. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on aggregated output (% change)a,b 
   Agricultural commodities   Food commodities 
   
Partial 
decoupling -100 
Full decoupling  
Partial 
decoupling -100 
Full decoupling 
EU  -6.25 -1.95  -1.82 -0.71 
Canada  2.90 0.84  0.53 0.21 
US  1.09 0.33  0.10 0.05 
Japan  0.46 0.14  0.08 0.03 
Developed 
countries 
 1.27 0.54  0.63 0.32 
Brazil  2.25 0.55  0.52 0.33 
South Africa  2.83 0.79  0.31 0.11 
China  0.30 0.09  0.14 0.05 
Developing 
countries 
 0.98 0.26  0.19 0.08 
Bangladesh  0.33 0.10  0.06 0.02 
Ethiopia  0.94 0.21  0.14 0.04 
Least 
developed 
countries 
 1.12 0.30  0.23 0.10 
Russia  0.65 0.19  0.41 0.18 
Rest of the 
world 
 1.28 0.39  0.39 0.14 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in 
the legend increases.  
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the regional aggregation.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B6. Comparison of the effects of eliminating domestic support under different 
assumptions of the SFP’s degree of decoupling on commodity specific output 
(range between full and partial decoupling – 100 in %)a,b 
 EU can usa IC bra zaf chn DC bgd eth LDC 
pdr -23.38 0.25 1.14 -0.38 0.01 2.83 0.11 0.36 0.02 -0.66 -0.18 
wht -7.49 7.78 4.81 3.07 -0.18 1.69 0.60 1.62 2.18 1.15 2.75 
gro -3.52 0.84 0.47 0.46 2.90 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.24 0.10 0.13 
v_f -5.55 1.43 0.64 0.66 2.20 4.30 0.17 0.74 0.30 0.20 0.34 
osd -9.01 2.49 1.41 0.56 3.02 0.80 0.92 0.66 0.86 -0.64 0.52 
c_b -0.98 0.29 0.03 0.41 -0.32 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.21 
pfb -18.13 0.47 0.70 0.72 -0.37 2.00 0.17 0.28 0.53 -0.20 2.14 
ocr -5.32 2.82 2.18 1.75 3.66 7.42 5.10 2.49 0.74 4.68 5.50 
ctl -1.70 0.52 0.17 0.29 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.03 -0.05 0.06 
oap -2.45 0.80 0.36 0.75 0.85 0.78 0.11 0.16 -0.07 0.42 0.21 
rmk -1.42 0.12 0.04 0.75 -0.11 0.12 0.15 -0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 
wol -16.60 -0.32 -0.16 0.35 0.33 1.17 0.57 -0.22 7.12 -0.72 -0.05 
cmt -1.65 0.13 -0.02 0.17 -0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 2.93 0.03 -0.01 
omt -2.00 1.21 0.28 0.72 1.56 0.52 0.14 0.20 6.17 0.02 0.52 
vol -4.50 1.73 0.37 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.19 0.83 0.27 -2.77 1.16 
mil -1.44 0.08 0.04 0.88 -0.08 0.35 0.15 0.19 0.61 0.59 0.48 
pcr -1.65 -0.05 0.59 -0.34 -0.02 0.74 0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -2.35 -0.44 
sgr -1.24 0.03 0.03 0.65 -0.23 0.44 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.41 
ofd -0.78 0.20 0.03 0.20 -0.03 0.16 0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.06 
b_t -0.49 0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.00 
MNFC 0.36 -0.20 -0.10 -0.06 -0.56 -0.25 -0.06 -0.20 -0.09 -1.23 -0.32 
SERV 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.44 -0.09 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in 
the legend increases.  
b IC = developed countries, DC = developing countries, LDC = least developed countries. Please refer to Table A1 
in the Appendix for more details on the regional and sectoral aggregation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B7. Comparison of the effects of eliminating domestic support under different 
assumptions of the SFP’s degree of decoupling on commodity specific output 
in the EUa,b 
  
Full decoupling 
 
Partial decoupling-100 
Paddy rice  -21.6  -45.0 
Wheat  -2.4  -9.9 
Grains  -1.4  -4.9 
Vegetables, fruits  -2.3  -7.8 
Oilseeds  -1.3  -10.3 
Raw sugar  -0.1  -1.1 
Fibers  -20.4  -38.5 
Other crops  -1.5  -6.8 
Ruminants  -4.0  -5.7 
Non-ruminants  -1.5  -4.0 
Raw milk  -0.7  -2.2 
Wool  -7.5  -24.1 
Ruminant meat   -4.7  -6.4 
Non-rum. Meat  -1.4  -3.4 
Veg. oils and fats  -0.7  -5.2 
Dairy products  -0.7  -2.2 
Processed rice  -2.0  -3.6 
Refined sugar  -0.1  -1.4 
Other food  -0.4  -1.2 
Beverages, tobacco  -0.2  -0.7 
Manufacturing   0.2  0.5 
Services  0.0  0.1 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in 
the legend increases.  
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the sectoral aggregation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table B8. Effects of eliminating domestic support under different assumptions of the 
SFP’s degree of decoupling on world market prices (% change)a,b 
 
 
Full decoupling 
 
Partial decoupling-100 
Paddy rice  0.60  1.59 
Wheat  0.95  3.61 
Grains  0.72  2.78 
Vegetables, 
fruits 
 
0.74 
 
2.23 
Oilseeds  0.60  2.59 
Raw sugar  0.54  2.12 
Fibers  0.97  2.22 
Other crops  0.99  4.52 
Ruminants  2.48  3.87 
Non-
ruminants 
 
0.85 
 
2.36 
Raw milk  1.24  3.65 
Wool  0.37  0.92 
Ruminant 
meat  
 
0.96 
 
1.49 
Non-rum. 
Meat 
 
0.82 
 
1.86 
Veg. oils and 
fats 
 
0.36 
 
1.21 
Dairy 
products 
 
0.62 
 
1.58 
Processed rice  0.40  0.96 
Refined sugar  0.28  0.75 
Other food  0.32  0.70 
Beverages, 
tobacco 
 
0.28 
 
0.61 
Manufacturing   0.13  0.03 
Services  0.13  0.04 
a Please refer to Table 1 for more information on the set of databases and the scenario design. The number 100 
indicates the share of the SFP that is shifted from the initial distribution according to land to the distribution 
according to a sector’s factor usage to capital, labor and land. The coupling degree is increasing as the number in 
the legend increases.  
b Please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix for more details on the sector aggregation. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Measuring the Trade Restrictiveness of Domestic Support using the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy as an Example 
Kirsten Urban, Martina Brockmeier and Hans G. Jensen  
Abstract:  
We use the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) to develop an extended index that 
measures the overall trade effects of domestic support payments in a general equilibrium frame-
work environment. Our index is capable of analyzing the development of the trade restrictive-
ness of domestic support payments over time and across countries and of comparing these pay-
ments with other protection instruments. Furthermore, our index helps evaluate agricultural 
policy reforms that introduce changes into the composition of domestic support payments. We 
conduct this analysis with an extended version of the GTAP model and database using the EU 
as an example. Thus, we incorporate detailed EU domestic support payments taken from the 
OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) tables in the GTAP framework and reconcile PSE data 
with the WTO classification scheme. Although our index slightly increases from 2004 to 2007, 
the results indicate a decrease in trade distortion stemming from the implementation of decou-
pled support in the EU. The trade-equivalent protection rate determined under the index shows 
that domestic support payments restrict trade more than tariffs and export subsidies. Addition-
ally, the index indicates that reducing WTO amber box domestic support payments would lead 
to decreased trade restrictiveness. 
Keywords: domestic distortions, agricultural policies, trade restrictiveness, simulation models 
JEL classification: D58, F13, F14, Q17, Q18 
1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an ongoing debate regarding the trade-distorting effects of domes-
tic support in agriculture. Typically, domestic support is based on a variety of different and 
country-specific agricultural policy instruments, which makes the impact on trade difficult to 
address. The importance of such payments has grown as the more detailed reduction require-
ments for domestic support from the Doha Round have been implemented. As a consequence, 
  
2 
 
several countries have initiated reforms of their agricultural policies to meet WTO criteria. New 
instruments have been developed to reduce production-distorting incentives of such payments, 
such as the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in the EU. Nevertheless, these new instruments, includ-
ing the SFP, are controversial because payments decoupled from production may still create 
incentives to produce based on other coupling channels, including uncertainty, imperfect credit 
markets, land and labor markets, and farmers’ expectations about future payments (Bhaskar and 
Beghin 2009). Thus, the trade-distorting effects of decoupled domestic support remain unclear. 
Over the years, two prevailing sets of indicators have been developed to provide information 
regarding domestic support in the agricultural sector, and these indicators have become ac-
cepted worldwide. One of these indicators is the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) from the 
OECD, which has been calculated since 1986 and is typically accompanied by several other 
composite measures, such as the Percentage PSE (%PSE), the Nominal Rate of Assistance 
(NRA) and the Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA). The aim of the OECD in using the PSE is 
to quantify the effects of national distortions consistently and to establish a common basis for 
a policy dialogue among countries (OECD 2010). Beginning from the same basis as the PSE, 
the WTO established the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) concurrently with its am-
ber, blue, and green box subsidy classification scheme in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
(WTO 1994). In the Doha Round, the WTO introduced an additional criterion, the overall base 
level of all trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS) (WTO 2004), to compare the amount of 
domestic support between countries and to facilitate the negotiation of commitments to reduc-
ing domestic support.  
Indicators such as the PSE can be classified as traditional weighted aggregates of price dis-
tortions and are thus not appropriate for analyzing the trade restrictiveness or economic welfare 
losses associated with policies (Anderson and Croser 2011). However, aggregation problems 
persist in quantifying domestic distortions and in other areas. Anderson and Neary (2003) point 
to the lack of a theoretical foundation in criticizing measures such as arithmetic or trade-
weighted average tariffs, non-tariff barrier coverage ratios and measures of tariff dispersion that 
are frequently used to compare international trade polices over time and across countries. None-
theless, researchers have developed several theoretically sound aggregation procedures to over-
come the aggregation problems that arise from different types and variations of policies across 
sectors and regions. The general objective is to produce a single index that captures the overall 
effects of different policy instruments using a consistent theoretical aggregation method. This 
index should be capable of evaluating trade policies across policy measures, sectors, regions 
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and, in particular, over time. Initial and influential theoretical work in this area has been pub-
lished by Corden (1966), Feenstra (1995) and, in particular, by Anderson and Neary (1994; 
2003; 2005), who developed two theory-based indexes, the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI).  
Several studies apply and further develop the concepts of the TRI and MTRI for tariff anal-
ysis in a partial or general equilibrium environment (Pelikan and Brockmeier 2008a; 2008b; 
Bureau and Salvatici 2005; Antimiani and Salvatici 2005; Kee et al. 2009). However, the liter-
ature on the adjustments and applications that measure the impact of domestic support payments 
remains scarce. The exceptions in the literature include Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995) 
and Anderson and Neary (2005), who adjust their TRI concept to account for factor market 
distortions and thereby generate an index that consistently quantifies the effects of domestic 
distortions on welfare. With respect to the MTRI, Anderson and Neary (2005) provide a rough 
adjustment to cover domestic distortions, but there have been no applications as of yet to vali-
date this methodology. Salvatici (2001) extends the TRI approach to evaluate the EU common 
agricultural policy by using an adjusted version of the GTAP model that includes modifications 
in the computation of equivalent variation. Also building on the TRI and MTRI, Anderson and 
Croser (2011), Croser and Anderson (2011), Croser et al. (2010), and Lloyd and MacLaren 
(2010) offer a methodological approach that is restricted to a partial equilibrium environment 
and estimates the relative contribution of different agricultural policy instruments to the overall 
trade and welfare effect. Utilizing the World Bank’s distortions data set, they apply this meth-
odology to generate time series of indexes for agricultural products that can be used to evaluate 
national policy development and make cross-country comparisons. One caveat regarding their 
approach is that the estimated indexes include neither non-product-specific domestic support 
payments as input subsidies not distributed at the product level nor, in particular, decoupled 
support. Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) contend that partial equilibrium estimates underestimate 
the true value of the indexes due to the neglect of general equilibrium effects. To overcome this 
bias, they apply semi–general equilibrium measures that account for input-output relationships. 
Although research has addressed certain domestic support issues, other important questions 
remain unanswered. How harmful is agricultural domestic support for international trade? Are 
domestic subsidies even more restrictive than tariffs? Has the introduction of decoupled sup-
port, such as the EU's SFP, decreased the magnitude of this effect? Additionally, country-spe-
cific domestic support typically consists of different categories and types of payments. Conse-
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quently, an evaluation tool is required that compares the trade restrictiveness of different poli-
cies according to the type and classification of support across countries and that evaluates their 
development over time. Furthermore, the WTO modalities paper defines commitments to re-
duce the OTDS and places reduction requirements on the AMS and blue box subsidies. How-
ever, most global equilibrium models evaluate the level of domestic support through the OECD 
PSE. Employing global equilibrium models in the analysis of domestic support reduction, as 
suggested in the WTO negotiations, requires the WTO amber, blue and green box support clas-
sification scheme and the PSE data to be reconciled. 
Against this backdrop, our objective is to provide a theoretically based index to evaluate 
different domestic support payment categories and types over time and across countries that 
can also serve as an evaluation tool for WTO criteria. In addition, this index should enable us 
to compare the trade restrictiveness of domestic support, import tariffs, and other protection 
instruments. To the best of our knowledge, this type of index is not currently available in the 
literature. Thus, this research contributes to filling the gap of applied analyses measuring the 
trade restrictiveness of domestic distortions. 
Specifically, this study extends the standard GTAP framework to incorporate detailed do-
mestic support categories and payment types. Furthermore, we match the OECD PSE data in 
the underlying GTAP database with the WTO amber, blue, and green box support classification 
scheme to reconcile the representations of both important measures of domestic support pay-
ments and then integrate them into the GTAP model. We also respond to the question of how 
this extended GTAP framework can be utilized to calculate domestic support indexes. For this 
purpose, we build on the work of Anderson and Neary (2005) and Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) 
and introduce an adaptation of the MTRI that is adjusted to account for domestic distortions 
into the GTAP model. The methodological approach introduced in this article extends the stand-
ard computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses of international trade liberalization and 
country-specific policy reforms by employing a CGE model that accurately covers domestic 
support payments and the corresponding trade restrictiveness using a theoretically sound index. 
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain how we adapted the MTRI to 
measure the tariff equivalent of domestic support payments, which is followed by a description 
of the extended GTAP modeling framework in section 3. Section 4 introduces the experiment 
design and simulation results. The closing section discusses our findings, offers political con-
clusions, and suggests directions for future research.  
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2 Existing indicators of domestic distortions for the EU 
The EU agricultural sector is heavily subsidized. The starting point of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) of the EU consisted of policy instruments, such as intervention prices and output 
subsidies, that primarily created production incentives. Such policies enhanced EU agricultural 
production on the domestic market, led to oversupplies on the world market, and replaced im-
ports. The EU substantially modified the CAP to address its impact and to meet WTO criteria. 
In general, these reforms induced reductions in market price supports and output subsidies, and 
increased decoupled subsidies, such as the SFP.  
Figure 1 shows the development of the CAP using OECD PSE data. The PSE consists of 
market price support (MPS) and budgetary transfers that are subdivided into single commodity 
transfer (SCT) payments, group commodity transfer (GCT) payments, all commodity transfer 
(ACT) payments, and other transfers to producers (OTP) payments that comprise the SFP. The 
graph displays only slight variations of domestic support payments in the 1986-2012 period, 
whereas it clearly depicts a change in the composition of the PSE.  
 
Figure 1. Development of the PSE composition of the EU (in € million) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD PSE database (OECD 2014) 
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The MPS share of the PSE decreases from more than 90% in 1986 to less than 20% in 2012. 
The share of budgetary transfers rises accordingly. Furthermore, the composition of budgetary 
transfers reveals the changes induced by CAP reforms. Figure 1 presents the increase in prod-
uct-specific (SCT) and group-specific (GCT) domestic support, introduced in 1992 with the 
McSharry reform, which remains coupled to production. The EU initiated the first attempt to-
ward decoupled support with the Agenda 2000 reform, which is shown in the larger shares of 
support allocated to all primary agricultural commodities (ACT) in figure 1. In 2005, the EU 
introduced the SFP (OTP), which was declared to be decoupled from production. The graph 
highlights that decoupled support has increased considerably since 2005, whereas coupled sup-
port has obviously diminished. 
The PSE payments are further subdivided according to subsidy types, such as output, input 
use, land, labor, and capital. Table 1 decomposes the PSE budgetary transfers of the EU25 into 
payment categories and types for the years 2004 and 2007 to identify the development of these 
categories and types. The first column in the years 2004 and 2007 present the values for each 
category (SCT, GCT, ACT, OTP), which are further subdivided into values for each payment 
type. The second column shows the shares of each category of the total PSE and the shares of 
each payment type of the corresponding category. The last column of table 1 depicts changes 
from 2004 to 2007. The total value of PSE budgetary transfers rises by 7% from 2004 to 2007. 
Furthermore, table 1 emphasizes the significant increase in OTP, which accounts for only € 
1,455 million in 2004 but rises to € 31,382 million in 2007. As a result, 53% of the PSE budg-
etary transfers are classified as decoupled from production.  
Additionally, coupled support in the form of product- and group-specific support (SCT, 
GCT) clearly decreases to values that are less than one-third of their 2004 values, whereas the 
less-coupled non-product-specific category ACT increases by approximately 9%. 
In addition, table 1 depicts considerable changes in the allocation of payments within each 
category. The composition of SCT shows a move toward payments based on land and away 
from payments based on output and input use. By contrast, the structure of GCT moves toward 
subsidies allocated according to input and labor use, whereas ACT shifts toward subsidies al-
located according to labor and capital use. Both categories show reduced payments based on 
land. These changes reflect an increase in production incentives through GCT and ACT pay-
ments and a decrease in production effects due to SCT payments. 
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Table 1. Composition of the EU25’s PSE in 2004 and 2007 Excluding MPS (in € million) 
 2004  2007  change 
Budgetary 
transfer € 
% share of 
PSE category € 
% share of 
PSE category % 
SCT 18,012 33 4,632 8 -74 
Output 243 1 2 0 -99 
Input 5,542 31 922 20 -83 
Land 2,061 11 1,173 25 -43 
Labor - - - - - 
Capital 10,167 56 2,534 55 -75 
GCT 19,331 35 5,529 9 -71 
Output - - - - - 
Input 1,304 7 1,190 22 -9 
Land 17,479 90 3,633 66 -79 
Labor 67 0 768 14 1,046 
Capital 482 2 - - -100 
ACT 15,785 29 17,131 29 9 
Output - - - - - 
Input 4,553 29 4,627 27 2 
Land 7,732 49 6,812 40 -12 
Labor 237 2 481 3 103 
Capital 3,263 21 5,212 30 60 
OTP / SFP 1,455 3 31,382 53 2,057 
PSE excl. MPS 54,583  58,674  7 
Source: OECD PSE tables 2004, 2007(OECD 2014) and own calculations 
Note: Here we allocated the PSE classification of policy instruments according payment types (output, input, land, 
labor, and capital) that are used in GTAP. 
The WTO scheme classifies subsidies coupled to production as AMS support (AoA Article 
6.2) consisting of MPS and non-exempted direct payments (amber box support) or direct pay-
ments meeting the criteria of AoA Article 6.5 (blue box support), depending on the extent to 
which they create production incentives. Decoupled support and other direct payments given to 
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agricultural producers as defined in AoA Annex 2, paras. 5 and 6 are categorized as green box 
support because they are only minimally trade distorting. Figure 2 shows the development of 
domestic support classified according to the WTO scheme from the 1999/2000 – 2009/2010 
marketing years. This graph highlights the reduction of trade-distorting amber and blue box 
support, and the rise of only minimally trade-distorting green box support. Thus, it reflects the 
movement from market price support schemes to decoupled support schemes. Hence, domestic 
support categorized according to this WTO scheme shows the same changes that can be seen 
in the PSE data from the OECD. Josling and Mittenzwei (2013) provide a reconstruction of 
WTO notification tables using the PSE categories and support types.  
 
Figure 2. Development of EU domestic support according to the WTO classification 
scheme (in € million) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WTO notification tables for domestic support (WTO ; WTO 
2014) 
In addition, Josling and Mittenzwei (2013) analyze and discuss the production requirement 
and the related trade-distorting effects of green box support and conclude that the PSE database 
is not only suited to rebuild but also to improve the policy details of the WTO notification 
tables. Many support programs that fulfill the WTO requirements defined in Article 6 and An-
nex 2 of the AoA imply that there is a need for production. Josling and Mittenzwei (2013), in 
particular, stress the benefit of utilizing both databases regarding the extent to which green box 
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payments require production that is provided by the PSE. Furthermore, they emphasize that the 
two datasets, the OECD PSE tables and the WTO classification scheme, can be regarded as 
complementary resources and use OECD PSE data to build pre-notification tables to overcome 
the delay in countries’ submission of notification tables. 
The PSE and the WTO classification scheme are both important measures that monitor 
changes in the composition of countries' agricultural policy instruments and are thus both well 
suited to evaluate such changes. Nevertheless, neither the PSE nor the WTO classification 
scheme enable a quantification of the impact on trade or a comparison with other trade-dis-
torting policy instruments, such as tariffs or export subsidies. 
3 Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index of domestic support payments 
The MTRI developed by Anderson and Neary (2003; 2005) is a theoretically based index that 
measures import volume-equivalent protection, which is defined as the uniform tariff   that 
results in the same import volume  0 0M p ,b  at world prices   of tariff-restricted imports, such 
as the initial sector-specific tariffs when domestic prices equal p  and the economies’ exoge-
nous income b : 
 
(1)    0 0 0 0 0p ,b : M (1 ) ,b M p ,b         
Following Anderson and Neary (2005), the import volume is given by world market prices 
times net import demand. The exogenous balance-of-payments surplus is assumed to be the 
same during both periods. Anderson and Neary (2005) considered a small open economy that 
produces and consumes 1n  commodities that are traded at exogenous prices with the rest of 
the world. All agents within this economy face the same domestic prices, which differ from 
world prices due to the country’s trade policies. 
This characteristic of accounting for protection in terms of import equivalences enables the 
MTRI to be an appropriate starting point for the development of our index, which measures the 
distortive effects of domestic support payments. 
In figure 3, we use a small country to illustrate an application of the MTRI approach to 
domestic support. We assume that this net-importing country provides a product-specific output 
subsidy, that the market is not protected by tariffs in the initial situation, and that there are no 
consumer subsidies. Abolishing the output subsidy shifts the auxiliary supply curve 0S  back to 
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the actual supply curve 1S  and decreases the agent's price from 
0p  to  , which is accompanied 
by a reduction in the quantity supplied from 0
sq  to q
 . The world market price for this product 
is not affected. The import demand quantity given by 0 0
d sq q  rises to 
0
d sq q
 . 
 
Figure 3. Implication of a removal of output subsidies - small country case 
Source: Authors' elaboration  
Note: The initial situation with an output subsidy in place is indicated with superscript 0 whereas the new situation 
after the removal of the output subsidy and the uniform protection rate is indicated with superscript 1. 
Following the MTRI concept, the removal of an output subsidy subject to a constant import 
volume leads to the new market price, , by implementing a uniform tariff, . Both produc-
ers and consumers are faced with new market price , which leads to a decrease 
in quantity supplied, , and demanded, . Because the world market price remains un-
changed due to the small country assumption, the new import volume given by  
equals the initial import volume given by . 
In the multi-good case, the implemented tariff, ds , reflects the uniform tariff that keeps the 
total import volume of the aggregated commodities constant, as all domestic support payments 
are removed.  
1p
ds
 1 1 dsp   
1
sq
1
dq
 1 1d sq q 
 0 0d sq q 
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We adapt the theoretical concept of Anderson and Neary (2005) to domestic support by 
quantifying the trade-distortive effect of these subsidies. As shown in figure 3, the idea of ap-
plying the MTRI as a measure of the distortions of domestic support is to remove domestic 
subsidies and quantify a uniform protection rate that keeps trade volume constant. To evaluate 
the trade-restrictiveness of domestic support payments with the help of a theoretically sound 
index, we must consider the effect on both import demand and export supply. Furthermore, 
consumers and producers receive domestic support payments such that the net import demand 
function  ,p cm p p  is determined as a function of producer pp  and consumer prices 
cp  (An-
derson and Neary 2005). 
 
(2)      ,p c c pm p p d p s p    
Assuming that there are no other trade policies in place, the distorted domestic producer price 
is given for commodity i  by  1p pi i ip    , where pi  is the rate of producer distortions. 
However, the distorted domestic consumer price is given by  1c ci i ip    , where ci  is the 
rate of consumer distortions.1 If 
p c
i i 0    , there are no distortions. 
The aggregated vector of net imports is given by  ,p cM p p : 
 
(3)    , ,p c p cM p p m p p  
Thus, the MTRI for domestic support payments (MTRI-DS) ds  is determined through the 
following identity: 
 
(4)            , : 1 , 1 1 , 1 ,ds p c ds ds p c p cp p M M M p p                     
Following Lloyd and MacLaren (2010), equation (5) represents the change in the value of 
imports from the free-trade situation for a small country.  
                                               
11 Assuming initial import tariffs in place, e.g., the producer price is given by   p pi i i ip 1 1      and the con-
sumer price is given by    c ci i i ip 1 1      , which would affect the height of the uniform protection rate. 
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(5)            ' , ' , ' ,p c p c p cM m p p d p p s p p          
Accordingly, the MTRI-DS, ds , is implicitly given by equations (6) and (7), where we 
equate this change with the situation with a uniform protection rate. Hence, the MTRI-DS quan-
tifies the homogeneous protection rate that results in the same change in the import value as the 
initial consumer and producer distortions. 
 
(6)                ' , ' 1 , 1 ' 1 , 1p c p c ds dsm p p m m                          
In general, because the rate of producer distortion differs from the rate of consumer distor-
tions, it is important to distinguish between consumer and producer distortions. Nevertheless, 
assuming c p   and linear import demand functions implying constant slopes of the demand 
and supply curves, equations (6) and (7) can be solved for ds  to obtain the general equilibrium 
form of the MTRI-DS, based on Lloyd and MacLaren (2010), with commodity 1,....,i n  and 
commodity 1,....,j n , where i j  are complements/substitutes reflecting cross-price effects.  
 
(7) 
   
   
i i i i
ds ds
i j i ju u
i j i jds ds
j j j jj j
i j i j
i i i i
c
i j i ji i
i j i jc
j j j j
i j
d d s s
p p p p
d d s s
p p p p
d d s s
p p p p
d d
p p
   
   
   
 
   
 
      
                              
         
    
              
   
p
i i
p
j j j j
i j
s s
p p
 
 
 
 
  
      
   
 
 
The MTRI-DS accounts for cross-price effects on both consumption and production sides 
and considers both producer and consumer distortion rates. Equation (8) shows the general 
equilibrium solution of the MTRI-DS. 
 
(8)    ds c pj ij j ij
i j i j
w a v b  
   
    
   
    
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The consumer distortion rate, 
ijw , and the producer distortion rate, ijv , are expressed by the 
equations (9) and (10) separating own- and cross-price effects. 
 
(9) ij i j i j i j i j
i j
w ( d / p ) ( d / p )           
(10) ij i j i j i j i j
i j
v ( s / p ) ( s / p )           
Equation (8) divides the total import responses into two shares: consumption responses de-
noted by a  and production responses denoted by b  (equations (11) and (12)). These shares 
weight the total production and consumption effects that are given in parentheses in equation 
(8). All weights sum to unity. 
 
(11)    i j i j i j i j
i j i j
a d p m p           
(12)    i j i j i j i j
i j i j
b s p m p           
In this article, we apply a CGE model to determine the MTRI for domestic support provided 
to agricultural producers. Deviating from the small country approach introduced above, the 
CGE approach allows us to account for effects on world market prices and considers diverging 
consumer and producer distortion rates.  
4 Extended GTAP modeling framework 
The analysis in this article is based upon an extended version of the standard GTAP model 
and updated versions of the underlying GTAP database Version 8.1 that are well documented 
in Hertel (1997) and Narayanan et al. (2012). Following Urban et al. (2014), we update the 
domestic support payments in the GTAP database to consider the structure of these payments.2 
The application of a complex updating procedure with a modified version of the Altertax pro-
gram (Malcolm 1998) enables us to integrate the PSE data according to the SCT, ACT, GCT, 
                                               
2 Market price support is implicitly included in the GTAP model via border measures. To avoid double counting, 
we only incorporated PSE budgetary payments into the GTAP database and model. 
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and OTP categories and the payment types, i.e., output, input, land, labor and capital. The var-
ious agricultural policy instruments are mirrored in the GTAP model in the form of the five 
price wedges affecting the transactions of producers at agents’ and market prices for output, 
intermediate inputs, land, capital, and labor, respectively. We implement additional policy in-
struments to subdivide each of these price wedges according to the four PSE categories to 
achieve a detailed representation of domestic support in the underlying value flows and the 
corresponding price-linkage equations. The SCT payments are linked to a specific product, 
whereas ACT and GCT payments are given to a group of commodities and are therefore allo-
cated with a homogenous rate across the commodities belonging to these product groups. OTP 
payments are not linked to production. Hence, they are distributed at a homogeneous rate across 
primary agricultural commodities according to land utilization (Urban et al. 2014), which re-
flects effectively fully decoupled payments (Cahill 1997).  
The introduction of additional policy instruments enables the relocation of domestic support 
payments in the updated database according to the WTO classification scheme. To achieve this, 
we subdivide each of the newly integrated domestic support price wedges in the GTAP model 
into amber, blue and green box supports, which results in a complex structure of domestic sup-
port payments in the GTAP model and database that represents both important measures of 
domestic support payments, the PSE concept and the WTO classification scheme. 
Modeling the MTRI for domestic support payments builds on an approach developed by 
Antimiani and Salvatici (2005) and Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008a). This approach introduces 
new variables that measure the imported quantity of all commodities by source and destination 
and define the newly implemented quantity variables as exogenous in the model to calculate 
the endogenously adjusted uniform tariff equivalent.  
The GTAP model represents trade through bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington 
assumption (Armington 1969). The elasticity of substitution therefor determines the similarity 
of commodities from different countries to allow all products to be differentiated by country of 
origin. The import demand is modeled in GTAP using a two-stage nested CES functional form 
(Hertel 1997). Consequently, a country both imports and exports in the same sector.  
To capture the trade-distorting effect of domestic support payments, we must keep track of 
the effect on both import and export flows. Considering this, we introduce the new policy var-
iable "MTRI-DS" in both the market price and export price equations. Adapting the approach 
of Antimiani and Salvatici (2005) and Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008a), we capture domestic 
support by introducing new variables to quantify the trade volume of commodities by source 
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and destination by determining the value of net imports in the model. Similar to their approach, 
we define trade volume variables as exogenous such that the adjusting uniform protection rate 
takes the changes on both the import and export sides into account, while we remove domestic 
support subsidies. 
In contrast to the simplified formal approach based on the small country assumption (com-
pare section 3), the general equilibrium environment of the GTAP model allows us to account 
for the effects of removing domestic support on world market prices.  
5 Experiment design 
The GTAP database Version 8.1 includes bilateral trade and protection matrices and addi-
tional data from the OECD PSE tables and links 57 sectors in 129 regions in the year 2007. 
This database is aggregated to the EU and to the Rest of the World and to 22 sectors (compare 
tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). The highly aggregated regional setting is chosen to avoid 
aggregation effects that might lead to a bias in the analysis. The aggregate of the EU consists 
of 25 EU member states. However, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Therefore, 
we have excluded both from the EU aggregate to allow consistent comparison of the regional 
aggregation and the PSE tables of the EU in the years 2004 and 2007. 
Decoupled payments are controversially discussed in the literature. Important issues include 
capitalization of direct payments in land rents as well as various coupling channels through 
which a farmer's production decision might be influenced (Bhaskar and Beghin 2009; Goodwin 
and Mishra 2005; Key and Roberts 2009; Latruffe and Le Mouel 2009). However, the extent to 
which this incentive occurs remains unclear, and we thus choose to follow Urban et al. (2014) 
in our analysis.  
We create a set of deviating GTAP databases to enable our evaluation of domestic support 
development (table 2). Therefore, we implement domestic support payments originating from 
OECD PSE tables for 2004 and 2007 (OECD 2014) in the GTAP database (version 8.1, base 
year, 2007). In so doing, we vary the assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling of the 
SFP. The first (PSE04-SFPland100) and second (PSE07-SFPland100) database represent a full 
capitalization of the SFP in land rents, whereby the SFP is allocated with a homogeneous rate 
across primary agricultural commodities to land. In the first database (PSE04-SFPland100), we 
integrate the levels of domestic support from the PSE tables of 2004 into Version 8.1, base year 
2007, of the GTAP database. 
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Table 2: Database Setting 
 
Name of the database 
 
 
PSE04-
SFPland100 
PSE07-
SFPland100 
PSE07-
SFPland90 
PSE07-
SFPland80 
Baseyear 
PSE table 
2004 X    
2007  X X X 
SFP 
allocation 
Land 100% 100% 
Land usage + 
90% of la-
bor, capital 
usage 
Land usage + 
80% of la-
bor, capital 
usage 
Labor, 
capital 
  
10% of 
factor usage 
20% of 
factor usage 
Effect on  
production 
Fully 
decoupled 
X X   
Partially 
decoupled 
  X X 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
This procedure allows us to compare domestic support over different years but does not 
create a bias through deviating parameters in different base years, such as changing trade pro-
tection data would, for example. For the third database (PSE07-SFPland90), we assume that 
the SFP is not fully capitalized in land rents but nonetheless creates production incentives 
through other coupling channels. Here, we begin from an allocation of the SFP according to 
factor usage and shift 90% of the SFP initially distributed to labor and capital onto land. This 
seems appropriate because Goodwin and Mishra (2005), for example, state that the effect of 
other coupling channels is rather modest. In the fourth database (PSE07-SFPland80), we ac-
count for a lower degree of decoupling, as in PSE07_SFPland90, and shift only 80% to land.  
We use the four databases as starting points to run the scenarios summarized in table 3. The 
database PSE07-SFPland100 is applied to first run a simulation that completely removes do-
mestic support payments given to primary agricultural commodities. This scenario serves as a 
benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of the extended MTRI at capturing the effects and 
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restrictiveness of domestic support payments. Second, three scenarios (table 3) are simulated to 
either eliminate domestic support, import tariffs or export subsidies and to determine the uni-
form equivalent protection rate. The remaining three databases are used to determine the MTRI-
DS, applying scenario DS–UPR 
Table 3. Overview of Applied Scenarios 
  Name of scenario 
  DS-UPR TMS-UPR TXS-UPR 
Abolishment of: 
Domestic support 
payments 
X   
Import tariffs  X  
Export subsidies   X 
UPR included in: 
Market price  
equation 
X X  
Export price  
equation 
X  X 
UPR: 
Swapped with  
net-imports 
X X X 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Note: UPR stands for uniform protection rate 
Finally, to validate the concept of the MTRI-DS, in particular the effects of domestic support 
payments on downstream sectors of the value chain, we calculate the MTRI-DS not only for a 
specific sector but also for aggregated primary and downstream sectors. In so doing, we analyze 
how different commodity aggregations affect the index number and the allocation effects in the 
EU due to removal of subsidies. We begin with eliminating domestic support payments given 
to all primary agricultural commodities, while we determine the uniform protection equivalent 
first for primary agricultural commodities and second for all food commodities to account for 
effects along the value chain.  
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6 Results 
Abolishing EU domestic support payments causes the well-known effect of a decrease in output 
and exports, while imports and the world market price increase (compare table A3 in the ap-
pendix). Although the trade-distorting effect of EU domestic support is obvious, we are not able 
to identify the overall level of trade restrictiveness of these policy instruments used for domestic 
support. Therefore, we describe in the following subsections the results of our applied MTRI-
DS in the GTAP model.  
6.1 MTRI-DS compared with border measures 
We utilize the three scenarios (DS-UPR, TMS-UPR und TXS-UPR) described in table 3 to 
assess this issue. Following the defined scenarios, we compare the results of completely remov-
ing domestic support, import tariffs, or export subsidies for primary agricultural commodities 
utilizing database PSE07-SFPland100 in table 4. In the first column of the table, we present the 
uniform equivalent protection for removing domestic subsidies and the decomposit ion of the 
overall change in the MTRI-DS by primary agricultural commodities. The second and third 
columns show the uniform protection rate and the decomposition for the removal of import 
tariffs and exports subsidies, respectively.  
Three points are notable. First, the MTRI-DS equals a uniform protection rate of 3.66, com-
pared with 2.98 for import tariffs and only 0.29 for export subsidies, which indicates that do-
mestic support payments are more trade restrictive than are import tariffs and export subsidies. 
Second, the decomposition reveals that the MTRI-DS is mainly driven by removing domestic 
support payments given to other crops, followed by fruits and vegetables; however, with respect 
to removing import tariffs, the fruits and vegetables sector contributes the most to the MTRI-
DS. 
Third, table 4 clearly shows that import tariffs are more trade restrictive in arable crops than 
domestic support payments, whereas domestic support payments are more trade distorting in 
the oilseeds and other crops sectors. Domestic support payments and import tariffs show almost 
the same level of trade restrictiveness only in the fruits and vegetables sector. Thus, the impact 
on trade caused by the applied protection instruments varies significantly between sectors. 
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Table 4. Comparison of the MTRI-DS with other Border Measures in 2007 
 Removal of:   
 Domestic  
support  
Import tariffs  
Export  
subsidies  
MTRI-DS / UPR for primary 
agricultural commodities 3.66 2.98 0.29 
Decomposition of results:    
All crops:    
Arable crops 0.56 0.75 0.00 
Oilseeds 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Other crops 2.42 0.50 0.00 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 1.62 0.11 
Livestock:    
Ruminants -0.66 0.04 0.18 
Non-ruminants -0.46 0.07 0.00 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1 adapted to PSE07-SFPland100 as described in table 2. Compare table A 4 to A 5 in the 
appendix for the effect of the elasticity of substitution and the underlying protection data on the MTRI of domestic 
distortion. For the representation of the results, we aggregated the primary agricultural sectors as shown in the 
table. The arable crops aggregate comprises paddy rise, wheat, cereal grains as corn, barley, rye, oats, sugar cane 
and sugar beet, and plant-based fibers. The Oilseed sector includes oil seed and oleaginous fruits, soybeans and 
copra. Aggregated other crops considers other crops as live plants, cut flowers, beverage and spice crops, tobacco, 
seeds, protein crops as clover, lupines, and alfalfa, fodder and forage products. The fruits and vegetables sector 
contains vegetables, fruits, nuts, potatoes, cassava, and truffles. The ruminants sector includes cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses, and raw milk and wool whereas the non-ruminants sector consists of other animal products as swine, poul-
try, other live animals, and eggs. 
6.2 Development of the MTRI-DS 
How does implementing decoupled support affect the results? In table 5, we compare the effects 
of the deviating GTAP databases (columns 1 to 4) regarding distribution of the SFP for base 
year 2007 (compare table 2). Furthermore, table 5 decomposes the results according to the ef-
fects of payment categories, payment types, different sectors, and the WTO classification 
scheme on the uniform protection equivalent. 
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Table 5. Development of the MTRI-DS for Agricultural Commodities and its Components 
  
PSE04- 
SFPland100 
PSE07- 
SFPland100 
PSE07- 
SFPland90 
PSE07- 
SFPland80 
1. MTRI-DS  3.42 3.66 4.64 5.62 
2. Payment category:     
 
Single commodity transfer 
(SCT) 
2.38 0.75 0.76 0.76 
 
Group commodity transfer 
GCT) 
-0.65 0.30 0.30 0.30 
 All commodity transfer (ACT) 1.68 2.59 2.60 2.61 
 
Other transfer to producers 
(OTP /SFP) 
0.00 0.02 0.99 1.95 
3. Payment type:     
 Output 1.73 0.39 0.39 0.39 
 Input 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.69 
 Land -0.72 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 Labor 0.10 0.18 0.95 1.72 
 Capital 1.58 2.11 2.32 2.54 
4. Primary agricultural commodities:   
 Arable crops -0.70 0.56 0.74 0.93 
 Oilseeds 0.94 0.13 0.23 0.23 
 Other crops 1.96 2.42 2.79 3.15 
 Fruits and vegetables 0.98 1.68 1.96 2.25 
 Ruminants 0.26 -0.66 -0.61 -0.55 
 Non-ruminants -0.02 -0.46 -0.42 -0.38 
5. WTO box classification:     
 Amber box 2.31 0.79 0.78 0.78 
 Blue box -0.60 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 Green Box 1.71 2.61 3.59 4.57 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: GTAP version 8.1, base year 2007. 
The MTRI-DS shows a slight increase of 7% from 3.42 in 2004 to 3.66 in 2007 based on 
growth of the total PSE from 54.583 to 58.674 Mio. € (compare table 1). However, a decrease 
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in MTRI-DS from 2004 to 2007 would be expected to reflect the higher share of decoupled 
support in 2007 because the CAP introduced the SFP in 2005, accounting for 53% (3%) of 
domestic support payments in 2007 (2004).  
As anticipated, the decrease in the degree of decoupling (columns 2 to 4) leads to a rise in 
the MTRI-DS. The integration of the SFP as effectively fully decoupled payments into the 
model results in the smallest uniform protection rate, whereas databases considering the SFP as 
only partially decoupled show a MTRI-DS that is increasing from database PSE07-SFPland90 
to PSE07-SFPland80, which corresponds to an increasing degree of coupling. Thus, the MTRI-
DS reflects the impact on trade restrictiveness of deviating underlying assumptions about the 
SFP.  
The second and third part of table 5 presents the MTRI-DS differentiated into categories and 
types of support. This depiction indicates that the SFP has no effect on the MTRI-DS when 
payments are modeled with a homogeneous rate across commodities allocated to land. 
This decomposition shows that SCT and ACT payments govern the uniform equivalent pro-
tection rate. SCT comprises product-specific subsidies and therefore obviously affects produc-
tion decisions. The effect of the SCT on the MTRI-DS declines from 2.38 (2004) to 0.75 (2007) 
because of the reduction in SCT payments from 18.012 to 4.632 Mio. €. The change in compo-
sition of the SCT away from subsidies based on output or input use strengthens this effect 
(compare table 1).  
6.3 Impact of the payment category and payment type on the MTRI-DS 
The composition of ACT payments explains the impact on the MTRI-DS. In 2004, only 49% 
of ACT payments are allocated to land. Payments to land are expected to have the least effect 
on production, particularly when distributed at a homogeneous rate across all primary agricul-
tural commodities. Furthermore, the contribution of ACT payments to the MTRI-DS rises from 
1.68 (2004) to 2.59 (2007) due to reduced payments allocated to land in favor of payments 
distributed to labor and capital. 
In contrast to ACT, GCT is provided in the form of group-specific subsidies; hence, GCT 
may create higher production incentives. Table 5 displays contrasting effects on the MTRI-DS 
in 2004 compared with 2007. In 2004, contribution to the MTRI-DS is negative, whereas it is 
positive in 2007, although the share of GCT payments shrinks considerably. In 2004, 90% of 
  
22 
 
GCT payments are provided as subsidies based on land. Additionally, the homogeneous distri-
bution across groups of commodities harms all commodities equally and does not boost factor 
re-allocation. Consequently, reducing those payments affects production decisions less than 
SCT and ACT payments affect such decisions. Furthermore, GCT subsidies based on land sub-
stantially decrease in 2007 whereas the distribution to labor clearly increases, which explains 
the reverse effect (0.3) on the MTRI-DS.  
Payment types affect the MTRI-DS differently. Output subsidies apparently create produc-
tion incentives shown by the highest contribution to the MTRI-DS in 2004 (1.73). The substan-
tial removal of output subsidies until 2007 explains the reduced contribution in 2007. The de-
termined effect for intermediate inputs is almost the same in 2004 as in 2007. According to the 
PSE tables, product-specific input subsidies are reduced considerably, followed by moderate 
decreases of input subsidies in the GCT category and only a slight reduction in the ACT cate-
gory. However, the contribution of intermediate inputs to the overall MTRI-DS diminishes only 
slightly. Payments given to capital largely decrease, whereas the effect on the MTRI-DS in-
creases. These results support the conclusion that payment types other than land have become 
more important. 
6.4 Decomposition of the MTRI-DS according to sectoral contributions 
The fourth part of table 5 shows a decomposition of the overall change in the MTRI-DS ac-
cording to sectoral contribution. Clearly, the other crops sector has the greatest effect on the 
MTRI-DS. Its importance even increases from 2004 to 2007 due to a rise in domestic support 
payments involving growth of capital- and labor-based payments that exceed the decreases in 
output subsidies. However, the sector for fruits and vegetables also reveals a significant effect 
on the MTRI-DS that increases considerably from 0.98 to 1.68. Domestic support in this sector 
is three times as high in 2007 as in 2004, which explains the increase, particularly because 
payments based on output, capital, and labor rise. The effects of the arable crop sector also 
grow, although the total amount of subsidies declines from € 30.245 million to € 19.794 mil-
lion.3 However, in 2004, the decomposition reports a negative number for arable crops. A neg-
ative contribution to the MTRI-DS implies that an import subsidy, export tax or a combination 
                                               
3 Table 1 shows the aggregated PSE values according to payment categories and types. Sector-specific PSE values 
are not presented in this article.  
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of these policy instruments is required to keep the volume of net imports constant. In 2004, 
96% of the subsidies for arable crops are allocated based on land and only 0.1% are output 
subsidies. Furthermore, no more than 8% are product-specific subsidies. Removing these sub-
sidies would imply a decrease in the value of exports that is less than the increase in the value 
of imports. Consequently, an import subsidy, an export tax or a combination of these policy 
instruments is required to keep net trade volume constant. In 2007, the share of payments allo-
cated based on land clearly decreased, thereby necessitating an import tariff, an export subsidy 
or a combination of these policy instruments to fix the net trade volume by inducing a positive 
MTRI-DS.  
By contrast, the contribution of oilseeds decreases from 0.94 in 2004 to only 0.13 in 2007 
due to a decrease of domestic support of -50%; in particular, product-specific subsidies allo-
cated on output are lowered. Additionally, the livestock sectors, in particular, show reduced 
trade restrictiveness. In 2007, both the ruminants and non-ruminants sectors even display a 
negative contribution to the uniform protection rate. The results for the sector of cattle, goats, 
sheep and horses demonstrate that this sector is highly subsidized. In 2004, 82% of domestic 
support is distributed-product specific, of which 98% is allocated based on capital. This result 
supports our assumption that this sector is highly trade restrictive. Nevertheless, removing do-
mestic support leads to a decrease in export values that exceeds the increase in import values, 
which yields a negative MTRI-DS and implies the need for an import subsidy, an export tax or 
a combination of these policy instruments to maintain an unchanged net import volume. We 
observe such a discrepancy because the import volume of the downstream sectors, such as meat 
products, substantially increased. 
6.5 Aggregation effects on the MTRI-DS 
Table 6 emphasizes the impact of sectoral aggregation on the MTRI-DS. The first column 
shows the effects explained in the previous sections, whereas the second column illustrates the 
uniform protection rate that is necessary to keep the net import volume of all food commodities 
constant to account for forward linkages. This net import equivalent clearly varies depending 
on the aggregation. The deviations are induced by changes in the downstream sectors because 
the removal of domestic support leads to higher input prices. In so doing, eliminating subsidies 
given to the livestock sector results in reduced output, higher market prices and, consequently, 
decreased exports and increased imports.  
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Thus, downstream sectors, such as meat products, are faced with higher input prices that 
cause market prices for meat products to rise and results in increased meat imports and reduc-
tions in the livestock inputs used in the meat industry. Consequently, a simulation that also 
retains the import volume of the forward-linked sectors yields an MTRI-DS for livestock that 
is positive; therefore, the trade restrictiveness of subsidies given to livestock producers is nota-
ble. 
Table 6. Impact of the Sectoral Aggregation on the MTRI-DS in 2007 
 
Primary agricultural 
commodities 
Food commodities 
MTRI-DS 3.66 1.97 
Decomposition of results:   
All crops:   
Arable crops 0.56 0.04 
Oilseeds 0.13 0.46 
Other crops 2.42 0.64 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 0.33 
Livestock:   
Ruminants -0.66 0.40 
Non-ruminants -0.46 0.11 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1 adapted to PSE07-SFPland100 as described in Table 2. 
6.6 Decomposition of the MTRI-DS according to the WTO classification scheme 
The last part of table 5 shows the results of the reconciliation of PSE data with the WTO clas-
sification scheme. Here, the achievement of the CAP reform in lowering the trade-distortive 
effects of domestic support is evident. In our representation, the amber box comprises only non-
exempt direct payments. The highly trade-distortive amber box support decreases substantially 
from 2004 to 2007, which is reflected in a decline of the contribution to the MTRI-DS from 
2.31 to 0.79. Furthermore, the EU cut payments classified as blue box support. However, in 
table 5 the contribution of blue box support to the overall MTRI-DS changes from -0.6 to 0.26. 
The effect of the removal of domestic support on forward linkages as described for the livestock 
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and meat sector in the previous paragraph explains this result. The trade-distortive effect of 
green box support increases from 1.71 to 2.61. Our application of the MTRI-DS reveals that 
payments assigned to the green box other than the SFP have a clear effect on trade. In 2004, the 
green box includes 32% of the PSE budgetary transfers, of which 9% are SFP, whereas in 2007, 
the green box increases to 84% of the PSE budgetary transfers and 66% of these are now SFP. 
Non-SFP green box support based on the PSE increased by more than 6% from 2004 to 2007. 
Green box payments other than SFP are modeled in GTAP by their PSE category, and the PSE 
concept distinguishes policy instruments according to their production requirement. ACT con-
tains most of the non-SFP green box payments. Only half of these payments are distributed to 
land whereas the other half is provided as mainly capital, labor and input subsidies. They attract 
more capital, labor and intermediate inputs to be employed in the agricultural sector and are 
trade distorting, as a consequence. The rise from 2004 to 2007 can therefore be traced back to 
substantial growth of green box payments allocated to output, capital, and labor. 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
The objective of this article is to provide a theoretically sound index that enables the evaluation 
of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments and the application of this index in a 
CGE framework. Specifically, we build on the work of Anderson and Neary (2005) to derive 
an index based on their MTRI. We name our index MTRI-DS and implement it in the GTAP 
framework. The adopted model is an extended version of the GTAP framework that considers 
domestic support payments in detail and includes a reconciled representation of two important 
measures of domestic support payments: the PSE concept and the WTO classification scheme. 
We employ this framework to determine the tariff equivalent of EU domestic support payments 
while accounting for the general equilibrium effects, including all intersectoral linkages and 
interdependencies with world markets.  
This tariff equivalent of domestic support payments is appropriate for comparing different 
protection policies, such as import tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support payments. 
The simulation results reveal that domestic support payments in the EU (3.66) are more trade 
restrictive than import tariffs (2.98) or export subsidies (0.29). Hence, our new MTRI-DS al-
lows a rating of the trade-distortive effect of different protection instruments based on quanti-
tative results. Furthermore, the resulting uniform protection rate demonstrates the development 
of domestic support payments in the EU over time, including the effect of the implementation 
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of decoupled support. Our MTRI-DS tracks changes in the composition of CAP policy instru-
ments and is therefore suited to assess the effect of policy reforms. Additionally, our MTRI-DS 
allows evaluation of policy reforms with respect to their contribution to meeting WTO require-
ments. In other words, the MTRI-DS helps to assess the effect of countries’ policy reforms over 
time, indicating a movement toward less-distortive policy instruments, and is therefore suited 
to support trade negotiations. Finally, the MTRI-DS figures are meaningful for comparisons 
across countries.   
Our MTRI is thus useful for policy analysis in which the relevancies of different policy 
instruments are considered and compared, such as in simulations to analyze WTO negotiations, 
which requires a comparison of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments, other 
protection instruments for market access, and export subsidies.  
Although this index already operates as an effective tool for analyzing domestic support 
payments, it also provides a springboard for further research. The PSE concept classifies do-
mestic support payments according to production requirements and thus results in a higher 
trade-distortive effect than does green box support under the WTO framework. Our current 
method of incorporating non-SFP green box payments based on the PSE into the GTAP model 
is clearly trade distorting and might, as a result, overestimate the effect on trade. De Gorter, 
Ingko and Nash (2004), however, refer to the definition of trade-distorting measures in the AoA, 
noting that not all policy instruments are appropriately categorized by their production require-
ments, which leads to underemphasized green box support. Consequently, delving deeper into 
the definition and quantification of trade-distorting measures would help to reveal whether our 
representation of non-SFP green box support correctly reproduces the non-SFP green box in 
terms of distortions.  
Second, aggregation bias can change the results and might, therefore, cause an over- or un-
derestimation of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments. In fact, in our analysis, 
we detect such an aggregation bias. The results clearly demonstrate that the MTRI-DS is af-
fected by the inclusion of forward-linked sectors. Therefore, focusing future research on ana-
lyzing the effect of sectoral aggregation on the MTRI-DS would lead to improvements in the 
validation of results.  
In the CGE application, we shift the focus toward producer subsidies, ignoring the potential 
implications of changes in consumer subsidies, although we theoretically derive the MTRI-DS 
from the import volume function, depending on consumer and producer prices. This derivation 
is based on the theoretical approach of Anderson and Neary (2005) and Lloyd and MacLaren 
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(2010). The reason to exclude consumer subsidies is the modeling of households as one repre-
sentative household in the GTAP model, which makes the model inappropriate for analyzing 
the effects of consumer support. This exclusion provides another interesting avenue for future 
research, as embedding consumer subsidies into the analysis would afford the model more ap-
plicability.  
The focus of the MTRI approach and subsequently our MTRI-DS is on foreign trade, 
whereas the implications for welfare and other effects within a country are not covered. Elimi-
nating domestic support reduces government spending whereas introducing the uniform tariff 
rate creates additional tax revenue in our application. Thus, this forces the question of how 
much this increase in government income affects production, consumption, and welfare. Elab-
orating a comparison of our MTRI-DS and the TRI of domestic distortion (Anderson and Neary, 
2005) following the GTAP application of Salvatici (2001) for the EU would therefore complete 
the assessment of the impact of domestic support payments. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1. Regional Aggregation of the GTAP Database 
Countries and Regions Abbreviation 
1 EU: EU25 
 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, United King-
dom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania 
 
2 Rest of the World: ROW 
 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Romania, Swit-
zerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Croatia, China, India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Panama, Rest of South America, Rest of Oceania, Rest of  Caribbean, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Hong Kong, Korea, Rest of East Asia, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Rest of Central America, Belarus, 
Rest of Eastern Europe, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Rest of Western 
Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa, Rest of South African CU, 
Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Rest of  Southeast 
Asia, Bangladesh, Rest of South Asia, Nigeria, Senegal, Rest of Western Africa, 
Rest of Central Africa, Rest of South Central Africa, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Ma-
lawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Other Eastern Africa, Taiwan, 
Rest of North America, Russian Federation, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Rest of 
FSU, Azerbaijan, Iran Islamic Republic, Ukraine, Mongolia, Nepal, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Bahrein, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab. 
Emirates, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Kenia, 
Rwanda, Namibia 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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Table A 2 Sectoral Aggregation of the GTAP Database 
Sectors Abbreviation 
1 Paddy rice pdr 
2 Wheat wht 
3 Cereal grains nec gro 
4 Vegetables, fruits, nuts v_f 
5 Oilseeds osd 
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet c_b 
7 Plant-based fibres pfb 
8 Crops nec ocr 
9 Cattle, sheep, goats, horses ctl 
10 Animal products nec oap 
11 Raw milk rmk 
12 Wool, silk worm cocoons wol 
13 Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, hoarses cmt 
14 Meat products nec omt 
15 Vegetable oils and fats vol 
16 Dairy products mil 
17 Processed rice pcr 
18 Sugar sgr 
19 Other food ofd 
20 Beverages and tobacco products b_t 
21 Manufacturing: Mnfc 
 
Coal, oil, gas, petroleum, coal products, Forestry, fishing, minerals, Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, paper products, publish-
ing, chemical, rubber, plastic prods, mineral products nec, ferrous metals, 
metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment, 
electronic equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures nec  
22 Services: Services 
 
Water, construction, trade, transport nec, sea transport, air transport, com-
munication, financial services nec, insurance, business services nec, recrea-
tion and other services, PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat, dwellings 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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Table A 3. Effects of an Elimination of Domestic Support Payments in the EU 
 
Output 
EU  
imports 
EU 
exports 
Domestic 
prices 
World mar-
ket prices 
pdr -21.85 52.37 -64.78 12.53 0.71 
wht -3.68 24.15 -21.11 3.70 1.24 
gro -1.82 5.25 -6.52 3.40 0.85 
v_f -2.16 5.73 -6.64 2.91 0.77 
osd -3.71 4.80 -9.58 2.95 0.84 
c_b -0.15 3.79 -3.90 1.41 0.56 
pfb -20.35 26.20 -51.35 17.25 0.91 
ocr -2.40 8.77 -10.29 2.74 1.35 
ctl -4.21 38.30 -29.04 10.92 2.31 
oap -1.58 4.31 -5.21 2.98 0.84 
rmk -0.70 5.39 -19.10 3.48 1.14 
wol -16.90 2.65 -18.90 2.16 0.43 
cmt -4.81 22.74 -22.55 4.18 0.94 
omt -1.58 10.82 -9.74 1.73 0.78 
vol -2.43 3.63 -5.80 1.36 0.47 
mil -0.67 4.27 -3.70 0.96 0.59 
pcr -1.99 5.50 -7.12 2.09 0.46 
sgr -0.21 -0.20 0.00 0.29 0.28 
ofd -0.49 0.73 -0.99 0.57 0.35 
b_t -0.22 0.31 -0.39 0.45 0.31 
Mnfc 0.20 -0.33 0.47 0.07 0.13 
Services 0.04 -0.22 0.28 0.06 0.13 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
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Table A 4. Effect of the Initial Protection on the Results of the MTRI-DS 
Protection reduced by  default increased by 
 100% 50%  50% 100% 
Primary agricultural com-
modities 
3.51 3.59 3.66 3.71 3.73 
All crops:      
Arable crops 0.72 0.64 0.56 0.47 0.37 
Oilseeds 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.20 
Other crops 2.17 2.30 2.42 2.53 2.63 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.67 1.65 
Lifestock:      
Ruminants -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 
Non-ruminants -0.46 -0.47 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1, base year 2007, PSE 2007, SFP allocated 100% to land. In addition, the validation of 
results requires an analysis of the implications of changes in the underlying border protection, because of the 
modeling of the MTRI-DS. We implement the MTRI-DS in the price linkage equations for exports and imports. 
In the price linkage equation for imports (13) the market price is determined.  
 
(13)    1 1 dsm i cifp p     
The multiplication of the specific tariff rate  1 i with the uniform protection rate  1
ds might lead to an effect 
of the initial tariff rate on the MTRI-DS. Hence, we conduct a second sensitivity analysis where import tariffs and 
export subsidies are decreased (increased) for all traded commodities by 50% and 100% to validate the impact of 
varying initial protection data. This analysis reveals that the impact on results is rather modest. 
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Table A 5. Effect of the Elasticity of Substitution on the Results of the MTRI-DS 
Elasticity of substitution Reduced by 
50% default 
Increased by 
50% 
esubm = 
esubd 
Primary agricultural commodi-
ties 3.70 3.66 3.54 3.70 
All crops:     
Arable crops 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.47 
Oilseeds 0.24 0.13 0.05 0.25 
Other crops 2.55 2.42 2.35 2.58 
Fruits and vegetables 1.64 1.68 1.71 1.55 
Lifestock:     
Ruminants -0.71 -0.66 -0.66 -0.68 
Non-ruminants -0.56 -0.46 -0.44 -0.47 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1, base year 2007, PSE 2007, SFP allocated 100% to land. Applying the concept of the 
MTRI-DS in a CGE framework, we are concerned about the Armington assumption. Therefore, we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis to assess the effect of the elasticity of substitution on the MTRI-DS. We distinguish between 
two cases in this sensitivity analysis. First, the nested case, where the elasticity of substitution among sources of 
imports (ESUBM) is equal to two times the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
(ESUBD), which is the default option in the standard GTAP model. We increase (decrease) the elasticity of sub-
stitution for 50% in this nested structure. Second, we assume a non-nested case, where ESUBM is equal to ESUBD 
(Francois and Reinert 1997). The results confirm minor impact for most of the commodities, although the direction 
varies between sectors. Oilseeds are much more sensible than other commodities.  
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
Industrialized economies, criticized for their trade-distorting domestic support provided to ag-
ricultural producers, initiated several reforms of their agricultural policies to fulfill World Trade 
Organization (WTO) domestic support reduction criteria. By contrast, emerging countries just 
have started to expand their agricultural domestic support programs and are still far from ex-
ceeding their WTO commitment levels. This disparity indicates that domestic support remains 
a significant topic of debate in trade negotiations. 
In addition, the literature reveals an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which policy 
instruments that are supposedly decoupled from farm-level output decisions still create produc-
tion incentives. These production stimulating effects stem from other coupling channels such 
as uncertainty, imperfect credit, land and labor markets, and farmer’s expectations about future 
payments. Therefore, the extent to which decoupled support capitalizes in land rents remain 
unclear, and analyses of domestic support effects need to rely on assumptions, expert opinion 
and the best available estimates. 
Analyses of multilateral trade liberalization are commonly conducted using Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) models. Methodologies to analyze the effects of market access 
policies and their restrictiveness to trade are sophisticated and well established, whereas the 
detailed representation of different and country-specific domestic support payments, and in par-
ticular decoupled payments, has received only little attention to date. 
With regard to these shortcomings of CGE modeling and analyses of domestic support, this 
thesis achieves the following methodological advances:  
1. Development of the standard GTAP database and model into an extended CGE model-
ing framework that represents domestic support payments at a very detailed level. This 
detailed coverage of domestic support payments accounts for different payment types, 
such as payments given on the basis of output, input and factor use, and different pay-
ment categories specifying particular production requirements that regulate the eligibil-
ity for support. Reconciliation of the OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) data in 
the underlying database with the WTO amber, blue, and green box support classification 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
145 
scheme, which enables both of these important measures of domestic support payments 
to be present simultaneously in the GTAP database and model.  
2. Introduction of a complex updating procedure to systematically modify the assumptions 
regarding production incentives induced by, e.g., decoupled payments that underlie the 
database and model.  
3. Derivation of a theory-based index and its integration into the extended GTAP modeling 
framework to measure the trade restrictiveness of domestic support in a single number. 
This index therefore enables the comparison of distortions caused by domestic support 
across policy instruments, regions and over time. 
This comprehensive and elaborate CGE modeling framework is generally applicable to an-
alyze the effects on industry and trade structure, and welfare, and also the distortions caused by 
countries’ domestic support payments. The applicability and relevance of this extended model-
ing framework is validated by applying this approach to analyze the effects of domestic support 
payments, particularly decoupled payments, taking the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 
the European Union (EU) as an example. This concluding chapter first summarizes and dis-
cusses the main findings that answer the posed empirical research questions in chapter 1. Sec-
ond, this chapter compares the extended GTAP modeling framework with other CGE modeling 
frameworks and comments on the way decoupled payments are introduced in applied models, 
and data availability. Finally, this section provides an outlook regarding future research.   
5.1 Discussion of the empirical results 
Based on the EU CAP, this thesis discusses the effect of different assumptions about the degree 
of decoupling of support payments and the corresponding modeling on policy simulation results 
at the national and global level. Therefore, this thesis simulates the effects of either a removal 
of decoupled support – the EU Single Farm Payment (SFP) - or total domestic support pay-
ments. Applying the extended GTAP modeling framework and complex domestic support up-
dating procedure, the assumptions about the support payment’s degree of decoupling in the 
underlying GTAP database are systematically altered. This updating procedure gradually re-
duces the share of decoupled support allocated to labor and capital and moves this amount to 
land. This way, the procedure creates a set of databases that covers the range of decoupled 
support allocated according to the factor usage with a homogeneous rate across commodities 
up to decoupled support distributed at a homogeneous rate across commodities to land. 
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In general, the results clearly indicate that the assumption about a support payment’s degree 
of decoupling and its modeling is an important determinant of policy simulation results. The 
higher the degree of decoupling is, the lower the effects on factor relocation, industry output, 
trade and welfare. If the payment is fully decoupled, it causes no effects.  
1. At EU member state level, the effect on industry output, trade and welfare diminishes 
with an increasing degree of decoupling. The extent of these effects clearly depends on 
the ratio of the SFP to the production value. In addition, the factor reallocation from less 
competitive to more efficient agricultural sectors, manufacturing and services explains 
why the output changes across sectors are affected differently in EU member states. The 
majority of countries reveals a decrease in output. Regarding the trade balance, all EU 
member states show a decrease in the share of agricultural exports to imports. Accord-
ingly, the aggregated EU exhibits decreased agricultural output, an increased negative 
trade balance for agricultural and food commodities, and an increase in welfare. 
2. The analysis of trade liberalization including domestic support turns out to be highly 
sensitive to the mode through which decoupled support is integrated and modeled in a 
CGE framework. These assumptions significantly affect the results and thus clearly 
matter for international trade analysis particularly in developing countries. The variance 
of the results measured across regions considerably increases with a decrease in the 
degree of decoupling. It becomes apparent, that the degree of decoupling significantly 
influences the results for net-food exporters of agricultural commodities, in particular 
developing countries. Depending on the EU SFP’s degree of decoupling, the effects on 
results are four or five times as high when domestic support payments are removed. The 
impact of the degree of decoupling is lower in net-food importing countries. Removing 
EU domestic support payments causes welfare gains in net-food exporting countries and 
welfare losses in net-food importing countries. The effect on welfare diminishes by up 
to 80% with an increasing degree of decoupling.  
3. The MTRI of domestic support payments reveals that the degree of trade distortion 
caused by the EU CAP is considerably affected by the extent to which the SFP is capi-
talized in land rents. The index value increases with a decrease in the degree of decou-
pling. The evaluation of the development over time indicates a movement towards less 
trade distorting CAP instruments. Thus, this analysis demonstrates that the MTRI of 
domestic distortions captures changes in the composition of CAP policy instruments 
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and is thus suited to assess the effect of such policy reforms and their impacts on trade 
distortion. 
Because the impact of the degree of decoupling of payments, such as the SFP, is not yet 
empirically known, expert knowledge and the best available estimates determine the assump-
tions about a support payment’s degree of decoupling in trade analysis. The use of estimates 
might lead to over- or underestimation caused by the effect of domestic support payments. To 
overcome this problem, this thesis delivers insights into the effects of removing domestic sup-
port payments, considering the entire range of underlying assumptions about the degree of de-
coupling. Therefore, this analysis helps to validate results by providing a range for the actual 
impact. The results, furthermore, highlight the importance of incorporating detailed domestic 
support payments with regard to the specific production requirements that regulate the eligibil-
ity for support in CGE modeling frameworks. 
Besides accounting for the effect of different assumptions of a country’s decoupled support, 
this updating procedure can also be applied to consider differences in the eligibility criteria of 
countries’ policy instruments that are classified in the same PSE category. 
5.2 Discussion of the extended GTAP modeling framework  
5.2.1 Extensions to include detailed domestic support payments 
The elaborate procedure to extend the GTAP modeling framework enables the integration of 
domestic support payments at a very detailed level, distinguishing different PSE payment cat-
egories and types according to their effect on farm-level output decisions. In addition, this thesis 
introduces two different options of modeling decoupled support. Option 1 models this payment 
category as a homogenous subsidy rate given to primary agricultural commodities that is dis-
tributed solely according to the factor land and reflects effectively full decoupling in the GTAP 
model and database. Only primary agricultural sectors employ land and furthermore, the supply 
of land is pre-determined. Therefore, a subsidy distributed at a homogenous rate to land in the 
GTAP model shows the same supply response as if the subsidy were abolished. By contrast, 
option 2 distributes decoupled support at a homogenous rate across primary agricultural com-
modities to land, labor, and capital and enables a general link to production without facilitating 
the production of a specific commodity and thus is partially decoupled. The literature includes 
several analyses proceeding in similar ways. However, the assumptions according to the under-
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lying degree of decoupling differ significantly. The standard GTAP database and model cur-
rently represents decoupled support as partially decoupled, which therefore significantly stim-
ulates production, whereas other models treat decoupled support as fully decoupled.  
Other approaches incorporate decoupled support in the form of direct income support mod-
eled as a lump sum transfer given to households. To implement such an approach, the domestic 
subsidies need to be allocated within the social accounting matrix (SAM). Corresponding stud-
ies in the literature primarily use single country CGE models or address only a specific region 
of a multi-regional CGE model because data from statistical- and household surveys need to be 
reconciled. Such approaches require the processing of huge amounts of country-specific data 
and disaggregate farm households and thus appear to be inappropriate for integrating domestic 
support payments for all countries in a multi-regional model that, in this particular case, depicts 
only one representative household. Such a global multi-regional model requires a correspond-
ing general approach that is applicable to all countries. 
These differences in modeling decoupled payments emphasize the potential relevance to ac-
count for the effect of different assumptions about the support payment’s degree of decoupling 
in the underlying database on policy simulation results when analyzing domestic support. 
The empirical analysis focusses on the EU CAP. In recent years, the EU has pioneered to 
push support policies towards sustainable development, environmental protection, nature con-
servation and rural development, which are referred to as second pillar instruments of the CAP. 
Global CGE models, such as the GTAP model, are less suitable for analyzing the very region-
specific effects of second pillar policy instruments. An exception is the Modular Applied GeN-
eral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET)1 that is highly specialized in modeling EU CAP policy in-
struments. This thesis aims at an assessment of domestic support in a CGE modeling framework 
that is general and applicable to other countries. Due to the extreme region specificity of the 
EU CAP second pillar measures this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The centerpiece of this thesis is a consistent modeling and integration procedure to represent 
detailed domestic support payments in the standard GTAP modeling framework using the EU 
PSE data as an example. This approach can be extended to update the domestic support pay-
                                                 
1
 MAGNET based on the standard GTAP model and database. Detailed information regarding the extension of 
GTAP provided by MAGNET are available from: https://www.wageningenur.nl/de/Publicatie-details.htm?publi-
cationId=publication-way-343535383037 
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ments of other countries and therefore enables a sophisticated and comparable analysis of coun-
tries’ domestic support. In addition, this approach can be transferred to other CGE modeling 
frameworks based on OECD PSE data. The extended modeling framework developed in this 
thesis is generally subject to the availability of OECD PSE data. The OECD PSE concept is a 
well-established and widely used measure of domestic support. The OECD provides PSE data 
for 14 OECD member countries and 7 other, in particular, emerging countries covering the 
period 1986 to 2013. In addition, other organizations such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank have just started to apply this well-documented approach to provide PSE data for, e.g., 
Central- and South America. Several applied CGE model databases incorporate OECD PSE 
data, such as the GTAP database.  
5.2.2 MTRI of domestic support payments 
To analyze the possible outcome of WTO multilateral trade negotiations, the approach devel-
oped in this thesis introduces additional policy instruments into the GTAP model that enable 
the relocation of domestic support payments according to the WTO classification schemes. 
Thus, this approach results in a complex structure of domestic support payments representing 
both important measures of domestic support.  
Although both measures (OECD PSE concept and WTO classification scheme) are well 
suited to quantify the amount of support, they fail to measure the level of trade distortion due 
to aggregation problems. To overcome this problem, this thesis further develops a theoretically 
sound index measuring the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments and integrates it 
into the extended GTAP model. This index enables the evaluation of domestic support consid-
ering different policy instruments over time and allows cross-country comparison. As a result, 
the extended modeling framework developed is much more suitable for analyzing agricultural 
policy reforms or the impact of WTO negotiations than other CGE models. This modeling 
framework quantifies the effects caused by domestic support on industry output and trade and 
the redistribution of welfare considering much more detailed domestic policy instruments and 
their requirements regarding production, which trigger the eligibility for specific subsidies. In 
addition, this framework quantifies the level of trade restrictiveness of domestic support pay-
ments, and thus allows a rating of the trade-distorting effects from different protection instru-
ments. The resulting uniform protection rate can furthermore be used to evaluate the develop-
ment of domestic support payments over time and can capture changes in the composition of 
policy instruments. The MTRI of domestic support payments provides an appealing measure to 
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evaluate the effects of policy reforms, and thus might be of particular use in the support of trade 
negotiations.  
5.3 Final remark and future research 
The focus of this thesis lies on the methodological extensions of the GTAP modeling frame-
work to generally capture domestic support payments on a very detailed level and to integrate 
a new index, the MTRI of domestic support payments to provide a sophisticated tool for the 
evaluation of policy reforms. The EU CAP serves as a prime example to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the methods developed here. The multitude of different policy instruments, and in 
particular the SFP with its still empirically unclear effect on production, highlights the extent 
to which policy analysis results, such as on industry and trade structure, and on the redistribu-
tion of welfare, are affected by different assumptions about the degree of decoupling of support 
payments. In addition, the MTRI of domestic support payments clearly shows that an increasing 
support payment’s degree of decoupling decreases the restrictiveness to trade. Accordingly, this 
operational approach helps to complete the tools for multilateral trade policy impact analysis 
accounting for market access policies, export subsidies, and domestic support payments. 
Such a detailed representation of domestic support payments in the GTAP modeling frame-
work creates the required prerequisites to facilitate a much more in-depth analysis of the level 
of trade distortions. This framework enables a comparison across countries and across the de-
velopment of a country’s domestic support over time, and thus provides scope for future re-
search. 
Several high-income countries have reformed the support they provided to agricultural pro-
ducers, whereas emerging countries such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa have started 
to expand their support programs. Accordingly, to analyze the effect of multilateral trade liber-
alization, it would be worthwhile to extend this analysis to cover at least all countries providing 
a significant amount of domestic support with a particular focus on uncertain assumptions re-
garding payments’ impact on farm-level output decisions. 
The focus of this thesis is on budgetary transfers. In the standard GTAP model, market price 
support is implicitly included via border measures. EU market price support has significantly 
decreased in recent years, and thus is, in the case of the EU, negligible. However, emerging 
countries, such as China, predominantly use market price support to stimulate agricultural pro-
duction. Thus, an analysis of Chinese domestic support effects would require the integration of 
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market price support into the approach. Therefore, a supplementary sub-module that singles out 
market price support in the GTAP model considering intervention prices is required. The ex-
tension to depict market price support enables the computation of the total Aggregate Measure-
ment of Support (AMS), a measure that is used by the WTO to set a limit on countries’ domestic 
support. The availability of such as measure would then facilitate the analysis of effects when 
countries, such as China, start to exhaust their limit of domestic support.  
This thesis analyzes the effect of domestic support in isolation from effects caused by other 
protection instruments, such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or export subsidies. The impact of 
country-specific border measures might affect the gain or loss resulting from removing EU 
domestic support payments and thus might affect the impact of domestic support payments in 
the conducted analyses. An analysis evaluating the extent to which countries’ border measures 
weaken or boost the effect caused by other countries’ domestic support would therefore be 
highly interesting. In addition, an analysis also considering countries’ border measures would 
contribute to the discussion of whether policy reforms, such as the reforms of the EU CAP, are 
coherent with development objectives.  
The sensitivity analysis examining the extent to which the underlying protection data and 
the elasticity of substitution affect the MTRI of domestic support payments reveals rather un-
interesting results. By contrast, a first analysis of the impact of the sectoral aggregation of prod-
ucts included in the MTRI of domestic support points out that the index is affected by the in-
clusion of forward-linked sectors. Therefore, focusing future research on analyzing aggregation 
effects would improve the validation of results.  
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Appendix 
Mathematical appendix to chapter 4 
 
The MTRI-DS developed in chapter 4 is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), : 1 , 1 1 , 1 ,ds p c ds ds p c p cp p M M M p pτ τ pi τ pi τ pi τ pi      + + = + + =        
with: 
dsτ  Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index of domestic support, uniform 
tariff 
pi  World market price 
pτ  Rate of producer distortion 
cτ  Rate of consumer distortion 
( )1p pp τ pi= +  Domestic producer price 
( )1c cp τ pi= +  Domestic consumer price 
M Import volume 
 
The MTRI, M, is defined implicitly by the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( )' , ' 1 ,m p u m M p upi pi∆ = ∆ +    
 
Be definition net import demand m is given by the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )i i im p d p s p= −  
 
The demand d and supply s for the good are functions of all prices p: 
 
i i i
j j j
m d s
p p p
∂ ∂ ∂
= −
∂ ∂ ∂  
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Assuming that there are no other trade policies in place, the distorted domestic producer price 
is given for commodity i  by ( )1p pi i ip τ pi= + , where piτ  is the rate of producer distortions. 
However, the distorted domestic consumer price is given by ( )1c ci i ip τ pi= + , where ciτ  is the 
rate of consumer distortions. If p ci i 0τ = τ = , there are no distortions. If a tariff it  is the only 
border measure for a good, then p ci i itτ = τ =  
 
The loss of the value of imports from the free trade situation for a small country is given as: 
 
Partial equilibrium approach, ignoring cross price effects: 
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General equilibrium approach: 
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Where M  is a ( )n xn  symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix of the partial derivatives of 
the import demand functions ( ),m p u that are income-compensated, thus 1 2
2 1
m m
p p
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
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Using this approach to determine the MTRI-DS according to the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' 1 , 1 ' 1 , 1p c p c ds dsm p p m mpi pi τ pi τ pi pi τ pi τ pi       ∆ = ∆ + + = ∆ + +         
We can derive the general equilibrium form of the MTRI-DS: 
( ) ( )
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enlarge with: ;
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to finally obtain: 
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